FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QVARTERLY REVIEW

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VOL·42 NO·3

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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The building is 680 feet in length (a very long par three on any golf course). It's 200 feet wide (forty more than a football field), and from the stark beauty of the ten-story-high canopy entrance to the wide scope of the domed pavilion at the rear, it expresses one thing very clearly: *tomorrow!*

A high spot of the Futurama is a ride that surrounds you with wonders. In an unforgettable experience, you'll be carried through time and space—through desert and jungle—to polar regions and across the ocean floor. In a single day this dramatic ride can accommodate 70,000 people—the entire population, for instance, of Muncie, Indiana, or Boulder, Colorado.

Also, in the Futurama's Avenue of Progress, you'll see the newest sources of power described and demonstrated in fascinating ways. And you'll learn how GM scientists are putting atomic power to work for both peace and defense use. At the Futurama you can visit a host of other colorful displays designed to attract, interest and challenge the imagination of every member of your family.

Futurama, in an inspiring way, symbolizes the progress of GM. And the major reason behind this progress is people—*the people of General Motors.*

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

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

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

Unfortunately, they wouldn't let us build it

Oh, well. Even if our new terminal at New York's John F. Kennedy Airport doesn't quite rival the Taj, it's still a splendid indication of how we feel about our passengers.

Not to be immodest, we might say it's also an indication of how our passengers feel about *us*. After all, if it hadn't been for the widespread success of our transatlantic service over the past few years, we wouldn't have had the occasion for a new terminal at all.

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

"Like most executives, I didn't think I was wealthy enough to set up trusts for Janet and the children now. I knew I wasn't what they call a 'Man of Property' with extensive personal investments in stocks and bonds or real estate.

"Then my banker showed me their booklet, 'Financial Planning for Management Men,' and I realized my estate was potentially a sizeable one. When I added the value of my deferred benefits —*group life insurance, pension and profit sharing arrangements*—to the value of our house, cash, securities, and ordinary life insurance, the total came close to three hundred thousand dollars.

"The booklet made the point that my kind of plan, with everything to my wife, not only would subject my estate to maximum taxes, but would also create investment and administrative headaches for Janet.

"My attorney, working with one of the Bank's trust officers, set up a Pilot Trust into which all my deferred benefits and my ordinary life insurance would go. Our home, cash in bank and personal effects go directly to my wife, but all the rest flows into the Pilot Trust where it is split into marital and non-marital trusts to take advantage of favorable provisions in the tax laws. The big advantages of a Pilot Trust are that it coordinates estate and investment planning for my family, puts all my assets under one roof, and reduces taxes and estate expenses. The potential tax savings would be as high as thirty-six thousand dollars. As my estate grows, the savings could be a lot more! And I can change my Pilot Trust at any time.

"But what's really reassuring is that Janet and the children would enjoy the benefits of competent investment service under uniform management and, at the same time, have considerate attention given to their changing financial needs by The Bank of New York."

The Bank of New York would be pleased to address any group of corporate executives interested in this idea. Also you may wish to receive a new, 24-page booklet which fully analyzes today's Management Man's financial and estate problems and offers a complete explanation of what a Pilot Trust is, how it is set up and what it can achieve. It also includes a comprehensive Financial Inventory Form. Just write to Financial Planning, Dept. K, The Bank of New York, 48 Wall Street, New York, New York 10015.

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What is it that can travel over water, land, mud and ice and may make the wheel obsolete?

It's been called a "GEM" (for Ground Effect Machine). It's been called a "Hovercraft." It's been called an "Air Cushion Vehicle." And it's a little hard to say whether it flies low or rides high.

But Republic Aviation has just concluded a licensing agreement to develop, produce and sell these revolutionary machines that travel on a cushion of air over any kind of surface, wet or dry.

Gas turbine engines provide air cushion

One of the most publicized GEM's already built has done commuter service on a test basis, carrying 24 passengers across Dee Estuary on Britain's North Wales coast, over sandbars and shoals where no boat could operate. Called the VA-3, it's a 4-engine 12-ton version that can handle about 2 tons of cargo. It hovers 12 inches over the surface on a cushion of air provided by two of its gas turbine engines, while the other two provide propulsion.

A variety of high-speed go-anywhere craft for industry and the military

Similar but more advanced versions of the GEM are expected to operate easily at speeds over 150 mph. Republic's prototype model will be equipped to ride three feet off the surface to clear waves or obstacles, and further development will produce models that can clear six to eight-foot obstacles. Consider then, what the GEM's capabilities might be . . .

- ☐ As a military landing craft, thundering in from over the horizon and right up onto the beach to park and unload—
- ☐ As an offshore oil-rig tender, carrying drillpipe, supplies and personnel over tidewater marshes, mud flats and open sea with equal ease—and without any dock—
- ☐ As an airport or harbor vehicle for police and rescue work—
- ☐ As a high-speed arctic exploration craft, unhampered by snow or thin ice—
- ☐ As a general-purpose carrier for underdeveloped countries where good roads are few and far too costly.

How big a future

As yet, nobody is entirely sure what the GEM's total potential for the future really is. Finding out is a big part of Republic's job. Considering that it took man some millions of years to discover the wheel—and another 7,000 to learn how to do without it—that could be a pretty sizeable order.



Republic will develop and produce air-cushion vehicles in this hemisphere under a licensing agreement with Vickers and Hovercraft Development Ltd. of Great Britain. Republic Aviation Corporation, Farmingdale, Long Island, New York.

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW

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The Editors.

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Vol. 42 APRIL 1964 No. 3

THE PRESIDENCY AND THE PEACE

By McGeorge Bundy

IT is with some sense of temerity that a member of the White House staff undertakes to comment on the large topic of the Presidency and the Peace. Loyalty and affection are so normal in such service that detachment is difficult. Nevertheless the importance of the topic and the enforced familiarity of close experience with the Presidential task may justify a set of comments whose underlying motive is to express a conviction that is as obvious as the daylight, in general, and as fresh as every sunrise, in particular: a conviction that the American Presidency, for better, not for worse, has now become the world's best hope of preventing the unexampled catastrophe of general nuclear war.

Moreover, both charity and sorrow can be good lenses for perception, and it may therefore be possible to consider the subject without impropriety by focussing upon the years of John F. Kennedy. The tragedy which has moved his Administration from politics to history may allow to his critics and excuse in his friends some generosity in the assessment of his three years. His death revealed his greatness, and the grief of the world was less for his tragedy than for its own—in that he had shown his spreading grasp of his duty to mankind as Chief Executive for Peace.

To focus on the Kennedy years is not to forget those before, and still less the firm continuation after November 22. The Presidents of the nuclear age before Mr. Kennedy also made the service of peace the first of their purposes, and the determined commitment of President Johnson to this same end, matured in decades of direct knowledge of our nuclear world, has been made

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plain in his own words and actions already. Indeed one purpose of a retrospective assessment is to clarify purposes which are as important to the President today as to the President last year.

A President in search of Peace has many powers, but none is more relevant or more effective than his power as Commander-in-Chief. The President is keeping the peace as long as he keeps his own nuclear power in check, and with it the nuclear power of others. This most obvious of his powers, apparently so simple and so negative, can be used for peace in a number of ways.

The prerequisite, of course, is that this power should exist, and that there should be confidence in its future as well as its present effectiveness. Nothing is more dangerous to the peace than weakness in the ultimate deterrent strength of the United States. In the quarter-century that man has known the atom could be split, each American decision to enlarge its power has been the President's alone. More subtly but with just as great importance, the choices of methods of delivery and their rate of development have also been Presidential.

As important as having strength is being known to have it; and here if anything the Presidential authority and responsibility are still more clear. This is the lesson of Sputnik, and of the "missile gap" which was forecast and feared by responsible and well-informed men both in and out of government between 1957 and 1961. There was ground for doubt and need for rapid action; the ground and the need were recognized, and important steps were taken, but an appearance of complacency led to an appearance of weakness, with considerable costs abroad. These costs would surely have been greater had it not been for the remarkable personal standing of President Eisenhower.

At the beginning of the Kennedy Administration there was need both for further action and for a reëstablishment of confidence. The new President himself had feared the missile gap and had pressed his concern in the campaign. It was with honest surprise and relief that in 1961 he found the situation much less dangerous than the best evidence available to the Senate had indicated the year before. His Administration moved at once to correct the public impression, and thereafter, throughout his term, he encouraged and supported policies of action and of exposition which aimed to ensure not merely that American strategic power was sufficient—but that its sufficiency was recognized.

The adequacy of American strategic strength is a matter of

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such transcendent importance that it must always be a legitimate topic of political debate. "How much is enough?" is a question on which honest men will differ, and interested parties will find room and reason for their claims. Thus it is natural that in the present political year we have ranging shots already from the fringes, some saying that our strength is too little and others that it is too great. Just as it is the responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief to ensure the adequacy of our strength, so it is his task, either directly or through his principal defense officers, to meet and overcome such criticism. The present Administration will not be lax in the exposition of the real situation, and no one who has closely examined the present and prospective balance of strategic strength can doubt that this year any assertion that we are weak will be found wanting to the point of irresponsibility.

There is an equal obligation to meet the arguments of those who think we are too strong. When these arguments grow out of fundamentally different views on the purpose and meaning of effective strategic strength, it may be necessary to agree to disagree. "Unilateral disarmament" is a tainted term, but it does embody something of what is desired by most of those who criticize our present strength as gravely excessive. The Presidents of the nuclear age have recognized that the law of diminishing returns applies to strategic missiles as to all other commodities; they have also agreed with President Johnson's comment that our nuclear defense expenditures can never be justified as a W.P.A. for selected towns or states. But they have all rejected the gamble of limiting our strategic strength in terms of any absolute concept of what is enough. They have measured our strength against that of the Soviet Union and have aimed at strategic superiority; that superiority has had different meanings at different stages, but seen from the White House its value for peace has never been small.

Yet even in this rejection of the underlying arguments which move so many of those who find our strength excessive, a President who cares for peace will respect their general concern. It is entirely true that nuclear strength can be provocative, that it is full of the hazard of accident or misuse, and that it imposes upon its commander, in his own interest as in that of mankind, a passion for prudence. All the Presidents of the nuclear age have understood this responsibility and have sought to meet it by

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insisting on disciplined and responsible control of this power. In the case of President Kennedy the pressing need was that as the number and variety of weapons systems increased, there should be ever more searching attention to effective command and control. To him this was a better answer to the dangers of accident than some arbitrary limitation of numbers; a thousand well-controlled and safely designed missiles could be less dangerous than a hundred of lower quality, as well as more effective in deterrence.

A related point was the President's powerful aversion to those nuclear weapons which could be used effectively only in a first strike. In 1961 and 1962 he faced a series of judgments on major systems; he always preferred the system which could survive an attack, as against the system which might provoke one. In the same way and for related reasons he preferred the system which was on the high seas or at home to that which required a base abroad and evoked a real or pretended charge of encirclement from Moscow.

The Commander-in-Chief must be strong, then, but also restrained. And as his strength must be recognized, so must his restraint. The doctrine of "massive retaliation" was never as absolute as Mr. Dulles at first made it seem, and its real weakness lay not in the undoubted fact that against certain kinds of aggression a nuclear response would be necessary, but in the appearance of a bomb-rattling menace which it created. The Presidency does well to avoid this appearance; in the Kennedy Administration the rule was that statements of strength and will should be made as calmly as possible. The President himself watched constantly to prevent the appearance of belligerence, and when the White House watch nodded—as in one magazine account in which a single phrase out of context was seized upon by Soviet propaganda—he made his dissatisfaction plain.

A similar discipline was enforced throughout the Administration upon both civil and military officials. Those who have read speech drafts for clearance know how seldom there is need for major change, and how often divergence between Presidential purposes and a speaker's draft can be corrected by revision which reconciles the real purposes of both. And again it is not only the act of coördination but the appearance of it which is helpful. The nuclear age multiplies the mistrust that peaceable men must feel toward military men who appear not to be under effective

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control, and nothing adds more to a President's reputation abroad than recognition that he is Commander-in-Chief in fact as well as in name.

Yet the Kennedy years show again, as the terms of strong Presidents have shown before, that harmony, not conflict, is the normal relation between the Armed Services and the Presidency. The maintenance of clear Presidential control over military policy and over public statements gave rise to some criticism, and intermittently there were assertions that this or that military need was being overridden—this or that viewpoint silenced. Energy and strength in the Office of the Secretary of Defense produced similar worries, and challenges to cherished privileges were not unresisted. But the center of emphasis belongs on the fact that the Presidency has these powers in this country; a President who uses them firmly, with a defensible concept of the national security, can count on the support of the officers and men of the Armed Forces. The American tradition of civilian control is strong and the tradition of loyalty among professional officers high; the services are eager for a strong and active Commander-in-Chief. The armed strength of the United States, if handled with firmness and prudence, is a great force for peace.

II

The President who seeks peace must have a clear view of the Soviet Union. The one great weakness of Franklin Roosevelt was that he did not; he had not the advantage of living, as all his successors have, through the realities of the years after 1945. Nothing is gained for peace by forgetting Czechoslovakia or Hungary or the recurrent menace to Berlin, or Korea or Southeast Asia or any of the dozens of times and places where Communists with help from Moscow have sought to put an end to liberty.

Mr. Kennedy had this clear view. He had it before he became President; he confirmed it in his first state papers; he understood not only the unrelenting ambition and the ruthlessness of Communism, but also the weakness and disarray of much of the non-Communist world. And for almost two of his three years—from the very beginning until the offensive weapons were gone from Cuba—he had an exposure to Communist pressure in Berlin, in Laos, and in the Caribbean which could only confirm the somber estimate with which he entered office.

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Against these pressures he was firm, and to meet them more effectively he greatly strengthened the defenses of the United States—not merely in strategic weapons for basic deterrence, but also in forces designed more precisely to meet the hazards of each point of pressure. The reserves who were called up for Berlin never fired a shot in anger, but military service by Americans has seldom made a more effective contribution to the defense of freedom and the keeping of peace. The new kinds of strength deployed to South Viet Nam have not finished that hard job, but they have prevented an otherwise certain defeat and kept the door open for a victory which in the end can be won only by the Vietnamese themselves. And never in any country did President Kennedy leave it in doubt that Communist subversion is always the enemy of freedom, and of freedom's friends, the Americans.

Yet always—and again from the beginning—he put equal emphasis on the readiness of the United States to reach honorable settlement of all differences, the respect of the United States for the reality of Soviet strength, and the insistence of the United States that both sides accept and meet their joint responsibility for peace.

He rejected the stale rhetoric of the cold war; he insisted not on the innate wickedness of Communism but on its evil effects. The Communist world was seldom if ever "the enemy." Characteristically, as in his Inaugural Address, the President used a circumlocution whose unaccustomed clumsiness was proof that it was carefully chosen: "those nations who would make themselves our adversary." Characteristically, too, what he there offered them was a request "to begin anew the quest for peace."

And he pressed in this same direction himself. In Laos, in Berlin, and most persistently of all in the search for a test ban, the President's powers, from beginning to end, were used toward the goal of agreement. Agreement must never be surrender; that would be no service to peace. The firmness of the United States under pressure was made plain both in Berlin and in Southeast Asia. But firmness was a means to honorable settlement, not an end in itself. Harboring no illusion about the difficulty of success, the President nevertheless persevered. He was convinced that at the least it was essential to leave no doubt, in all these issues, of the good will and peaceful purpose of the United States. If there were to be a continued arms race, or a test

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of strength, it must be plain where the responsibility lay. But the larger truth, as he saw it, was that in these areas of difference there was real advantage to both sides in reliable agreement—if only the other side could be brought to see its own real interests, free of ambition that would be resisted, and of fear that was unjustified.

In 1961 and 1962 the invitation to seek peace together met a thin response. True, the threat to Berlin, so noisy in 1961, and so sharpened by the confession of Communist bankruptcy which was the Wall, seemed slightly milder in 1962. And an agreement was reached on Laos, imperfect in its terms and in its execution, but much better than no agreement at all. It was in Laos above all that one could see the advantage to both sides of even the most incomplete disengagement, as against a tightening and sharpening of confrontation.

But no agreement at all had come in the field nearest the President's heart—that of limiting the nuclear danger. On the contrary, Soviet tests had led inexorably to American tests. It was somehow a measure of the Kennedy temper and purpose that of all the Soviet provocations of these two years it was the resumption of testing that disappointed him most.

III

The Cuban missile crisis was the most important single event of the Kennedy Presidency. As the President himself pointed out afterward, it was the first direct test between the Soviet Union and the United States in which nuclear weapons were the issue.

Although vast amounts have been written about the crisis, we still have no solid account of one half of it—the Soviet side. What is not known of one side limits our ability to assess action on the other, and this limitation should warn us against judgments that this act more than that, or one advantage more than another, was decisive. It does not prevent a more general judgment of the main elements contributing to success.

What is at once astonishing and wholly natural is the degree to which the clear components of this success are precisely those to which the Presidency had been bent and not only in the Kennedy Administration: strength, restraint, and respect for the opinions of mankind.

That strength counted we cannot doubt—though it is typical of the uncertainties of assessment that the partisans of specific

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kinds of strength remained persuaded, afterward as before, of the peculiar value of their preferred weapons. Believers in nuclear dissuasion as an all-purpose strategy asserted the predominant role of strategic superiority; believers in the need for conventional strength, while not usually denying the role of SAC in the success, were convinced that what mattered most was usable non-nuclear strength at the point of contest. Interesting as this argument may be, it can have no certain conclusion. Prudence argues for a judgment that all kinds of military strength were relevant. The existence of adequate and rapidly deployable strength, at all levels, was the direct result of the reinforcement of balanced defenses begun in 1961.

A further element of strength in this crisis was the firmness and clarity of the Presidential decision to insist on the withdrawal of the missiles. This was not merely a matter of one speech or even of one decision from a week of heavy argument. It was a position clearly stated, and internationally understood, well before the crisis broke. It was reinforced in its power, and the Communist position correspondingly weakened, by the repeated Soviet assertions that no such weapons were or would be placed in Cuba.

The strength of this position, like the strength of the available military force, was reinforced by its disciplined relation to a policy of restraint. That nuclear weapons should not be strewn around as counters in a contest for face was a proposition commanding wide support. Any impulse to discount or disregard the direct threat to the United States, as a problem for the Americans to solve, was deeply undercut by awareness of the difference between American and Soviet standards of nuclear responsibility as revealed in this moment of danger.

More broadly, the strength and restraint of the American position in October stood in striking contrast to the position in which others found themselves. As a first consequence, and to a degree that exceeded predictions, the allies of the United States both in this hemisphere and in Europe were clear in their support, though in public comment, especially in the United Kingdom, there was evidence of the difficulties we should have faced if we had been less clearly strong, restrained, and right.

It can be argued, of course, that in this crisis the opinions even of close allies were not crucial, and it does seem probable that such critical decisions as the turn-around of arms-bearing

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ships and the announcement that the missiles would be removed were not determined by O.A.S. votes or by world opinion. This particular crisis might have been successfully resolved even in the face of doubt and division among allies whose immediate power at the point of contest was negligible.

But so narrow a judgment neglects two great hazards. Immediately, a serious division among the allies might have provoked action elsewhere, most dangerously at Berlin (and indeed in all the postwar annals of the bravery of West Berlin there is no moment in which the courage and strength of the Berliners —and indeed of all free Germans—have been more important in discouraging adventure). And even if no such adventure had been attempted, the position after the crisis would not have been one in which "the quest for peace" could easily be led from Washington. It was and is the central meaning of this affair that a major threat to peace and freedom was removed by means which strengthened the prospects of both.

The October crisis came out better than President Kennedy or any of his associates had expected. The analysis suggested above would not have been compelling in the discussions of the week of October 15, and the predominant reaction in Washington on October 28 was one of simple and enormous relief. In the weeks after the crisis, attention was diverted, first by backstairs gossip over who gave what advice, and then by a renewal of political debate over Cuba, a problem of another order of meaning than the missile crisis, and one which had rightly been left essentially as it was, while the major threat was removed. And finally, it was far from clear, in the immediate aftermath, that "those who had made themselves our adversary" in such a sudden and shocking way would now be ready for a different relation.

But what is important for our present purposes is that what shaped American action in this crisis—what set and sustained the tempered response, both to danger and to success—was the President. And while the man in the office was Kennedy, with a taste and style of his own, I think it is right to claim that the office as well as the man was embodied in the resolution, restraint, and responsibility that governed in these weeks.

IV

As the great disappointment of 1961 was the renewal of testing, so the great satisfaction of 1963 was the limited test-ban treaty.

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The withdrawal of missiles from Cuba did more than end a specific crisis of great gravity. It also signaled an acceptance by the Soviet Government, for the present at least, of the existing nuclear balance. In that balance there is American superiority, as we have seen, but it is a superiority that does not permit any lack of respect for the strength of the Soviet Union. No safer balance appears possible at present. No overwhelmingly one-sided margin is open to either side, and it was one lesson of the Cuban affair—as of many others since 1945—that it was well for peace that Communist strength should be matched with a margin. But the purpose of this margin must still be peace, and the aim of policy must still be to get beyond conflicting interests to the great common need for a safer prospect of survival. This is the meaning of the limited test-ban treaty.

If the missile crisis was the proof of American strength in conflict, the test-ban treaty was the proof of American readiness to work for this common purpose. And whatever the moving forces on the Soviet side, in the non-Communist world the Presidency was the necessary center of action. A special and distinguished role was played by the British Prime Minister, but Mr. Macmillan would be the first to recognize that it was mainly through his close relation to two Presidents that he was able to make the British contribution effective. It is only the American President who can carry the American Senate and the American people in any agreement on arms control, and it is only with American participation that any such agreement can have meaning for the Soviet Government.

Unless a President uses these powers with energy, arms control agreements are improbable. The momentum of the arms race —the power at work to keep it going almost without conscious new decision—is enormous. Military men in all countries find it hard to approve any arms control proposal which is not either safely improbable or clearly unbalanced in their own favor. In the United States only a strong Commander-in-Chief with a strong Secretary of Defense is in a position to press steadily for recognition that the arms race itself is now a threat to national security. Only the President can ensure that good proposals are kept alive even after a first rejection, and that new possibilities are constantly considered—so that there may always be as many proposals as possible on the table waiting for the moment of Soviet readiness. The readiness to meet all threats must be matched by a demonstrated readiness to reach agreement.

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In the case of the limited test ban it was President Kennedy himself who reached the conclusion in the spring of 1963 that the United States would not be the first to make further atmospheric tests. That quite personal decision, recognized at the time as fully within the Presidential power, and announced in an address on peace whose power and conviction were immediately recognized, is as likely an immediate cause as any for the announcement, less than a month later, that the Soviet Government would now be willing to sign an agreement which had been open for two years. There followed a period of negotiation and then a debate on ratification, and in these again the Presidency was central. The test-ban treaty, as we have all told each other a hundred times, is only one step, and President Johnson has made clear his determination to seek further steps with all the energy and imagination the government can command. Meanwhile the lesson of the test ban is that no step at all can be taken in this field unless the President himself works for it. A President indifferent to arms control, or easily discouraged by Soviet intransigence or irresponsibility, or inclined to a narrow military view of the arms race, would be a guarantee against agreed limitation of armaments. Conversely, where there is zeal in the search for agreement, refusal to accept initial disappointment as final, a cool and balanced assessment of the risks of agreement against the risks of unlimited competition, and a firm use of the powers of the office, the Presidency can become—as in this case—an instrument of hope for all men everywhere.

V

In concentrating attention upon the great requirements of strength and a love for peace, and in using as examples such very large matters as the missile crisis and the test-ban treaty, I do not pretend to have exhausted the connections between the Presidency and the Peace, even as they showed themselves in the short Kennedy years. There is more in the Presidency than the special powers of the Commander-in-Chief or the special responsibility for pressing the hard cause of disarmament. There is more, too, than a need for understanding of Soviet realities. The Presidency is a powerful element in the strength or weakness of the United Nations, as every Secretary-General has known. The Presidency remains the headquarters of the Great Alliance, as even the most separated of national leaders has recognized.

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The Presidency is an indispensable stimulus to Progress in the Americas. The Presidency must make the hard choices of commitment that have brought both honor and difficulty, as in Korea in 1950, or in South Viet Nam in 1954. The White House visit and the White House photograph are elements of democratic electioneering not just in the United States, but wherever the name of the American President can bring a cheer. The death of a President men loved has shown how wide this larger constituency is. Allies, neutrals, and even adversaries attend to the Presidency. When the American President shows that he can understand and respect the opinions and hopes of distant nations, when he proves able to represent the interests of his own people without neglecting the interests of others, when in his own person he represents decency, hope, and freedom—then he is strengthened in his duty to be the leader of man's quest for peace in the age of nuclear weapons. And this strength will be at least as important in meeting danger as in pursuing hope.

The Administration in Washington, led now by President Johnson, will face new problems and make new decisions, and as time passes the new imprint of a strong mind and heart will be felt increasingly—in the Presidency, in the Government, and in the world. President Kennedy would have been the last to suppose that the purely personal characteristics of any President, however loved and mourned, could or should continue to determine the work of the Presidency after his death. President Johnson will conduct the office in his own way. Yet the short space of three months is enough to show plainly that the pursuit of peace remains his central concern, while the effective transfer from one Administration to the next has reflected the fact that loyalty to President Kennedy and loyalty to President Johnson are not merely naturally compatible, but logically necessary as a part of a larger loyalty to their common purpose.

And as we remember John Kennedy, let us separate the essential from the complementary. The youth, the grace, and the wit were wonderful, but they were not the center. There lay courage, vision, humanity, and strength, tested on the path to the office, and tempered by the office itself. It is these qualities, applied to the greatest issues, that belong not only to the man but to the job.

It is my own conviction that this kind of President and this kind of Presidency reflect the general will of Americans. Tem-

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perate use of strength, respect for honest difference, sympathy for those in need, and a readiness to go our share of the distance—these qualities, which I have described in phrases borrowed from our new President, are qualities of the American people. They have their opposites in our character too, but these are what we honor; these we expect of our Presidents. In the terrible shock of President Kennedy's death there were many—perhaps too many—who saw the foul deeds of a few days in Dallas, and not the dead President himself, as the embodiment of the real America. They were wrong. As a man, as a President, as a servant of the Peace, he was what we are, and his achievement belongs to us all. Strengthened by his service the Presidency continues, and so does the quest for Peace.

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OUR DEFENSE NEEDS

The Long View

By Roswell L. Gilpatric

THE United States may face a dilemma over the extent and use of its military power in the event the cold war with the Soviet Union eases before major steps are taken toward general disarmament.

This dilemma was foreshadowed in President Johnson's first major policy statements. In his November message to the Joint Session of the Congress, he rededicated the government to "the maintenance of military strength second to none," and in his December address to the United Nations he stated a new national objective: "We know what we want: The United States wants the cold war ended, we want to see it end once and for all."

Another indicator of this forthcoming dilemma was in two votes by the United States Senate on September 24, 1963. In the morning of that day, the Senate voted 80 to 19 to ratify the partial test-ban treaty, and in the afternoon it voted 77 to 0 for the largest defense budget in peacetime history.

In June of 1963 President Kennedy's speech to the American University had also reflected the same two lines of U.S. policy, namely, to keep our defenses strong while seeking to improve East-West relations and stop the arms race. These were his words:

> Today the expenditure of billions of dollars every year on weapons, acquired for the purpose of making sure we never need to use them, is essential to keeping the peace.
>
> . . . both the United States and its allies, and the Soviet Union and its allies, have a mutually deep interest in a just and genuine peace and in halting the arms race.
>
> Let us reëxamine our attitude toward the Cold War. . . .
>
> We must, therefore, persevere in the search for peace in the hope that constructive changes within the Communist bloc might bring within reach solutions which now seem beyond us.

In January of this year President Johnson's State of the Union message reëmphasized the same points. On the one hand, he pledged that there would be maintained the "margin of military safety and superiority" now possessed by the United States. At the same time, he promised new steps toward the control and eventual abolition of arms and undertook that, even without

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agreement, the United States would "not stockpile arms beyond our needs or seek an excess of military power that could be provocative as well as wasteful."

There is no fundamental inconsistency between these two policies. Indeed, the lesson to be learned alike from those modern nations which have most successfully avoided wars—the Swiss and the Swedes—or from Roman policies in the long period of the *Pax Romana,* is the truth of that harsh guidance: "If you wish for peace, prepare for war."

Today it is not too difficult to explain any apparent inconsistency between these two approaches: that one complements and supports the other; and that unless we are willing to credit our rivals with superhuman qualities of goodness of nature and self-restraint, we had best not risk tempting them from a prudent path. Thus at present there is broad support for a policy which insists both on maintaining adequate military power and on simultaneously seeking out opportunities—of which the test ban, the ban on bombs in orbit, the wheat sale and the "hot line" to Moscow are examples—to move toward a lessening of tensions and the growth of increasingly normal relations between the two major blocs.

But what about tomorrow? Will we be successful in holding to both lines of policy? Will we be able to decrease our defense effort, supposing a reduction is consistent with our national commitments and national interests, without relaxing our resolve to deter aggression and international lawlessness? Or, on the other hand, will we be able to move as freely as we should toward alleviating cold war tensions, while still maintaining adequate defenses?

Unfortunately, there can be no confident answer to such questions. History does not provide much assurance regarding the ability of nations, especially democratic nations, to keep equally alert to both the possibilities for peace and the dangers of aggression. Too often the tendency has been toward an all-or-nothing approach; an approach which cannot reconcile the simultaneous existence of both danger and opportunity; an approach which leads nations to view wars as either unthinkable (and so discouraging serious attention to defenses) or inevitable (and so requiring a rigid stand against the enemy)—or even as both unthinkable and inevitable, with a consequent breakdown of any semblance of rational policy.

Indeed, even today we sense a fear that the Western democra-

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cies will not be able to follow both policy lines, causing some to argue for suppression of one or the other policy goal—not on the grounds that it is unsound, but rather that if it is pursued it will draw support away from the other. Many of those who opposed the nuclear test ban did so not on grounds that there lay in the treaty a significant military risk to the West, but rather because they feared that any easing of tensions would soon find the Western democracies inviting disaster by letting down their guard long before a real resolution of differences between the two blocs was in sight. Similarly, there are those on the other side who argue for massive cuts in defense spending, not on the basis of any serious analysis of the military threat which we must be prepared to neutralize, but simply on the grounds that only by greatly reducing defense spending, and so (in their view) removing the basis of a "cold war mentality," can the Western governments be free to move forward toward reasonable settlements with the Soviet bloc.

There are further variations of these attitudes, but in all of them the central assumption is the same: that we cannot pursue simultaneously more than one of the two goals—reducing tensions and keeping our defenses strong—not because the goals are inherently incompatible but because there are flaws in our societies which make it impossible for governments to pursue both effectively. As noted earlier, there is, unfortunately, a good deal of historical example to support this bleak view. As Walter Lippmann has pointed out (in describing the "malady of democratic states"): "The unhappy truth is that the prevailing public opinion has been destructively wrong at the critical junctures. The people have imposed a veto upon the judgments of informed and responsible officials. They have compelled the governments, which usually knew what would have been wiser, or was necessary, or was more expedient, to be too late with too little, or too long with too much, too pacifist in peace, and too bellicose in war, too neutralist or too appeasing, or too intransigent."

As a result, the best answer we can give to those who counsel that it is dangerous even to attempt a balanced policy is not that they are clearly wrong—for there is too much history which says they may be right—but that to fail to try a balanced policy is even more dangerous. We cannot afford a policy which, in effect, deliberately avoids seeking a reduction of tensions in order to keep the public alert to dangers. Nor can we afford a policy which

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deliberately seeks to lull the public, and ignore dangers where they exist, in order to make it easier to build support for a policy of peaceful accommodations.

II

I stress all this partly because it is so important that it bears frequent repeating, partly to avoid any misunderstanding about what I have in mind when I discuss, as I now propose to do, the kind of military establishment which might be appropriate for the United States should there develop a continued easing of the level of East-West tension such as we have seen during the past year. I am not talking about an inevitable major decline in U. S. defense spending, but about one that might be feasible should the present amelioration of East-West relations prove more permanent than the "Spirit of Geneva" or the "Spirit of Camp David."

I do not know how permanent the present relaxation may be, and would not attempt to predict. I do know that there is evidence that responsible leaders of both blocs are increasingly aware of the consequences of nuclear war, and of the dangers of limited wars or even of intense crises getting out of control. Consequently, it is clearly in the national interests of nations in both blocs to exercise restraint in the conduct of their foreign and military policies. For no one can foresee what might happen should any nation, through miscalculation or folly, infringe on the vital interests of another or invoke a morally binding commitment given by another nation. Recognizing, as I believe both sides do, the dangers of our situation, the need for restraint and the need to search for greater international stability, I think it at least possible, though not assured, that we shall at last find a more than temporary easing of East-West tensions.

Should that possibility develop into reality, we would not want either to see armaments continue at unnecessarily high levels, with the various dangers and instabilities that could bring, or to see a prematurely drastic cut in military preparedness, with the dangers and instabilities that could bring. And since military planning has so often been out of phase with the realities of the moment, we had better start thinking now about "after-the-cold-war" defense policies, if we are to be prepared to respond sensibly to the opportunities we hope will arise. It is in that spirit—and in the hope of stimulating attention to these issues—that I pro-

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pose to discuss a possible military posture for the United States which, it seems to me, might be a reasonable one for a midway point between cold war and a genuinely peaceful world with effective international law and minimal national defense establishments.

Already there has been, in fact, a modest turndown in the arms race. In December 1963, Premier Khrushchev announced a cut of 600,000,000 rubles in the Soviet military budget for the calendar year 1964. Of course, we cannot be sure this is a genuine cut rather than an exercise of statistical legerdemain. But it did follow announcements by senior U. S. officials in the fall of 1963 that our defense budget would probably decline modestly in the years immediately ahead. The budget for Fiscal Year 1965 (which begins July 1, 1964), presented to Congress in January, provided approximately $2 billion less for defense than would have been called for by continuing spending at the previous year's rate, after taking into account uncontrollable increases such as military, civilian and retirement pay. By coincidence, both the Soviet and the U. S. cuts in military spending for the next budget year come out at the same percentage: 4 percent of the base figure.

The principal U.S. budget decreases were not, however, based upon reduction in tension, but were essentially a consequence of the energetic efforts during the previous three years to close certain gaps in our defense posture. There was the fact that we were putting behind us the accumulated deficiencies in conventional force equipment inherited from the 1950s. The correction of those deficiencies had required an increase in the Army procurement budget from $1.5 billion in Fiscal 1961 to $3.2 billion in Fiscal 1964. Once this was substantially accomplished, normal programming of conventional equipment procurement could be safely resumed. More important, we are past the peak of the very large expenses involved in building up our Polaris and Minuteman missile forces. A figure of $5.5 billion was included for Polaris submarines in the Fiscal '62–'64 budgets, and $2 billion for additional Minutemen in the Fiscal '64 budget alone; and we have increased our alert-force megatonnage by over 100 percent in the past three years. As a consequence of these large increments, we were approaching the point at which further increases in strategic delivery vehicles promised little meaningful military advantage. Consequently, we had a substantial decline

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in the expenses of this part of the strategic force. Finally, the intensive Cost Reduction Program instituted by Defense Secretary McNamara in 1962 allowed for further significant reductions of cost.

Thus, the cut in defense expenses for 1965 does not imply a cut in the level of U.S. military preparedness. Nevertheless, this was the first real reduction in our defense spending in a decade. It reflected the conviction of senior defense officials that the level of defense expenditures in one year does not have to be regarded as the floor for expenditures in the following year.

As to the Soviet cut, we can only speculate. Indeed, because of the character of the public Soviet budget, we have no firm data on which to estimate how great a cut is really involved. It might be either more or less than the 4 percent announced, or conceivably no cut at all, although this is not likely. If the cut is roughly equivalent to that announced in the Soviet public budget, we can attribute it, in part, to factors similar to those which allowed a decrease in our own military spending: that is, in part to pressures arising from the desire to allocate a larger share of resources to other sectors of the economy and in part to a desire to take a small symbolic step to indicate that arms budgets need not inevitably spiral upwards from year to year.

The question then arises, how far the U.S. and Soviet military efforts can decline, in the absence of formal arms limitation agreements, through this kind of complementary action—what Khrushchev has called a "policy of mutual example." To the extent that the Soviet cut reflects a genuine reduction in military forces, it reduces the level of the military threat which the West must be prepared to negate, and so allows for some reduction in that countervailing effort. Similarly, to the extent that the U.S. budget decline reflects, as it does, a tapering off in the growth of our strategic nuclear forces, that presumably makes possible a decision by prudent Soviet planners to slow their own effort. The prospect of diminishing marginal returns from further force increments affects the utility of Soviet force increases at least as much as it does those of the United States, although for somewhat different reasons.

Let us assume that this process of "mutual example" continues —perhaps not in an unbroken decline in tensions, but at least with a definite trend toward less troubled relations in the military sphere and a clear, if not uninterrupted, trend downward in the

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intensity of military preparations on both sides, while we continue to compete vigorously in the economic and political spheres. Under such circumstances, what kind of U.S. force structure might be envisaged by the end of this decade? Our security requirements would remain, in principle, substantially as they are today. But they could lessen quantitatively in face of parallel declines in the balance of forces on both sides.

Several elements must enter into the resulting power equation:

First, the forces, including those for strategic deterrence, which the United States must possess to counter the threat represented by the Soviet forces as they then exist;

Second, the forces needed to contain whatever level of aggression the Chinese Communists and their allies are capable of mounting, bearing in mind that at some time they will have nuclear weapons; and

Third, the forces which may be required for the United States to project its power presence to deter or arrest conflict in areas where there is no confrontation of the superpowers, but where subversive insurgency, aided directly or indirectly by the Soviets or the Chinese Communists, constitutes a threat to the stability of nations aligned with the United States or looking to it for assistance. A détente with the U.S.S.R. would not necessarily cause the Soviets to relinquish their objective of supporting what Khrushchev calls "wars of liberation."

In recent years there have been a number of instances where a U.S. military presence has served to avoid or damp down conflict in parts of the world where the United States and the Soviet Union have not been directly involved. Such has been the case in South Korea since 1953, in Thailand in 1962, in Saudi Arabia in 1963 during the dispute with the United Arab Republic over Yemen, and in the recent joint U.S.-U.K. air exercises in India. The same motivation lies behind the current proposal for the Seventh Fleet to put a task force in the Indian Ocean. The British Commonwealth similarly projected its military power during the crisis over Aden in 1962 and is in the process of doing so again to counter the current Indonesian threat against Malaysia. In order to preserve peace and prevent the spread of externally supported subversion throughout Latin America, it may also be necessary in the years ahead for the United States to maintain a larger military presence in the Caribbean area. The difficulties in Panama may be only symptomatic of more serious troubles to come,

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particularly if Castro retains, or enlarges, his capacity to foment such troubles.

III

A combination of U.S. military forces tailored to the strategic situation which would prevail in the absence of major confrontations between the Soviet Union and the West could, by 1970, look something like this:

Strategic retaliatory forces. A deterrent force, consisting only of hardened and dispersed land-based and mobile sea-based missiles, with all of the vulnerable, earlier-generation missiles deactivated and all manned bombers retired from active deployment. Such a force, comprised of weapons systems invulnerable to surprise attack, would be capable of destroying the centers of Soviet and Chinese Communist society.

Continental air and missile defense forces. Only warning systems, such as the big ballistic missile detection and tracking radars in Alaska, Greenland and Scotland, and the current generation of surface-to-air missile systems for tactical deployment would be maintained. Manned interceptors with their ground-control counterparts and all other bomber defense and warning systems would be phased out unless the Soviets changed their presently indicated intention of concentrating their strategic power in missiles. There would be no production or deployment of anti-ballistic-missile systems in the absence of Soviet moves to proceed beyond experimental installations of such systems.

Reconnaissance forces. Both aircraft and satellite-based reconnaissance systems would be retained and improved to take full advantage of state-of-the-art developments, so as to provide the United States at all times with a world-wide capability for the collection of both strategic and tactical intelligence.

General-purpose forces. No significant changes would take place in this category except for a reduction of Army divisions that might be withdrawn at some stage from Korea or from Europe (if a decline in the Soviet threat there allowed). The remaining Army ground forces and the existing Marine divisions, with presently planned air support and airlift (consisting of all the Tactical Air and Military Air Transport units, plus the Marine Air wings), would be needed to deter or counter threats of aggression not directly inspired or supported by the U.S.S.R. The bulk of the U.S. forces now assigned to the Pacific Command

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are there primarily to meet the threat from Communist China and her satellites, plus Indonesia. Hence, in the event of a détente with the Soviet Union alone, it would not be safe to reduce U.S. force levels in the Pacific.

It should also be possible to reduce the National Guard and Reserve forces, retaining—in the case of the Army—only the high-priority divisions plus round-out units capable of quick call-up.

Such a cutback force, if made possible by a true détente between the United States and the Soviet Union, should require an annual level of defense expenditure about 25 percent under the current (Fiscal Year '64) rate, and 10 percent or so below that at the end of the Eisenhower Administration. At the new reduced levels, force strengths would be little below those prior to the 1961 build-up. The main difference between the two sets of forces would be in their mix, those postulated for 1970 being better balanced with far less emphasis on nuclear-weapon components.

The force sketched above leaves many questions unanswered. There probably would be little argument within our national security establishment about retiring the older, unprotected missiles. These weapons do not constitute, in any case, a major element of our force numerically, and are the most vulnerable and least reliable of our missiles. There would be, again, little argument about keeping intact the later-generation missile systems, such as the Minuteman and Polaris. These are the most effective elements of our strategic force, both as deterrents and as fighting weapons in time of war. It is difficult to conceive of circumstances under which it would be sound to cut back these forces in the absence of explicit, effectively policed, arms-control arrangements.

Deactivation of the bombers would raise more of an issue. Modified B-52s and the newer B-58s could probably be kept operable into the '70s. On the other hand, particularly if the Soviets were undertaking similar steps, there seems to be no compelling reason why the bombers need be kept in the active force. We would have to consider the effectiveness of a bomber reserve force, including the time required for a call-up, should that ever be necessary, and the storage arrangements (presumably reflecting a maximum practical dispersal), and the degree of assurance we could have, lacking formal inspection, of the retire-

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ment from active service of the Soviet bomber fleet. We should also take into account the effects on the military balance and on over-all stability of various alternatives, ranging from development of a next-generation strategic bomber or keeping a large part of the bomber force on active duty to a complete phase-out of a substantial share of the force. All of these questions, and many more affecting our strategic forces, will have to be looked at carefully in the years immediately ahead if we are to be ready to proceed intelligently should the opportunity for a major slowdown in the arms race develop during the latter half of this decade.

Similarly, in air defense, we would have to consider what degree of confidence we could expect to place in our estimates of Soviet retained bomber strength, if any; the significance of an interceptor force in a period when both sides are heavily armed with long-range missiles; the effect of deployment of ballistic missile defenses, given the limitations on the effectiveness of any system that could be developed in the foreseeable future; and many other questions. We might, as I have suggested, find it consistent with our interests to retain only warning systems and short-range surface-to-air missiles. As with offensive forces, we will be able to proceed with reasonable confidence only if these questions have been carefully considered prior to the time a decision must be made. It was the earlier period of study and debate which made it possible for the new Administration to move forward on its defense programs with speed and confidence in 1961. Issues such as survivability, non-nuclear options and controlled response had been extensively examined for several years prior to 1961. Since then we have been living on that intellectual capital, and we have an urgent need to replenish it.

The most difficult problems arise in trying to establish proper levels for our general-purpose forces. These do not lend themselves to the relatively precise analysis of alternatives and mixes that can be applied to strategic offensive and defensive forces. On the other hand, because they are intended primarily for non-nuclear engagements, their effect on problems of military stability in the world is less dramatic than the effect of nuclear forces. Probably it would be prudent to retain substantially the forces we now have, decreased only to the extent that Soviet reductions in Eastern Europe permitted an offsetting decline in NATO in Western Europe. Similarly, it may be possible to make

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reductions if, through changes in the world situation, and through the improvement in mobility which is playing such a marked role in modernizing our forces, the United States can reduce its garrison forces in Korea.

Strong efforts, meanwhile, would presumably continue in research and development, to assure that we were not left behind in major technological developments that could upset the balance of power between the blocs. Consequently, military research and development expenditures would remain high, such declines as did develop being the result mainly of savings on the large expenses of final engineering and testing of full-scale new strategic systems, rather than from a reduction in the breadth of our research programs or in pushing new frontiers of technology.

We would continue to put major effort into improvements in the command and control, reliability and flexibility of our strategic forces and would proceed with exploratory development of some new systems. But, assuming similar restraint on the other side, we could probably, without injury to our national security, exercise a good deal of restraint over the deployment of any major weapon systems beyond those already programmed.

All of this, I emphasize again, is not to lay out a plan for a military program at the end of the decade. It merely suggests the kind of program that might be adequate to meet our commitments and defend our interests, while at the same time contributing to general military stability, provided the present movement toward détente with the U.S.S.R. continues to progress in the years ahead. Under these conditions, the kind of restraint outlined here (although not necessarily the details suggested) would be in our interest, provided similar restraint were exercised by the Soviets. Greater reductions probably could not be achieved in the absence of explicit arms-control arrangements, including a substantial degree of international inspection.

IV

What is clearest in all this is that the United States, in order to safeguard its best long-term interests in the decade ahead, must remain alert to the changing requirements—and opportunities—that will develop over the remainder of this period. The world changes fast these days, and the state of the military arts fastest of all. We can be quite sure that among the important factors in the military situation at the end of the '60s will be some which few

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people are seriously concerned with today. Yet our ability to safeguard the peace is going to depend in large measure on our ability to keep pace with the realities of military defense as they change over the years.

This essay selects one possible situation, and outlines one possible set of military forces that might be appropriate to it. There are other situations we should be thinking about: a hopeful world in which substantial measures toward disarmament and international inspection have begun; a more dangerous world in which the cold war is renewed in bitter form; and a world in which tensions last at about the level where they are today but complicated by various kinds of technological developments. We should be thinking about appropriate military postures in each situation, and thinking through the long-term implications of possible new ventures in armaments—such as, for example, major antiballistic missile deployments—so that we may try to shape the military environment that will exist at the end of the '60s and not merely stumble into it.

The power of the United States in the years ahead might take on entirely different forms and proportions than the mix of armed forces which comprises our military establishment today. New characteristics may be desirable to meet power requirements in the changed conditions that have been assumed. The most important requirement must always be "usability," but the qualities which make a military force usable may vary as conditions vary.

Our military power must be such that the President can apply the measure and kind of force appropriate to any provocation, so that he may use force, when justified, with some confidence that history will judge his actions as serving the best interests of the nation and of the world, and not merely as the trigger for massive mutual destruction. Thus, one constant will be that our military power must always provide a variety of capabilities suitable for dealing with a broad range of contingencies. Our military power must not only serve to deter but also, if deterrence fails, to defend. It may also be important that it assume a more unobtrusive character than it has in the past. Sea-based power, for example, offers political advantages not possessed by the stationing of ground troops and air units on foreign soil.

We can discern some things which will probably remain good guide-lines even amid these uncertainties. Readiness will always be an essential requirement for our future military forces. A

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highly advanced state of technology and a broad industrial base are no longer a sufficient foundation for the projection of armed force to back up foreign policy. Never again can this nation expect to be allowed the time to start mobilization after a crisis has already developed. Today our contingency plans call for immediate deployment of forces in being or capable of being called up within 60 to 90 days at most. This condition assumes a really ready reserve force and existing stocks of equipment. Mobilization plans for civilian training and conversion of commercial production will not suffice.

Further, there must always be a balance in the U.S. power base. We should never again have troops without modern equipment, or units immobilized by lack of airlift, or ground forces unprotected by air cover. At all times the complexion and shape of the U.S. forces must reflect the forward thrust of military technology and be sensitive to quick shifts in the power equation. In the past, our military doctrines have too often been out of focus with the political realities at the moment. This lack of balance has existed even under relatively static conditions such as we cannot hope for in the future.

In view of the prospect that such a major reshaping of the military and political situation faces the United States in the years immediately ahead, the wisdom and appropriateness of our defense policies may be tested more severely than ever before. Indeed, as suggested earlier, the need for restraint and firmness, for the pursuit of both political stability and military security, for both resistance to aggression and an unfailing search for an honorable détente—all this complexity merely reflects the complexity of the world we must live in and reminds us that the ability of democratic governments to act rationally and effectively to preserve themselves is itself in question.

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THE WORLD ORDER IN THE SIXTIES

By Roberto Ducci

WE live, no doubt, in a period of accelerating history, though what precisely we can expect from this acceleration nobody dares predict. The end of World War II is still not 20 years away, yet there already is little resemblance between the blueprint for world order drawn in 1944 and the world of 1964. A world order after a war which caused 30,000,000 casualties should last somewhat longer than that. The *Pax Romana* after the civil wars fought just before the birth of Christ lasted, on and off, a couple of centuries. The *Pax Anglica* after the Napoleonic Wars lasted a century. The *Pax Americana* (nobody can deny that the United States has kept the peace since VJ-Day, with some tacit coöperation from Russia) has now lasted nineteen and a half years, but thanks only to several changes in the organization of the world, some of them improvised under the pressure of events.

This article will attempt to peer into the darkness of the future and imagine how peace can be kept in the sixties and the early seventies. Is the present world order (if any) going to last? What forces and what ideas are pressing for a change? Where are the centers of resistance? What sort of new equilibrium (if needed) will be established, and by whom?

II

The blueprint for peace at the end of World War II was simple and therefore had a certain harmonious elegance. Five main powers were to be responsible for assuring the peace of the globe, and they were given juridical sanction for this in the United Nations Charter, which accorded them permanent seats and veto rights in the Security Council. The United Kingdom was to be responsible for northwest Europe, the Mediterranean, the Near and Middle East, southern Asia and Oceania; the Soviet Union for its own enormous mainland and for Eastern Europe; France for the bulk of Africa, north and south of the Sahara; China (the China of Chiang Kai-shek) for the Far East. The United States, having brought peace back to the earth and the boys back home, could safely withdraw to its front porch overlooking Latin America, except for giving a hand in the establishment of democracy in

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Germany and Japan and generally supervising the state of affairs in the four other continents.

This idyllic dream of San Francisco and Yalta was shattered within a year or so of F.D.R.'s death. The United Kingdom was unable to bear such a heavy burden in four continents; having wisely let India go, it tried with scant or no success to hold the Near and Middle East, and was forced to put the defense of the eastern Mediterranean and of Australasia in the lap of President Truman. France kept her colonies for a time, thanks to the ability and devotion to her *corps d'élite;* but then the retreat had to be sounded. China surprised most people by going Communist, and thereby subverting the balance of the world: for Russia had in the meantime converted the whole of Eastern Europe into a fortified encampment and had brought her weight to bear all along the provisional border with the West. The American boys, 400,000 of them, had to be sent back to Europe in a hurry.

The forces which were active in international society in those years and which changed the face of it in an amazingly short time were not always identified correctly. At the beginning, the nature and the strength of the world-wide revolt against the white race was much underrated. The capacity of glorious old countries like Britain and France to play a world role was, on the contrary, much overestimated. Most people saw Communism in terms of aggressiveness, and few in terms of weakness: yet weak it certainly was until 1950 at least, during the period in which there was little the Soviet Union could do against the American nuclear monopoly. For the Kremlin, those were the years of the Great Fear: the fear of Capitalism using its military superiority to blow Communism out of existence; the miserable fear that Marx and Lenin had been wrong after all and the bourgeoisie right. One of the two blocs into which the world split itself in the late forties was created out of that weakness and that fear: for Stalin's iron hand imposed the Soviet yoke on the young countries of Eastern Europe, ruthlessly suffocating their nationalistic pride and their pathetic invocation of independence, in order to establish the widest possible *glacis* between the American bases in Germany and the main Russian industrial and population centers. While even old guard Communists were sent to their death or placed in solitary confinement, all vestiges of national identity in Eastern Europe, except in Tito's Jugoslavia, were pursued and as far as possible suppressed.

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Thus, the Soviet response to the challenge presented by the American nuclear monopoly was the forcible integration into the U.S.S.R. of those parts of Europe which were within reach of the Soviet Army. When shortly afterward the American monopoly was broken, the general impression (probably a very hasty one) was that, conditions of parity having been reëstablished in the nuclear field, the superiority now rested with whoever had the biggest conventional forces, namely, the Soviet bloc. The art of nuclear deterrence being in its infancy, people's minds and even generals' thoughts were conditioned by the old doctrines of conventional warfare. This was a powerful incentive to integration among the Western European states and to the integration of them all with the United States in a single political and military system.

III

The Western bloc, of course, was never really similar to the Stalinist bloc, except in the sense that there was one leading power which, however, did not need to threaten or use force to be recognized as leader. This is shown, among other ways, by the Western bloc's parallel development in the direction of Atlantic integration and in the direction of European integration. (Stalin had violently forbidden any attempt at union among his satellites.) There were psychological reasons for evoking the rise of a united Europe from the ashes of the defeated and impoverished old continent, once suzerain of the world. There was idealistic aspiration toward a general reconciliation of the European peoples, putting an end to three thousand years of strife. But this might not have been transferred to the realm of practical politics had it not been for the necessity of solving a seemingly unsolvable problem: how to call upon the potential might of Germany (a few years after her defeat and destruction) to help in the defense of the West, without making her again the dominant country in Europe.

There were two schools of thought. The first, mostly English, held that Germany could safely be contained only in a political and military system guaranteed by the United States and the United Kingdom. The other school, prevailingly French, thought that no real security could be obtained unless Germany were merged along with some other European countries in a new supranational system. In the latter system there would be equal-

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ity among the participating countries, but France would be a little more equal than her partners (she would not renounce atomic weapons, would not be subject to legal limits in conventional forces, would receive financial aid for her colonial policy or for her nuclear research, and so on)—though not enough more equal to please Charles de Gaulle's vision of French equality. This second school got the encouragement and support of the United States, but could not totally prevail over the first.

These two patterns of organization therefore coexist in the Western world, not hampering, but strengthening each other. One is intended to maintain the balance of military power in the world, and therefore inside Europe itself, through the absolute superiority of the United States in nuclear weapons; the other is to maintain the balance of political and economic power inside Europe. But this double scheme may continue only so long as no participant questions how the military equilibrium in the world is to be kept. Since one of the conditions of the equilibrium is the nuclear monopoly of the United States, the questioning of that monopoly will not permit the double scheme to survive for long.

John Foster Dulles was, if not the author (because he must share that honor with Jean Monnet), at least the most powerful sponsor of the Western political system just described and of the system of world order founded upon it. It has become fashionable nowadays to pass negative judgments upon Dulles' achievements and designs; his credo is branded as reactionary, his effort to establish a world-wide net of military pacts is described as a form of mania, his diplomacy of brinkmanship is labeled as warmongering. His stern and disciplinary vision of reality, his habit of telling blunt truths, his massive and rather dominating personality did not endear him to statesmen or to the masses. Still, the objective historian will acclaim him as a man who possessed a supreme capacity for weighing exactly the forces present in the world arena. He was the first man in America and probably in the world to understand the political implications of nuclear weapons and the advantages that diplomacy could get from even a temporary superiority in that field. The doctrine of massive retaliation, which the West is now correctly abandoning, was in Dulles' days the right application to the diplomatic struggle of the military superiority then enjoyed by the United States, since it could devastate the heart of the Soviet Union while the Russians could not do the same to the United States. The doctrine gave better

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results in a defensive posture (as in the Quemoy-Matsu case) than in an offensive one (although the fact that it was not invoked to help the insurgent workers and students of Budapest may be charitably explained by the state of utter confusion into which the West had worked itself over the Suez affair). But normally, since brinkmanship was based on an exact evaluation of the opposing forces, it was able to keep the status quo and peace. When the first Sputnik showed that the balance of power was about to be redressed in favor of the U.S.S.R., Dulles was quick to perceive it and to start the slow retreat toward a different military and political posture.

Through the menace of massive nuclear retaliation, and while it was credible, Dulles had consolidated a world order which looked and was rational. It was jointly administered by the two blocs, one of which was deterred from making war if not from exporting subversion, while the other had renounced war except in self-defense (as the autumn of 1956 crudely showed). Communist propaganda attacked the "imperialistic policy of blocs" as a menace to world peace. The reverse was true: it was the existence of two solid and balanced blocs that kept the peace. Probably this was silently recognized even in the Kremlin.

Was Khrushchev sincere when at the end of 1958 he suggested fixing a legal frontier between East and West by a legal partition of Germany, implying that this would establish peace firmly on the Continent? Probably he had in mind the advantages of a truce with the West while the Soviet Union consolidated its economic and political situation. It is not likely, however, that the whole content of the Berlin ultimatum of 1958 can be explained in a conservative way, even though other acts and gestures of Khrushchev's reveal that a thread of conservatism runs through his policies corresponding to the present situation of the U.S.S.R. in the world. The insistence that war is not inevitable, the recent emphasis on the sanctity of frontiers—be they Tsarist frontiers in Asia or Potsdam frontiers in Europe—and above all the support given to the plan for limiting the possession of nuclear weapons to the "haves" reveal the Soviet interest in perpetuating the present state of the world—one in which, on more or less Dulles' lines, each of the two Great Powers would continue maintaining order in its third of the world, while the other third remain the object of their mutual competition, short of war.

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IV

The perpetuation of the two-bloc system as a basis for world order might not be a bad thing, though hardly one that the Chinese would call revolutionary. The question is whether the changing face of society has not already made it obsolete.

In the last five years it has become apparent that a gradual process of erosion is at work in each of the two opposing blocs. Owing to various reasons which will be examined later, the leader of each bloc does not seem to have the same authority as before. There have been cases of overt rebellion, France in one camp and China plus Albania in the other, as well as a number of minor acts of insubordination in both. The two apparently monolithic constructions of the fifties now have more resemblance to boiling underground magmas, from which come rumbles indicating the formation of deep and wide crevices. This fluidity is reflected in the internal situation in several states of the Western Alliance. Ideological and party divisions which until a few years ago used to be very sharp, and which mostly coincided with the dividing line between friends of the United States and friends of the U.S.S.R., have become less precise and even tend to disappear. The corresponding phenomenon in the East, though less visible, is the emergence of revisionist or of pro-Chinese factions in the Communist parties. There is a continuous interaction, further, between these new trends and others which are at work in a different sphere: Roman Catholicism under the leadership of the Popes themselves is breaking out of its medieval fortress, seeking union for the Christian churches and admitting tolerance toward other religions (including, it would seem at times, the Communist religion). In such a syncretistic and conciliatory atmosphere it becomes more difficult, in turn, to enforce the dogmatic creeds as of old; and Yevtushenko can fight in the East the battle for intellectual liberty which has become a bit stale in the West.

Let me now try to indicate the motives, more or less common to the Western and Eastern societies, which may have prompted these visible transformations. Starting with the less important, the first motive can be found in the fact that the difference in economic and technical capacity between the leading nation and the other nations of a bloc is decreasing; for short periods, indeed, the leading nation may even be the one to experience an economic crisis. Thus what was once a powerful force for the unity of each

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bloc is now less effective. Financially and economically, Western Europe is on its own. The same cannot be said of the smaller Comecon countries; yet present-day Russia, in the grip of a severe agricultural crisis and begging for long-term credits, is certainly not in a position to supply capital in the amounts necessary for their further industrial development (not to speak of China).

The second main cause of the erosion of both blocs is that the effectiveness of the nuclear protection afforded by each of the two leading nations is diminishing and the fear of nuclear reprisal against political misbehavior is vanishing. De Gaulle's thesis on the first point is well known. Without going so far as he has in his reasoning, all eyes now can see that the threshold for nuclear intervention is being set higher and higher, so that only the most vital interests would trigger the deterrent. The growing appreciation of this has certainly had a considerable influence on China's rift with the Soviet Union. What assurance can Peking have that, in case China were threatened with nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union would willingly run the risk of being itself wiped out? The Peking leaders must be convinced that China needs her own nuclear arsenal in order to survive; and if they cannot get it from the U.S.S.R., they will do everything possible to procure it by their own efforts. (If this analysis is correct, there is no chance of China subscribing to a treaty against the dissemination of atomic weapons. And if this treaty were applied only to the mainland of Europe—France excepted—and to underdeveloped continents, what useful purpose could it serve? Nations that have accepted the lower status do not need to take such engagements; others, whenever able, will pay no heed to them.)

On the other hand, there has been ample proof by now that even a weak country can sever itself from a bloc, and either change sides or remain isolated, without suffering more than economic hardship. Jugoslavia, Cuba and Albania are cases in point. Why this should be possible, and in what limits (the U.S.S.R. rapidly intervened against Hungary's attempt to leave the Warsaw Pact), may be explained by the fact that in the nuclear era Great Powers need allies much less than before. Allies may have a psychological, economic or propaganda value; they have very little military value now, and even the importance which their geographic position might have had for the establishment of nuclear bases has been reduced to practically nil by the development of intercontinental and sea-based missiles. On purely

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strategic grounds, allies and therefore blocs have more and more a marginal value.

The third reason for the erosion of the bloc system is found in a series of psychological factors. After 15 years of tension, the ruling groups on both sides of the Iron Curtain no longer find it possible to keep their peoples in a state of active ideological mobilization. The measures taken for diminishing tension have a multiplier effect. "Imperialistic encirclement" ceased to be an excuse for crop failures or for the paucity of consumer goods in the Soviet Union once the United States began to be impersonated by Kennedy's smile. In the same fashion, the "threat of Soviet aggression" is ceasing to be an effective electoral device for rightist parties since Stalin's deadly sarcasm began to be replaced by Khrushchev's parables and jokes. It is now permissible for a member of the bourgeoisie to be "American" or "Gaullist" and for a member of a Communist party to be "Russian" or "Chinese" (though not in the East), even though Gaullism and China are not yet really credible alternatives. In the sphere of individual conscience, a new urge is growing not just to move toward an ill-defined "peace" (which might also be the peace of the dead), but to ensure wider possibilities to express one's personality, to meet and understand one's neighbor, to communicate with him in some new endeavor, to establish a measure of fraternity somewhere else than in war cemeteries, to make the whole world one's home.

Above all, fear—that great cement of alliances—is beginning to vanish, both in the internal relations between members of each bloc and in the relations between the two blocs. Big Brother has ceased to be feared because of his bigness, or to be loved because of his brotherhood. Die-hard capitalism and intransigent Communism are both becoming obsolete and out of fashion. All this presages something new—for something has to fill the void which will be created.

V

Just as in internal politics people are fleeing extremes, so in international society new positions are becoming fashionable. These positions could be called neo-nationalism and neo-neutralism (similar to but not identical with nineteenth- and early twentieth-century nationalism and neutralism). Some neo-nationalistic countries, like de Gaulle's France, have chosen to remain for the time being members of a bloc; and nearly all neo-

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neutralist countries feel sooner or later the barrenness of their position and try to coalesce in a "non-bloc" in order to increase their influence on world affairs. But fundamentally the position of both is sustained by the faith that in our changing world a nation can find its salvation best by relying upon its own efforts and resources. This trend points therefore, if we are not grossly mistaken, to a gradual "atomization" of international society.

Before considering its implications, we should ask whether this trend is not something fleeting, whether the old system will not in the end be reëstablished without too great difficulty. If I sincerely doubt this, notwithstanding what I had to say on the advantages of the two-bloc system, it is because in order to have once again a bipolar world we would have to find a way of convincing ourselves that China does not exist: an exploit which may still be possible for a while on the East River but is certainly impossible everywhere else. The leading powers of the two blocs enjoyed a remarkable and very rare combination of three faculties. They had exclusive control of the "final" weapons. They had economic resources which permitted them to extend aid to the nations of their group. They enjoyed positions of ideological superiority deserved as a result of victory in war and/or revolution, so that the ideology each sponsored had no difficulty in becoming the ideology of the group. These three conditions are obsolescent, and in combination are obsolete. A treaty may try to keep control of nuclear weapons in the hands of *beati possidentes:* it will mean nothing for China, nor probably for France, nor even for those nations or groups of nations which will invoke the Chinese and French precedents. Economic aid from the leading nation of a bloc will be required in decreasing quantities. Finally, the ideological leadership will be challenged more and more often (as it already is beginning to be): people who cease to be afraid or in need do not remain convinced of the ideological superiority of others.

All signs seem therefore to point to an alteration of the world order. The movement is led, as always, by real revolutionaries. In our day the role is played by de Gaulle and Mao, who have revolted openly against the established order. But what really signals that the wind is set to blow in another direction is the recognition by the World Establishment itself of the change in the psychological, if not yet in the political, climate. In different fields, obeying different pressures, aiming at different goals,

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John F. Kennedy and John XXIII and Nikita Khrushchev have given a powerful impulse toward transforming the order which had prevailed in the world since 1947.

VI

In a way it is comforting that in such a short time and over such a vast surface of mankind's geographical and spiritual domain the trend toward a new state of affairs has been given favorable recognition. The risks accompanying a prolonged period of changes are evident. As Walpole, Metternich and Salisbury, among others, saw in their times, hardly any modification of a given international equilibrium can take place without involving the possibility of war. In our day such a possibility might produce so much more terrible destruction and misery that the period of change should, if possible, be reduced to a minimum.

The first and most risky effect of the weakening of the two-bloc system is or will be, as I said, the "atomization" of international society. The compound effect of nationalism and neutralism, the two forces which are wearing down the blocs, will be felt not only in South America and Africa, in the Middle East and Asia, but in Europe itself, both Eastern and Western. The example of Hungary will not be reproduced easily or soon; but the example of Jugoslavia or Albania might well find imitators, in forms and circumstances which cannot be foreseen. The political posture of Sweden and Finland, as well as that of Switzerland and Austria, may have a larger appeal in the context of world-wide ideological and political détente. Neutral-nationalism (the theory of salvation through one's own efforts or, one might say, the modern political Protestantism) will cross the barriers of color, race and geography; unity might be sought in this faith, as suggested by Tito and others, instead of in geographical-racial factors, as suggested by Sukarno. And properly so, because ideas, as missiles, do not stop at state borders. We shall indeed witness more and more frequent attempts (not always crowned with success) by certain powers to act beyond what would be considered their normal range of influence—China in South America, Cuba in Africa, France in the region of Asia from which she was forcibly expelled ten years ago.

The battle between good and evil continues to be fought, though with softer trumpets and more sedate alarums. But official neutrality in that battle is no longer considered a bad

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thing. Dulles was often accused, in office and after, of wanting to brand neutrals as immoral. In effect, he might have adopted the words *Hors de l'Eglise pas de salut*—outside the Church there is no salvation—a very justified precept for the Roman Church in pitched battle against the Reform, but less correct, leaders of the Ecumenical Movement feel, in a situation of religious stalemate. Still, it may well be that Dulles, consistent with his conception of world order, was against neutrality not so much because he considered it immoral as because he found it infectious.

In the same way, it is not to be concluded from the likely atomization of international society that the freedom of movement which it will offer to small and big powers is a bad thing in itself; it may even be, under certain aspects, a valuable thing. But this freedom of movement, if left to its natural operation, carries with it the danger of frequent collisions. In the world political system of the fifties the risk of war was limited. It was unlikely that a global conflict could happen by accident and there were no possible *agents provocateurs*. In Berlin, Korea, Viet Nam and Egypt escalation was prevented by a tacit agreement between the two world powers. It seems doubtful that this could remain true in a world where five or more nuclear powers existed and where, moreover, nearly every state's lack of responsibility could create innumerable occasions for conflict.

I shall not presume to show on what lines the new international order should be erected if the worst is to be avoided, but merely point out that the main responsibility for a peaceful and rapid transition rests with the present great powers. It is for them to realize that the first-priority requirement is to reduce the number of unknown factors in the international equation. They should encourage, whenever and wherever possible, the formation of units larger than the traditional nation-state (or than the artificial countries created in Africa and Latin America). The benefit which a really united Europe could be for the stabilization of peace and the prevention of adventures in one of the most sensitive regions of the world is now evident to many. Let us hope that one day it may become as evident in Moscow as it is now in Washington. Similar solutions should be attentively considered as the eventual aim of a gradual evolution in the Middle East, or in certain regions of Africa, or in the area stretching from Malay to New Guinea to the Philippines.

Pending the formation of such wider and more responsible

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political units, encouragement should be given to regional organizations, of the type recognized by the U.N. Charter. They should be strengthened so as to make them able to keep the peace in their respective areas: NATO in the North Atlantic and the Council of Europe in the European regions, O.A.S. in the Americas, O.A.U. in Africa, SEATO in Southeast Asia. Nobody, looking back to the events in Cyprus, can fail to see, for instance, how useful a strong European regional organization might have been for solving both the short- and the long-term crisis.

Realistically, however, one must recognize that the effort to concentrate power and therefore responsibility in several groupings of nations, thereby reducing the margin of anarchy in the world, has evident limits. Could the United Nations help to put some order into the residual anarchy? The answer must be, as Secretary of State Rusk pointed out in his address at Columbia University last January, that the present United Nations, being founded on the juridical fiction of equal rights and responsibilities for every single member state, without possessing ways and means to enforce some sort of order, in practice reinforces the anarchy natural to a society based on a multiplicity of irresponsible states.

The effort to improve the peace-keeping machinery of the United Nations, as suggested by Secretary Rusk, is therefore going to be vital. It is indeed difficult to see how the world order is to be kept in the late sixties and early seventies unless the United Nations undergoes a thorough overhaul. Not inconceivably the two present superpowers may one day agree that the strengthening of the United Nations might be in the interest of both, so that it might help them carry the responsibility of peace which they will not be able to shoulder any longer. It might well be to their advantage (as shown by Mr. Rusk's proposal to enhance the prestige and power of the Security Council, and particularly of the countries having permanent seats) to delegate some functions to other countries or groups, and have them share the burden of the superpowers in the world arena—though probably not their real strength as measured by the yardstick of the missile age. If that happens, the future organization of the world might not be very dissimilar in principle from the one which was drafted in Dumbarton Oaks 20 years ago by the victors of World War II.

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THE LABOR PARTY'S DEFENSE AND FOREIGN POLICY

By P. C. Gordon Walker

IF the Labor Party wins the General Election, the prime concern of a Labor Government would be the maintenance of the Western Alliance and, above all, Britain's close relationship with the United States. This does not mean that things can simply go along as they are. I am much disturbed by developments in NATO. This treaty is, in any case, drawing toward the end of its 20-year term and we must all soon begin to think very hard about its renewal. The British Labor Party has for some time given close thought and attention to the future of the Western Alliance—even before the American proposal for the Multilateral Force. We think our ideas offer a far better solution to the problems that the M.L.F. is intended to meet.

Over and above all these particular problems, the world situation—the framework within which defense and foreign policy must be framed—is changing. I think that the Cuba crisis was a major turning point. In those heart-stopping days President Kennedy and Mr. Khrushchev, as the representatives of humanity, looked together over the abyss of actual nuclear war. Both men not only drew back from the edge with very considerable political courage; both also left a way open for the other to withdraw.

This was because it was nuclear weapons that were in play. If the world had still had only the weapons of the Second World War, these would almost certainly have gone off. But nuclear weapons are weapons of suicide—this was what became clear in the Cuba crisis in a more vivid and actual way than ever before. At last weapons wholly new in kind brought with them a corresponding change in kind in foreign policy. It became clear that nuclear weapons could never, of purpose and intent, be deliberately used. For the first time in human history the settlement by force of major and vital disputes between the great powers became impossible. Simultaneously, the United States and the Soviet Union realized more clearly than before that, besides all their real conflicts, they had a certain field of common interest at least in regard to nuclear weapons.

First, there was a common interest in stabilizing the nuclear

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balance at about its present level. There was no point in ever more astronomical expenditure to preserve an ever higher, more precarious and dangerous balance in weapons that could neither be used nor yet dispensed with. This common interest translated itself fairly easily into the test-ban treaty, which greatly inhibited the experiments upon which further development of nuclear weapons depends.

Secondly, there was a common interest in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to other powers. It would cease to be possible even to stabilize the nuclear balance if other nations produced nuclear weapons, made tests and built up stockpiles. American and Russian monopoly of nuclear weapons became a genuine mutual interest. It is significant in this connection that the Soviet Union was prepared to risk a grave split with China in order to hinder the latter's acquisition of nuclear weapons.

II

The British Labor Party has thought out again its defense and foreign policy in the light of these immense developments. On the whole, we have found that our basic ideas need little adaptation.

We accept without question the need for a Western nuclear deterrent so long as Russia has nuclear weapons. We are ready to bear the full moral and political implications of membership in an alliance which possesses such weapons. There is no trace or hint of neutralism in our attitude or policy. We do not, however, believe that Britain herself should seek to make or possess nuclear weapons of her own. Here we have changed our policy. The cancellation of Blue Streak was the turning point. It then became obvious that Britain had not the means to remain in the nuclear race.

We do not accept Sir Alec Douglas-Home's argument that we must continue to buy an American weapon as a sort of status symbol that would purchase us a place at the peace table. It seems to us pointless and wasteful to have a weapon that could not be used by itself and which adds nothing to the power of the American nuclear armory. Moreover, the British Prime Minister's argument is an open invitation to other countries to do likewise and must, therefore, tend to the dissemination of nuclear weapons.

From the point of view of Britain's own military power we have come to the conclusion that, since the Cuba crisis, it has become clear that the only usable form of force is conventional. This ap-

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plies equally to the superpowers. Provided that the nuclear balance is maintained, America's actual power in the world depends upon the conventional forces that she maintains in Germany and elsewhere and upon such conventional capacity as "Big Lift." This applies *a fortiori* to a power like Britain.

Labor's defense and foreign policy is based upon the realities of the world. There are only two superpowers that can afford the full panoply of nuclear weapons that is necessary to a real nuclear power. There are in addition great powers that can play an important part in the world. Because of her resources, her place in the world, her Commonwealth connections, Britain can hope to be the most significant of these great powers. The condition of Britain's greatness is that she recognizes the facts of life and that she adopts wise and suitable policies.

The Labor Party believes that Britain cannot disassociate herself, in the world as it is, from nuclear weapons. We do not intend to throw away the nuclear weapons that we now possess—the V-bombers, which constitute a formidable but wasting striking force. The problem that faces us is what we do when the V-bombers become obsolete. We think we should not replace them with weapons bought from America. Such weapons would not be independent, they would not be usable and they would divert expenditure from conventional forces.

This policy of ours is necessarily dependent upon agreements reached with the United States. In the first place, we would want to renegotiate the Nassau Agreement. But we do not wish simply to cancel it. We want to negotiate a far-reaching new arrangement with Washington. The opening of talks to this end would be one of the first acts of a Labor Government.

We would want to have a real share with the United States in shaping nuclear policy and strategy and we accept, both as a fact and as something desirable, that the last decision must be in the hands of the President. But we want to participate fully, intimately and without limit in the formulation of the ideas, policy and strategy that together make up the doctrine upon which any particular decision of the President must depend. We would want to share in the decisions about the deployment and targeting of nuclear weapons and in future production plans. We would also seek to conclude agreements under which we could execute enough specialist work to benefit from the industrial fall-out that comes from the production of nuclear weapons.

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This would be to ask a lot from America. But in exchange we would recognize and support the ultimate nuclear monopoly of the United States in the West. We would also, by example and policy, help to counter the spread of nuclear weapons. We believe also that if NATO is to survive the termination of its treaty-life some reorganization of this kind must be undertaken.

A Labor Government would want France and Germany to play the same role as Britain in the Western Alliance. As regards France, we must be ready to wait until she is ready. A welcome place should be left for her. Meanwhile, no help should be given to France in the production of her own nuclear weapons. This would be against the true interest of the Western Alliance. As regards Germany, this is—as we see it—the only way by which Germany can be given a full and equal place in the alliance, without acquiring nuclear weapons of her own. This would provide a far more satisfactory and lasting solution than the M.L.F.

Here is one reason why the Labor Party opposes the proposed M.L.F. It would not, in our view, be wise to launch an elaborate plan for a weapon of little importance in order to secure only a short-term solution of the German problem. If indeed there is such a strong psychological demand in Europe for nuclear equality as is alleged by proponents of the M.L.F., then it won't be satisfied by the appearance of nuclear independence.

The M.L.F. would also inevitably divert European effort and resources from conventional forces to a nuclear weapon that would add nothing either to the reality of Europe's defenses or to the strength of the West. If it should turn out that the M.L.F. were the only way of avoiding the spread of nuclear weapons to Germany, we would, of course, look at the proposal again. But we do not believe that it is the only way, or even an effective way, of achieving this end.

III

Labor's ideas for a reorganization of NATO and the Western Alliance would also help to create the framework of an Atlantic community within which it would be much easier to tackle the problem of Britain's relations with the European Economic Community. The "Kennedy Round" would also contribute greatly to this end; a Labor Government would throw all its weight behind the success of this proposal.

Until there has been significant progress toward the achieve-

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ment of an Atlantic community, it is extremely improbable that there will be any dramatic changes in Britain's relations with the European Economic Community. A Labor Government would not risk a second failure of negotiations to enter the Common Market; that would have catastrophic consequences.

We would set about improving our relations with France. We cannot conceive of a British foreign policy conducted in enmity or coolness toward France. We would not seek to line ourselves up with the "Five" against France. That would be a barren policy, for there is no such thing as the "Five." There is either the European Community or six separate countries. Whether or not we become a member of the Community, we hope for its success and prosperity. Like the United States, we regard this development in Europe as a healthy one and as a stabilizing factor.

Our general policy would be to create as close relations as possible between ourselves and the European Community. We would seek to proceed by pragmatic steps. Wherever possible we would want to equate our tariffs with those of the Common Market. We would encourage cross-investment. We would be eager to undertake joint European projects, such as the development of nuclear propulsion or communication satellites. We would be ready for a mutual abolition of passports and for reciprocal social security arrangements.

We would keep an open mind about whether or not these and similar steps would one day lead to the reopening of negotiations. If this seemed possible we would prefer to start with general discussion of the fundamental political question at issue—namely, whether it is possible for Britain to enter the Common Market without severing her independent relations with America and with Commonwealth nations. This was the question that was never overtly raised in the Brussels negotiations.

In all this we would act in concert with our partners in EFTA. We are determined with them to show that in many ways a Free Trade Area works better than an Economic Community.

We would want to take part in any discussion of steps toward a closer political union in Europe. We would oppose the idea of a European nuclear deterrent. This would be at complete variance with our concept of a single, indivisible Western Alliance.

An essential feature of our defense policy would be (for reasons given above) to improve our conventional forces. We believe we can raise the number of troops that we need without conscription.

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Our main aim would be to carry out a program of modernization and equipment. We want troops with great firepower and we want a large Transport Command.

We recognize our duties in Europe. But we have also a role to play in the Indian Ocean—a role that fits in with America's strategic needs. We may well want to increase our forces in the Indian Ocean and in the strategic reserve. Our idea is to create two or three small floating bases that would enable us to give military assistance to our friends in the Persian Gulf and elsewhere. We would by this means be able, in due course, to give up sovereign bases in Aden and Singapore. A sovereign base in someone else's country is never secure. We would far prefer to hire dry-docking and other facilities.

We would like, if we could, to reduce our defense expenditure, as the United States is doing. But I cannot foresee any chance of an early substantial cut in it. The money that we saved by not replacing our V-bombers would have to be put into the equipment of our conventional forces.

IV

A Labor Government would pay increasing attention to North-South relations—to the relations between the advanced countries in the Northern Hemisphere and the hungry nations in the Southern Hemisphere. This seems to us in the long run to be of more fundamental import to the world than the division between East and West.

There must, of course, be massive and increasing aid for developing countries, but, fundamentally, the problem as we see it is one of psychological relationship. Aid should as far as possible be without strings. This means that the democratic world must be much more self-confident in the competition with Communism for the friendship and affection of Southern Hemisphere countries.

We must go on the general assumption that a country that has gained independence—either from colonial rule or from alien economic domination—will want above all to maintain that independence. It will not, therefore, be attracted by a Communism that wants to dominate it. It would be far more attracted by democracies that are true to themselves and to their belief in the right of individuals and of peoples to live as they wish.

We must be tolerant of social revolutions in countries where

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these are long overdue—even if they sometimes take unpleasant forms. A lot of patience goes into the establishment of good relations with touchy, newly independent nations.

We must all try to get away from direct bilateral aid. The relationship of charity is a difficult one both for donor and recipient. In the main, a Labor Government would wish to proceed by raising the price of the primary products of developing countries. We would put much effort into the negotiation of world commodity agreements. Aid given in this form is anonymous, without strings and permanent. It is a form of aid that the West can give without rivalry from Communist countries.

A Labor Government would seek to refresh and strengthen Britain's relations with Latin American countries. We recognize the primacy of the United States' interest in Latin America, but we feel that there is a part we can play in this potentially rich and powerful area of the world.

We dislike United States' pressure to prevent our legitimate trade with Cuba. We accept, and will ourselves enforce, a ban on shipments of military value. But we do not accept a distinction between shipments of wheat to the Soviet Union and of buses to Cuba. When asserting its own vital national interests (which we accept and recognize), the United States must accept the vital national interests of other members of the alliance. Trade and the freedom of the seas are among Britain's vital interests.

A Labor Government would want to make closer its relations with China and would press actively for the admission of China to the United Nations. We believe that an isolated China is a wild and uncontrolled force in a very dangerous part of the world. We should begin to try and talk with China and to subject her to the pressure of world opinion in the United Nations. At the same time, we want to avoid any suspicion that we are playing China off against Russia. In the conflict between Russia and China our sympathies must be with Russia.

V

The general guiding line of a Labor foreign policy would be to extend the field of common interest between the United States and the Soviet Union. We would do our utmost to help in the achievement of this end. We will support measures of arms control and measures against surprise attack. We would be prepared to put forward further proposals for areas of thinned-out arma-

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ments and, as part of a more general and precise set of agreements, a nonaggression pact.

We would, let me add, stand firm for the independence of West Berlin and for the Allied right of access to the city. We would not extend diplomatic recognition to East Germany. However, we would not exclude dealings with the Pankow régime as part of a wider international arrangement that would guarantee Allied access to Berlin.

We accept that the Oder-Neisse frontier cannot be discussed except in a final German treaty: but, as we have often said, we cannot conceive of such a treaty that does not recognize this frontier.

We would do our utmost to press on with general disarmament: our immediate aim would be to bring closer the American and Russian draft disarmament treaties. A Labor Government would set up an Office of Disarmament (closely related to the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defense) for the close, hardheaded and detailed study of disarmament and arms control.

We would in all our policies seek to strengthen the United Nations. We regard the enlargement of the United Nations as an admirable development; it has created a genuine forum of world opinion.

We believe that Britain's role depends not upon a bought nuclear weapon, but upon our strength, our position in the world, our unique relationship with Commonwealth countries in every continent. This last is something that neither America nor Russia can match.

In the last resort, Britain's place in the councils of the nations depends upon the fact that we cannot be left out. The other nations cannot make general settlements in which we do not participate or to which we are not committed. At the same time, of course, we must pursue a wise and appropriate defense and foreign policy. The whole aim of a Labor Government would be to heighten and enhance Britain's influence in the world.

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LATIN AMERICA: A BROAD-BRUSH APPRAISAL

By Philip W. Quigg

IN dealing with nearly one hundred countries that in varying degree look upon the United States as their *deus ex machina,* surely one of the most difficult problems is to achieve a set of foreign policies sufficiently coherent to be comprehensible to ourselves and to our friends and at the same time sufficiently responsive to the enormous differences even among those nations which for convenience we group together. The maker of policy must always, in some measure, strike a compromise between consistency in our relations among many countries and flexibility in shaping our relations to the peculiarities of each one. At the highest levels of government, however, the pressures are inevitably toward generalization and simplification as a means of making administration manageable and of attracting political support for policy decisions.

When Secretary Rusk asked, "Who speaks for Europe?", he reminded us that our tendency to generalize in terms of continents is not very valid even where shared experience is oldest, development is most uniform and integration has progressed furthest. To generalize about Latin America is far more difficult. The dangers of thinking of Latin America as an entity have frequently been pointed out, yet the practice continues among the public, if not within the State Department. In dealing with Asia no one presumes to generalize about the whole continent; at the very least we break it into regions, and in fact our bilateral relations vary enormously from country to country. Even Africa, which is at least self-consciously African, we divide into North, Central and Southern, though throughout the continent the drive for unity is intense, communication is close and stages of economic development are widely comparable.

Despite the importance and appearance of hemisphere solidarity, these factors do not apply to the countries of Latin America. Their common Hispanic culture and certain similarities in the way they look upon life and the world around them obscure a vast indifference to one another and a marked desire to be considered unique. They look to the United States above all and secondarily to Europe, but their knowledge or awareness

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of other countries of South and Central America is limited largely to contacts sponsored by public or private agencies of the United States. Pan Americanism has not cut deep, and even the effort to establish a Common Market has not much strengthened the Latins' sense of involvement with one another. Though an incident in Panama or Cuba will remind them how closely their destinies are linked, it is easier to find unity in what they are against than in what they are for.

Though we may be accused with some justice of being inadequately informed about Latin America, there are some 30 North American correspondents in Mexico City; none from other Latin American countries. There are at the very least a dozen universities in the United States where one can study the history, culture, politics and economics of Latin America in some depth; there is no Latin American university offering more than the most superficial survey course in the same field. Until very recently there was no direct air or passenger-ship service between the two largest countries, Mexico and Brazil.

It is said that in the Mexican Foreign Ministry, 60 percent of the officers work on United States affairs, 20 percent on international organizational affairs, 15 percent on European affairs and 5 percent on all the rest of the world including Latin America. In some other countries the disproportion would not be quite so high, but the pattern is uniform. Similarly, the average cultivated Latin American will have made several trips to the United States and to Europe, but none to other parts of Latin America.

To him, this does not seem surprising. As in other less developed parts of the world, the lines of communication have been to the centers of industrialization. Even today the opportunities for trade within Latin America remain limited. In any case, he looks to Europe and the United States for sources of interest and inspiration—cultural or technological—and does not expect to learn anything of value from other countries of the Western Hemisphere.

Moreover, he is likely to be more conscious of the differences between his country and others in Latin America than he is of their similarities. The most obvious, but not necessarily the most significant division is between those who speak Spanish and those who speak Portuguese (nearly 40 percent). Even the Spanish language, which would seem to others so close a bond, can be a source of minor friction, for each country takes its own

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version to be authentic and others offend the ear. Similarly, the racial mixing which has occurred in the Caribbean basin and which is a source of pride to a Mexican does not excite the admiration of a Chilean. And 21,000,000 "all-white" Argentines can feel themselves vastly superior to 75,000,000 Brazilians because the latter are intermixed with Indians and Negroes—indeed have created one of the most admirably integrated nations on earth. Parochial attitudes aside, a country like Argentina, where the whole population participates in the economy and where literacy is 85 percent, is a very different country from others where the majority have not yet entered the economy or the society.

In addition, of course, Latin America has had its quota of border wars, ancient rivalries and interventions—overt and covert. Recent political history, too, plays a part in separating the countries from one another. Differences in political orientation and forms of government are an obvious source of tension. Venezuela refuses to recognize half a dozen governments that came to power without benefit of elections. Mexico makes no such distinctions but is sure that its revolution has put it 50 years ahead of the rest of Latin America; its attitude toward its southern neighbors is, at best, patronizing. Geography, too, has been a cause of division, for the Andean range or the Amazon jungles have been more effective than oceans in inhibiting travel. And by the sheer difference in size alone, Brazil feels that it has little or nothing in common with Costa Rica. Finally, there are the obvious but profoundly important differences in the extent of economic development. When all of these distinctions are toted up and overlaid with nationalism, it is hard to find the common denominators on which "a policy for Latin America" can be based.

II

One result of the differences described—and the Latins' own awareness of them—is that while the United States is trying to develop a coherent body of doctrine on which to base multilateral relationships such as the Alliance for Progress was conceived to be, each of the Latin American countries wants to be treated by the United States as a special case.

A Mexican may say: "We have achieved political stability under a democratic system; in land reform we are pioneers; high

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social mobility has been attained and we have a large middle class; our money is sound and our growth rate is well ahead of population growth. On the testimony of no less a person than Eugene Black, former President of the World Bank, we are close to the point of self-sustaining growth. If nothing else, our proximity to the United States makes our needs and problems exceptional. How can you compare us with any other Latin American country? What we want from you more than anything else is respect for our right to differ with you and understanding of our desire to make our own way in the world."

A Venezuelan may say: "We have just had a completely free election under a multi-party system (not like those Mexicans with their one-party system and controlled elections); we have achieved a broad consensus on basic issues and perhaps we are at last breaking out of the cycle of coups and dictatorships. We have honest government, extensive land reform and rapid development. We have no race problem, no religious problem and no class problem. How can you compare us with any other Latin American country? What we want from the United States above all is a 'good' oil policy, and secondarily, some technical assistance and—again in contradistinction to Mexico—vigorous measures against Castro."

A Brazilian may say: "In size and population we are between two and three times that of the next largest country; we are continental in scope and have unlimited potential; our colonial experience was altogether different from that of the Spanish countries; our history is a record of political stability and non-intervention by the military; our traditions support non-violence and compromise. Our industrialization is unequaled in South America and, until recently, our rates of economic growth were the highest. How can you compare us with any other country in Latin America? What we want from you above all is respect for our primacy and understanding in our present economic and political difficulties brought on by the desertion of our elected leader [Quadros]. Also, a fairer price for coffee."

A Chilean may say: "We are the most politically sophisticated of all Latin American countries and our dedication to constitutionalism and democracy is the most deeply rooted. In over a century we have only twice suffered civil strife. We excel in the progressiveness of our social legislation, the integrity of our courts, the freedom of our elections, the excellence of our police

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and the quality of our universities. We were the first to comprehend the meaning of the Alliance for Progress and the first to present a plan in conformity with its requirements. What we want above all from you is appreciation of our capacity to set standards for Latin America and recognition of the need to be masters in our own house where the influence and scope of U.S. foreign capital is oppressive to us."

These hypothetical arguments, all of which are essentially true, if overstated, could be multiplied almost indefinitely. Each would appeal for comprehension of the distinctive qualities of the country concerned, for recognition of its special virtues and handicaps. In sum, each country would argue for bilateral arrangements with the United States, because only then can its uniqueness be taken account of.

There is no desire to add here to the vast literature on the Alliance for Progress—its ills and shortcomings. Like a color wheel that, when spun, comes out a neutral gray, all the criticisms finally cancel one another out. Where the United States is concerned, what it boils down to is that we cannot have one foreign policy for Latin America, nor can we have 20 different policies. Every measure we try to implement will in some degree be a compromise between generalizations which have limits to their validity and specifics which lack vitality for peoples, parliaments or politicians. Without generalizations there can be no concepts and without concepts there can be no policy. Therefore, it serves no useful purpose to criticize the Alliance for Progress for presupposing an entity which does not exist or for trying to develop broad conceptions which in fact have varied applicability. But to be aware that this is the case is very important if we are to achieve the necessary flexibility within an over-all plan.

Take, for example, the question of land reform, a key element of the Alliance and a subject on which President Kennedy spoke eloquently, though in very general terms. If by land reform is meant redistribution of land (as is too often the case), then the question is irrelevant or very secondary in four of the most important countries of Latin America: Mexico and Venezuela, where the problem was being attacked long before the Alliance for Progress; Argentina, which needs agricultural modernization, not land redistribution; and Brazil, where requirements vary enormously from state to state but where land redistribution is secondary to the need for resettlement, agricultural research, taxa-

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tion of uncultivated land, farm credit, rural development and the like. But since in Brazil land reform *is* synonymous with land redistribution and since the term itself has been expropriated by the Communists, a quite unnecessary battle is raging in which leftists and opportunists are using the good name of the late President of the United States to stir up controversy and feather their political nests. As a result, urgent and feasible reforms of agriculture are blocked.

Other examples could be cited in the requirement for national planning where no planners exist or for matching funds where no money exists unless, as in inflation-ridden Brazil, the government prints it. None of these obstacles and exceptions is a reason not to encourage agrarian reform, planning and a matching effort by the recipient nation. But they show how difficult it is to develop grand conceptions that are responsive to the real needs and problems of particular countries.

III

One of the areas in which flexibility has been most limited—and by our own hand—is the effort to combat Communism. Here our Cuban policy, and its involvement in our domestic politics, tends to dominate everything, so that our responsible officials have little room for manœuvre. But in fact the nature of the danger and the tactics being used by the Communists vary greatly from country to country. A U.S. policy or attitude which may be right for a country with a strongly anti-Communist government but with heavy Communist infiltration among the unions will hardly be appropriate for a country where there is little popular sentiment in favor of Communism but where leftists are eating away the government at the top—"superversion," as one close observer has called it. And a policy or attitude which may be appropriate for a country where the Communist Party is illegal and driven underground will not necessarily be effective in a country where the Communist Party is actively campaigning in a free and wide-open election.

Our alarums and excursions over Castro have had a whole series of undesirable effects in Latin America. First, our constant preoccupation with Castro and our disposition to credit him or his Moscow superiors with every act that offends us throughout the Hemisphere built up his prestige, even among those who are staunch anti-Communists but not above enjoying the sight of

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Uncle Sam discomfited. Second, the enormous prestige and respect we gained in the missile crisis of October 1962 have been sullied much less by our failure to obtain Soviet adherence to every particular of the agreement than by the undignified image that we, as a people, afterwards created of fear and petulance. Third, our insistence that everyone stand up and be counted on the Castro issue has embarrassed some countries and annoyed others, without achieving the unanimity we sought. In fact, the nations of Latin America have taken most of the important steps we thought necessary, but they would prefer not to talk about it. For example, the Mexicans, the most reluctant of all to take a vigorous anti-Castro position in public, are actually coöperating with us in ways which may be, strictly speaking, illegal under their constitution. For a country which has used legalism as its chief weapon of defense for more than a century and whose dearest ambition is to exercise its independence of the United States, this is not easy to do. Fourth, and now looking at the other side of the coin, the Latin American republics are in truth using our "Castrocentrism," as one foreign minister referred to it, as a stick to beat us with. Indeed, it is doubtful if a majority of the countries of this Hemisphere want to see Castro brought down—not because they are "soft on Communism," but because they feel he has served them well without ever constituting a serious threat to them. They are inclined to believe that without the apparent threat, the sources of largesse might dry up and that the United States would return to its attitude of indifference toward its southern neighbors. And several look forward with foreboding to the day when Cuban sugar reënters Western markets.

Meanwhile, Castro himself has been more successful in discrediting the cause he serves and in alerting the Hemisphere to the fact that danger does exist. The economic disaster that Castro has inflicted on his people is well known; what once looked like healthy nationalism and a desire to be free of U.S. domination looks now like a sellout to another foreign power, which may be better or worse depending on the individual's point of view, but is not what is wanted. Castro's name is heard less and less in Latin America, and where Communist parties are trying to attain power by constitutional means—as in Chile—his name is hardly mentioned; he simply is no longer a selling point. Only where the Communist parties are illegal and have turned to violence, as in Venezuela, or where they are legal but splintered and unpopular, as

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in Peru, does one hear Fidelismo praised as a model, and then not insistently or effectively. Communism itself has lost some of its lustre; it just is not as fashionable as it used to be, partly, at least, because since the Sino-Soviet split, it has become less the stirring ideology it once was and more a protest movement, taking many guises from ill-defined leftist nationalism to ineffectual fanaticism. With so many angry gods in the pantheon—Stalin, Khrushchev, Mao, Castro and (still) Trotsky—it becomes difficult for the fellow traveler to know whom to worship, while the infighting among the leaders is often sharp and destructive. Except in a few places, such as Chile, which has the best organized and proportionately largest Party in the Hemisphere operating in an atmosphere of unequaled freedom, Communism remains a danger in Latin America not so much because of its own strength, but because of the weaknesses in the societies into which it burrows; not because there are so many disciplined Communists working efficiently round the clock, but because there are so many politicians in default of their minimum obligations to their people; not because there is so much poverty but because there is so much corruption and inefficiency; not because Communism is considered an ultimate good but because there is so much with which to discredit democracy.

It needs to be remembered, too, that Communism is only one brand of extremism found in Latin America. For every disciplined Communist or ideological fellow traveler there is probably at least one opportunist without political commitment of any kind who may be trying to use the Communists for his own purposes or who may hope for personal gain through a fascistic power structure. In any case he finds it advantageous to destroy whatever is healthy in society and obstruct whatever promises sound progress. To brand all rogues and extremists as Communists is a dubious tactic, for it confuses the issue and makes them appear stronger than they are. Indeed we might profitably declare a moratorium on words like Communism and democracy and talk more about good government and representative government. This would help to clarify our own thinking, too. For Latin America is replete with examples of governments which are relatively "good"—in the sense of honest and efficient—without being "representative," and others which are technically "representative" without being "good." To plump quite so hard as we do for freedom and democracy, without reference to the enormous

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variety of experience and tradition in the countries of Latin America, may only succeed in blackening the name of democracy where constitutional régimes are immobilized, corrupt or unresponsive to the wishes of the people.

IV

It has been widely believed in the United States that the slow progress in Latin America has been due either to the almost insurmountable nature of its problems or to the resistance to change of its privileged classes. For parts of Latin America these explanations still have some validity, but for the major countries of Latin America—those on which all else depends—they are far from the point. What impresses a visitor to Argentina or Brazil or Mexico is that, as compared to other parts of the less developed world, the problems are so manageable, so near (and yet so far from) solution. In these countries and many others there is general acceptance of the need for change, sometimes even a consensus on the general lines that change should take. The leadership groups, the men of power and influence, are for the most part only one or two generations removed from the peasantry or are the sons or grandsons of European immigrants.[1] Even in a country like Peru, which has had no revolution and no populist dictatorship, the President and a majority of Congress are progressively minded. But unfortunately this is no guarantee that progress will be made with sufficient speed.

For all too often party comes before country and the question as posed is not what shall be done, and how, but who will get credit for it if it is a success. To be sure, this is in the nature of politics, but in Latin America it is carried to extremes. Thus one finds parties opposing what they have been promoting for years, simply because they are not in the government. It is not to be expected that good of country will be put above all other considerations; it would be enough if the party were thought of as existing to represent the interests of the individuals and groups that compose it rather than as an instrument for the aggrandizement of its leaders.

Another factor in the incapacity of Latin American governments lies in the nature of the much-heralded middle class that

[1] It can be argued that Argentina today is more Italian than Spanish. One indication is that the majority of politicians, including the President and his two most recent predecessors, are of Italian extraction.

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has emerged. There are exceptions, but in general it does not perform the same function in Latin American societies today as the similar class served in nineteenth-century Europe or America.[2] It arose not in opposition to the aristocracy, but in potential conflict with the industrial worker and the urbanized proletariat. Therefore it has not spurred evolutionary forces, but has been essentially conservative; and it has placed a higher value on social acceptance than on political power. This is not to say that the middle class has accepted the standards or the political ideas of the old aristocracy; but neither has it accepted the social responsibility nor the political leadership which, for good or ill, the aristocracy once exercised. As the old order crumbled, nothing has been offered to take its place.

Having defaulted on one set of responsibilities, it became easier to default on another. Since the government was not "theirs" and in any case was corrupt, it was not difficult to justify cheating the government out of the means of governing. Tax evasion is a national pastime in Latin America and a matter of individual pride. When collections are only a fraction of what is due the government, taxes are increased, often to such absurd heights and in such irrational ways that tax evasion becomes a necessity for survival. Meanwhile, the factory worker and a few others whose taxes may be collected at the source become the chief supporters of government.

The middle class, then, has not always exercised the political function that we assume it serves. This has left a vacuum to be filled too often by incompetents and opportunists. The Brazilians, whose sense of humor is a virtue carried to a fault, are wont to say that Brazil is the land of the future and always will be. The joke has the ring of truth and what makes it particularly poignant is that to bring that bright future into the present requires only a modicum of political leadership of strength and integrity. And so it is, in varying degree, with many other Latin American republics. They may not all be on the eve of a bright future, but there is not one whose prospects could not be altered out of recognition by a decade of consistent political leadership, integrity in public office and evidence of responsibility to the electorate.

Latin America has recently had a striking example of what honest and purposeful leadership can accomplish. Romulo Betan-

[2] See Claudio Veliz, "Obstacles to Reform in Latin America," *The World Today*, January 1963.

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court has bequeathed to Venezuela a sense of pride and achievement, which in the climate of Latin America is a gift beyond price. The admiration which flooded down on the President and people of Venezuela from North America after the December election stirred them deeply and there was hardly a literate Venezuelan who did not know of the letter in *Time,* nominating the Venezuelan voter as Man of the Year. No one can say whether the sense of unity and purpose now prevailing will have finally broken the tradition of dictatorship and violence, but there is a hope and optimism abroad in the land that is rare in Latin America today.

It will be said that few countries have the advantages of Venezuela's wealth, and this is true. But it is not the crux of the matter, as is demonstrated by a comparison of, say, Argentina, which has done so little with so much, and Costa Rica, which has done much with so little. The crux of the matter is that, with the possible exception of the Middle East, Latin America is the most politicized area in the world which has not evolved an adequate tradition of public service or political responsibility. While we must guard against applying Anglo-Saxon standards to a very different environment and culture, it is clear that until Latin America's political underdevelopment is corrected, its economic development will continue to lurch and stumble. For what is retarding development in the major Latin American countries is not so much lack of wealth and technology nor the vested interests of landed or commercial classes; it is the prevalence of corrupt and demagogic leaders, often the legacy of dictators, governing people whose cynicism about politics leads them to alternate between fatalism and violence.

The climate of uncertainty thus created, the unpredictable exercise of arbitrary powers by government, whether elected or not, are insuperable obstacles to sound economic growth. Governmental planning becomes a political football and private capital moves into the least productive areas, where the interest rates are highest and where the investor can get in and get out with the fattest profits and the least risk.

The Argentines and Brazilians know as well as anyone that there simply is no excuse for the conditions found in their countries today—try as they will to explain them or blame them on others. The new and almost freely elected government of Argentina has done only two things of the least consequence in its first four months in office: one is to renegotiate the foreign oil contracts

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to its advantage; the other, to increase its borrowing from the central bank so as to become current in its payments to employees and suppliers. What characterizes these acts is that they require no courage, no imagination and solve nothing. Already there is talk of more *golpes*, more military intervention. The situation in Brazil is worse, because there the Communists are in a position to take advantage of the economic chaos which already seems near, and which may be allowed or encouraged to become a reality.

It would be inconsistent with an earlier thesis of this article if there were not innumerable exceptions and qualifications to be made concerning these sweeping generalizations. Chile does have a tradition of public service, though it also has a tradition of protecting private monopolies; the Argentine landowner does exert political influence out of all proportion to his numbers; individuals of great eminence do serve as government ministers, often in maddening frustration; there are some individuals of great courage and integrity in public office; the incapacity or unwillingness of the Latins to organize and to coöperate for defined objectives would sorely try the best of leaders; our press has exaggerated some crises and failures out of proportion; and it should go without saying that we in the United States are not faultless either in our domestic affairs or in our relations with Latin America. The list of qualifications could be extended, but the generalizations hold, on the testimony of the Latins themselves. In the words of a democratic labor leader who had just survived a bitter battle with the Communists, "What we need is more patriotism." It is a word which, for all the rampant nationalism in Latin America, is almost unknown there in other than a flag-waving sense.

In countries which prize dynamic leadership above all else, it is particularly tragic that there is so little of it. The truly astounding outpouring of grief in Latin America on the death of President Kennedy was probably not so much because of any new initiatives he took or more sympathetic attitudes he reflected toward them, as because he epitomized what they themselves are looking for in a leader: personal appeal, energy, eloquence, ability and integrity.

V

One senses that our responsible officials in Washington and our Foreign Service Officers in the field are being ground fine between the sensitivities of the Latin Americans and the need to state

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harsh truths; between their very lively affection for the Latins —so generally reciprocated—and the awareness that the United States is being outrageously used; between the Latins' private respect for the United States and their public abuse of it; between American commercial interests and the national interest, which are too often assumed to be the same; between the American public's unwarranted sense of guilt about Latin America and our Congressmen's periodic outbursts of wrath; between . . .

The tensions and conflicts are innumerable. What few generalizations can be drawn which will have validity for some appreciable part of this diverse area we call Latin America? After acknowledging that diversity and realizing that no policy will be relevant for all parts of Latin America, we might consider some of the following:

1. Talk more about responsible and responsive government and less about democracy.

2. Try to put our own fears of Communism in better proportion to the extent and nature of the threat. Cuba was not subverted, but had Communism clamped on it from the top. The country which today is most in danger is probably Chile, where a Communist-Socialist coalition stands a better than fighting chance of being freely elected to office next September, with a plurality of at most 30 percent of the vote. Elsewhere the threat may be altogether different, and more remote. Most of the things we can do to fight Communism in Latin America have to be done quietly, and they are being done. But there are limits to what we can accomplish, and sooner or later we will have to be resolute in resisting the gentle blackmail which is posed as, "Help us or else. . . ." One day, perhaps in Brazil, the second option may have to be taken up. To assume that the alternative must be Communism seems very dubious.

3. Distinguish more clearly in our own minds between technical and genuinely developmental aid programs, which more often than not are admirable in conception and accomplishment, and other forms of assistance which are unproductive and merely protect irresponsible governments against the day of reckoning. One reason the American people seem disillusioned with the rate of economic development in countries we have helped is that they do not know how small a proportion of our total aid has been used for development, how much to balance budgets or unsuccessfully fight inflation.

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4. Avoid giving the impression that we look upon the O.A.S. merely as an instrument for fighting Communism. It has rarely been used effectively on issues of primary interest to the Latin American countries or as a means of drawing them more closely together.

5. Avoid making a fetish of consistency where circumstances in fact differ. For example, though we must do what we can to discourage military coups, we cannot thereby be put in the position of defending—simply because they were elected—venal governments which have wholly defaulted on their minimal responsibilities.

6. Do not let our own need for resoluteness and realism become an excuse for "getting tough" or an unwillingness to discuss and act in areas of friction between us and the Latin American nations—whether it be the Panama Canal or water disputes with Mexico or the price of coffee.

7. Give the highest priority in our programs of training, education and exchange to the search for leadership and the cultivation of a sense of individual responsibility for government.

8. Do not expect that the unwarranted abuse we are subjected to from Latin America will cease until the discrepancies between us and them—in size, power and accomplishment—have disappeared. It will be a long time.

9. Though our "big stick" is too obvious to need to be carried, the first half of Teddy Roosevelt's dictum—to speak softly—still has great merit. Latin America is of two worlds. One is that of Cuba and Panama and damn-Yankeeism and demagogy and scalding headlines. The other is a quiet world where public statements are avoided, where emphasis is on the spoken word exchanged between a few individuals, where genuine respect and even affection for the United States is demonstrated. This is not only the world of diplomacy, as it ought to be, but the world of thousands of other individual relationships that tie us to Latin America. It is the world where things get done, away from those who would use any means to destroy those relationships and away from the temptation even of honorable men to take political profit from their dealings with us.

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LONELINESS IN THE BELOVED COUNTRY

By C. W. de Kiewiet

TO write against the racial policies of South Africa is not a difficult undertaking; through its discriminatory legislation, the South African Government provides plentiful material for the use of its critics. To write reflectively not about the black but about the white population is not easy and can lead to misunderstanding. Yet there is room for an explanation of South Africa as many or most of its white inhabitants see it. In any event, an explanation is not a justification.

South Africa's isolation from the rest of the world is a source of mounting bitterness within the country. Last October, Prime Minister Verwoerd received what seemed a stinging rebuff when the prime ministers of the Scandinavian countries turned down an invitation to visit South Africa to see it for themselves. Their refusal sharply illuminated South Africa's estrangement. Since Dr. Verwoerd is not a stupid man, he can hardly have been surprised at the refusal; but some interpreted the incident as a painful evidence of the willingness of South Africa's critics to condemn without any knowledge of the real facts of the country.

The real facts, as the average South African sees them, are the events, the atmosphere, the tempo, of his own daily life. The outside world, he believes, has a distorted focus on his country. His own picture of himself comes back to him, reflected in hostile debates in the United Nations, in images so misshapen that he feels himself to be the victim of a deliberate plot of misrepresentation and slander.

How does a South African who feels that the outside world is unfair to him see himself? What is his own focus upon his daily life? His view is not much different from that of the Southerner in a quiet suburb of Nashville or Atlanta who has an easy, friendly way with a Negro gardener. The fact that the personal warmth and kindliness which the white South African feels is part of a master-servant relationship sustained by the laws of the land does not occur to a housewife who gives her kitchen boy her husband's old shirt or who drives him in her own car to the pass office. One of the most remarkable facts is the manner in which the great range of discriminatory laws and the severity of their appli-

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cation to Africans are masked and submerged. They seem to exist at a lower level of comprehension and significance, like automobile accidents. This is so in spite of the still remarkably outspoken English language press.

This is not a colonial land. Its inhabitants are not colonists. They are at home here. Their earliest forebears came not very long after the Pilgrim Fathers came to America. The father of his country is Paul Kruger. His birthday, October 10, is a combination of Washington's Birthday and the Fourth of July. For the Afrikaner there are the same parades and proud patriotic speeches, the same reminders of past suffering, present accomplishment and future promise. The year 1964 is only the fourth year of the Republic, of full, unqualified, independent nationhood.

It is with bitterness and resentment that the Afrikaners hear the demand that this precious prize of independence be yielded almost as soon as it is won. Why should the fruits of over two generations of effort after the Boer War, of nearly five generations of effort since the Great Trek, be diluted and drowned at the demand of angry men at the United Nations? What other nation in what other continent of the entire world is being asked to give up so much?

Against those who cannot or will not see as they see, hope as they hope, South Africans—or certainly a great majority of them —have feelings of bewilderment, even outrage. Having themselves so intensely in view, the rest of the world is out of focus for them. To the resentful South African, it seems that the eye of the State Department, the British Foreign Office or the Kremlin flits casually over Viet Nam, the Berlin Corridor, Cuba, Kashmir, Laos, only to fix itself balefully on South Africa.

If the South African's view of himself is distorted, so too is the outside world's view of South Africa. The average man in the United States or the United Kingdom reduces the complexity of South Africa to simplicity. The thoughtful and conscientious South African liberal is baffled in trying to discern any feasible and acceptable course of progressive action. Yet outside the country the comfortable assumption prevails that there is no need for discussion; the obvious wrongness of the South African position must be matched by an available and self-evident rightness of immediate action.

South Africa's critics, particularly those in the Afro-Asian bloc, have already scored a major propaganda victory over South

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Africa. They have changed the whole frame of reference in which South Africa is judged. They have destroyed the concept of South Africa as a normal modern state and have gone far in substituting an African or Pan-African concept. In the view of average South Africans, South Africa is in Africa but not of it. They would prefer to compare their country with a small European nation or an American state; they do not like or accept the equation with other African states. Sometimes the Afrikaner likes to be compared with Israel, also a holy and beloved land, also beleaguered.

An even greater diplomatic triumph has been gained in forcing South Africa's domestic policies into the forum of international debate, even possibly onto a road leading to international action. The world feels that South Africa cannot be permitted to stand aside from the great current of change in Africa, that it cannot be absolved from the responsibility of yielding freedom, dignity and opportunity to men of all races within its borders.

To the leader of the new African state, the South African situation is an intolerable moral blot on his continent. The doctrine of white supremacy, perpetuated by a network of laws and police action, forces him into a radicalness of speech and action which admits of no other consideration than the overwhelming issue of human rights. In the winy atmosphere of new-found dignity and independence, African leaders are understandably provoked by the gospel of apartheid into defining the whites of South Africa as an intrusive expatriate element; and from that premise into making demands for changes so swift and sweeping that they inevitably seem prescriptions for chaos and disaster.

In Africa the time schedule for change has become extremely brief. Thirty or forty years ago even the most advanced and liberal thought on the future of Africa and the African would have placed the achievement of political independence far in the future, certainly beyond the middle of this century. Today the demand for independence and political rights brooks no delay and rejects the slow years of preparation that seemed natural earlier. Backwardness, primitiveness, economic unpreparedness cannot be accepted as reasons for slowness in removing political unfreedom, legal disabilities and economic restraints in the remaining areas where they prevail. The backwardness of the population of Angola or Mozambique, for instance, is absolutely no excuse in the eyes of independent African leadership for any delay in granting these territories their independence.

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White South Africa still adheres to the old time scale, so abruptly rejected in Africa to the north. "Give us time and we can find an answer" is a most common plea or assurance one hears in conversation with the intelligent South African man in the street; and often it is more sincere than evasive or complacent. The African and the South African time schedules are too utterly apart for any chance of agreement or adjustment.

The South African Government and its opponents in the Afro-Asian bloc are therefore engaged in a strange race. South Africa wants all the time, delay and postponement possible; time is needed to reveal the weaknesses of its opponents, and to confirm the practical wisdom and establish the success of South African policies. The generalship of the Afro-Asian bloc, on the other hand, cannot afford to wait until the new African states have established their own stable political and economic systems. Since they cannot run fast at home they must try to run as fast as possible abroad. Just as the politics of independence came before the economics of independence, so now does the diplomatic battle against South Africa come before the capacity to apply real pressure through their own matured national strength. The acquisition of African nationhood was of necessity followed by a request for the international financial and technical assistance that would provide independence with its social and economic foundations. The declaration of diplomatic warfare against South Africa also called for international aid, not in money but in votes in the United Nations, official expressions of sympathy, pressure through diplomatic channels and maybe still more tangible action in the form of boycotts, embargoes and sanctions.

The leaders of the Afro-Asian bloc instinctively feel the season of their advantage may be short. Already there is some impatience in the United Nations corridors over the stridency of their discourse, concern over the erratic and unpredictable character of political development in many African states, disillusionment at signs of oppression and dictatorship in some of them, concern over the heavy international bill yet to be met to insure stable economic growth and apprehension at the innumerable points of actual and potential friction among the African states themselves.

For the time being, however, most of the Western world still maintains a strong feeling of sympathy for the African states, an attitude of tolerance for the asperities of their domestic and foreign policies. At almost every conference on African matters

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Westerners show a nervous anxiety not to give offense to African leaders, to avoid bluntness in talking with them, to compromise the matter in hand to avoid ruffling individual susceptibilities. In this kid-glove treatment of African leaders the South African senses discrimination. The flow of financial support from governments or private foundations, the gentle tone used by American scholars in discussing the politics of various new African states where corruption and force are obviously rife, the almost deferential treatment given African politicians even when they are sulky and importunate—all this gives these critics an impression that the Western nations are acting emotionally, uncritically, even blindly, as if from a sense of guilt and fear. Although Washington and London must and do place the highest value on helping independent Africa to attain a more viable and prosperous footing, many of their acts and policies look sentimental, hasty and unrealistic when seen through South African eyes.

Finally, South Africans of all degrees find it difficult to understand the success of the diplomatic generalship of the Afro-Asian bloc, when so many fingers can be pointed at the generals themselves. Dictatorship in Ghana and the Sudan, the tragedy of tribal massacres in the Congo, bloody strife in Zanzibar, the perversion of one democratic system after another into a one-party government, arrests and expulsions of dissenting leaders without pretense of trial by law—what title do these facts give African spokesmen at the United Nations to talk about the police state in South Africa? Why this harsh isolation of South Africa when in fact she has so much company on the same continent, not to mention phenomena elsewhere like the caste system in India and America's own civil rights crisis that might give critics of apartheid pause? To South Africans it is an inescapable reflection that there is much hypocrisy abroad and much unfairness to South Africa. Dr. Verwoerd emphasized this feeling when he said that the difference between South Africa and much of the rest of the world was not in the practice of racial discrimination and separation but in the fact that South Africa used laws to carry it out while others did not. This is, of course, an overwhelmingly vital point of difference, and it did not escape Dr. Verwoerd's critics.

II

Future historians may describe the break-up of the colonial system in Africa in terms of the emancipation of mother countries

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from their empires rather than the emancipation of colonies from their mother countries. More was involved than the progressive grant of independence to former colonies; there was also the withdrawal of strategic power. In the case of Britain it was the closing of the protective umbrella held over British possessions, among them the Union of South Africa.

Two men, neither of them English, saw most clearly the new logic of African historical developments. The first was de Gaulle, who recognized that France would not have sufficient freedom and resources to become a leader in the new Europe unless she were emancipated from Africa. The second was Dr. Verwoerd. When he took the Republic out of the Commonwealth he was a step ahead of the inevitable moment when it would be plain to all that Great Britain no longer would exercise its power on behalf of South Africa.

For his act Dr. Verwoerd paid a price. South Africa's diplomatic defenses were greatly weakened, and its exposure to the offensive of hostile powers increased. But he gained a reward, which he accurately predicted. The declaration of a republic, he said, was the necessary first step toward uniting the country. He was right. As the grim truth became evident that Great Britain was, in impolite language, scuttling the traditional responsibilities of empire, the English-speaking South Africans entered a strange and lonely world. Familiar symbols faded; the comfort of having the Union Jack at hand was gone. As the pace of change in the rest of Africa increased, they pondered Dr. Verwoerd's warnings that South Africa was on its own and had to defend itself by its own strength. The traditional dividing line in South Africa had always been between Boer and Briton. The withdrawal of British strategic power and the propaganda war with the rest of Africa have blurred that division. Correspondingly, events of the last decade have given far greater prominence to the dividing line between white and non-white.

There are other reasons why the English-speaking community has changed some of its views of Dr. Verwoerd and his government. The Prime Minister himself exemplifies the statement that the Afrikaans-speaking section of South Africa is especially capable of throwing up men of great strength of intellect and will power. At the time of the Boer War and for a long time afterwards, the English-speaking South Africans had a low opinion of the business acumen and the managerial skill of the Afrikaner

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population. Now they behold men who handle their affairs with boldness, shrewdness and even imagination, and with practical consequences matched by no previous administration in this century. Comparisons between Dr. Verwoerd and the stern, headstrong but deeply imaginative leader of France are by no means absurd.

Even in the bitterly controversial area of race and language the Prime Minister's team is admitted to have acted with vigor and resourcefulness. Once South Africa had a native problem because few people thought seriously about it and nobody did anything much about it. Today the native problem is in the center of political thought and action. Quite apart from the debatable character of its basic assumptions and principles, this administration stands far above any previous government in the attention which it pays to the great issues of the nation. Whatever the ultimate outcome, good or evil, it will not be due to neglect. The government's activities range over the eradication of some urban slums, sanitary and police measures (although at great cost to human dignity), the creation of a Bantustan in the Transkei, the establishment of border industry and much more. Its fiscal policies have also improved the favorable balance of opinion. The financial panic after the Sharpeville massacre led to the prediction that matters would get worse if the Republic left the Commonwealth. But against the flight of capital and a collapse of confidence the government acted promptly and most firmly.

The effectiveness of the government's fiscal controls separated the sheep from the goats. Before the elections of 1960 it was possible for liberals to think of selling out and getting out. Now the government's firm administration of fiscal controls has forced many people to weigh their political beliefs against their economics, to consider what degree of sacrifice they are willing to accept. To what extent marginal and complacent adherents have left the liberal ranks is impossible to say. But it is quite certain that considerations of purse and property caused a new thoughtfulness about Dr. Verwoerd and his policies.

This tendency became deeper when the announced collapse of confidence did not after all take place. For a while the stock market sulked at lower levels; orders and inventories dropped; housing starts and commercial building lagged. But then stagnant capital, unable to take flight out of the country, flowed back into circulation. Stocks became good buys, building spurted, order

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books filled up, confidence returned. There was even quite suddenly a skilled manpower shortage. The white community was busy at work and had money to spend. For such prosperity the government reaped its reward. As a political dividend it was all the more valuable because it came from the business and industrial community. In South Africa the errors of politics have almost always been corrected by the triumphs of economics.

It is impossible to give any reliable measure of the new support that has moved behind Dr. Verwoerd. Yet very clearly Dr. Verwoerd is stronger politically by far than he was when the Republic was established. His political opponents are not at present a threat to his hold on office.

The independent African states are engaged in an effort to convince the rest of the world that Portugal and South Africa are a threat to world peace. In so doing they have handed the South African Government the means of declaring that not its policies but the words and deeds of its opponents constitute a menace to domestic peace. Ben Bella's threat to train saboteurs strengthens the government's claim that it must be given special powers in order to maintain domestic security. A leader in one of the African states may only be orating before a home audience when he talks menacingly of an invasion of South Africa, but his words none the less confirm South Africans in the belief that the crisis is real and that the government must use its police powers, even at the expense of the rule of law, in order to maintain the security of the state. As a result, fewer people than before are unhappy about the great increase of police powers now exercised over the entire population.

With each foreign attempt to hedge South Africa in, the government secures support from the individual or group that feels hurt. There is the scientist who has done invaluable work for the whole of Africa, but cannot pay a visit to Uganda; the Catholic who must fly around Africa to get to Rome now that South African airplanes have lost the right to land at Nairobi or Khartoum; the merchant who cannot send his goods to Dar es Salaam; the technician or official who must fight efforts to expel him from non-political international gatherings—such individuals are less inclined than they might once have been to side against Dr. Verwoerd, at least on matters of foreign policy.

It is not true to say that Dr. Verwoerd has acquired a stable, singleminded, resolute addition to his following. But it is true to

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say that a variety of considerations—property, fear, indignation, admiration—have become lines of sympathetic communication between his government and sections of the population which traditionally have opposed him and his predecessors of the Nationalist Party.

The government has also gone far in eliminating another kind of opposition. Even after Sharpeville any visitor who was enterprising enough could meet native leaders in variety. Now any effort to do so is met with a blank stare and a shrug of the shoulders. Most of the known African leaders are in prison or under strict surveillance; if there are others they are in hiding. There probably is a steady trickle of escapees over the borders, of whom some certainly will end up behind the Iron Curtain. African leaders who undertook to state their case within the country, to seek adjustment by discussion, to be available for negotiation, have landed in jail; the others almost certainly will seek harsher and less compromising means to their ends. What is true is that South Africa is destroying those with whom it could deal and breeding a generation of exiles with whom it will not be able to deal.

III

The liberal forces in South Africa are overwhelmingly the single most vital element of light in darkness and of hope in despair. Since South Africa as a whole is out of focus, its liberal elements are out of focus too. The cloud of resentment produced by South Africa's racial policies hides the liberal elements in its murk. They feel abandoned, and some have become bitter and angry. Many marginal liberals, that is, liberals of speech rather than deed, have fallen away or become mute. But when all deductions and qualifications have been made, there certainly remains a most significant and in numbers not inconsiderable group of anxious, thoughtful, responsible and conscientious minds. Although the English are numerically preponderant in their ranks, liberals cannot be ranged on one side of the linguistic fence.

The South African universities contain a special and highly important group of liberal-minded men who suffer acutely from the isolation and the unpopularity into which their country has been thrust. Not all university men by any means are liberals; one is much more likely to meet liberal colleagues in the English-speaking than in the Afrikaans-speaking universities.

A recent conference at the University of Cape Town illustrated

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the courage with which some of the South African liberals are facing the grave predicament in which the universities in South Africa find themselves. The conference was on the very matters that concern South Africa most deeply. The absence of emotional excitement, the intellectual integrity, indeed the generosity and impartiality of utterance, revealed the determination of an academic community to be its proper self, to maintain an atmosphere of free and scholarly inquiry no different from that in centers of learning anywhere else in the free world. Visitors from abroad felt grateful to their South African colleagues for evidencing the existence there and in other parts of South Africa of the questing spirit that controls and emancipates through knowledge and understanding. These men made it clear that the word liberal is the strict opposite of the word servile. Despite all the perversion and distortion of meaning inflicted on this word in South Africa, it remains the proper description of those who believe that freedom, justice, opportunity, health and nourishment are riches that can be mined without depletion and that increase the more intensively they are mined. During the exchanges at Cape Town it was impossible to avoid a sense of sadness and even a sense of sharing in guilt, because the shadow that fell on their country's policies fell upon them too. They were isolated. They found it harder to find recruits to fill gaps in their ranks with first-rate minds. Above all, the flow of funds from foundations and other donor agencies in the outside world had dwindled to a trickle.

At another university there was a second but more informal confrontation with a senior academic group so opposite to the foregoing and so depressing in its meaning as to create the deepest sense of pity and of tragedy. What began as pleasant chatter at a dinner table suddenly turned into angry accusations and denunciations of the American "stab in the back." Reason was swept aside in an assault on the American Government, foundations and universities, on African study programs in American universities and on South Africans who had accepted posts in African universities. Almost animal anger was directed indiscriminately against American support of African universities and also against the alleged American support of Afrikaans universities, as showing that American policy illogically supported both Dr. Verwoerd and his African opponents. In the face of this sort of anger, reason and explanation sounded thin and made no headway.

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What mattered was the discovery of the loss in a university of the liberal, reflective temper, the dulling of its edge and the degradation of its goals. Decent men were turning to narrow xenophobia. Their justification was that the heavy weight of world opprobrium had fallen indiscriminately upon them too, or so they felt, even though they had battled for the open university and spoken loudly and clearly on the right of men of color to the opportunities of education. Therefore, in spite of the sourness of the occasion, it was possible to come to the same conclusion as after the sweeter discourse at the University of Cape Town.

The conclusion is that it is destructive and wasteful to neglect the sources of thought and liberal debate in this laboring land. When the intellectual leaders of a country become demoralized and perplexed or feel repudiated, they can become, despite themselves, even without knowing it themselves, converts to the heresies they have battled. For any country this is a moment of tragedy. We have a responsibility to give companionship and encouragement to those who have not fled the battle and do not wish to sheathe their swords.

It is from the thoughtful spirits within and without the South African universities, and not from the speeches of government ministers, that one must try to make a new appraisal of government policies. Their voices are little heard overseas, but it is they who show that the gross oversimplification of the South African crisis is misleading and dangerous. It would be provocative and unhelpful for any outsider to be too specific or too doctrinaire in defining the appropriate direction or pace or timing of liberal action in South Africa. Anyone who says that he knows the answer shows that he does not understand the problem. This is why the sweeping and doctrinaire statements of political leaders outside the country do not always command the expected respect of the serious South African liberal.

His search is for change within the framework of an economic system which is greatly dependent upon the presence of the white population. He cannot ignore the fact that the white population is responsible for the investment of capital, for scientific and technological skills, and for the organization through which they can effectively be exercised. He must even consider the fact that the stable environment suitable to economic growth and development, the atmosphere favorable to capital formation and capital

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imports, in turn depend upon an efficient system of public safety, upon the preservation of domestic law and order.

In the modern world, it is totally unacceptable to argue that these economic prerequisites justify the claim to an exclusive white hegemony. It would be equally unrealistic not to recognize that abrupt and violent political change could disrupt the conditions needed for economic development. The South African liberal therefore is searching desperately to find a way between the two unacceptable alternatives of economic chaos and human despair.

That his search is a lonely and sometimes desperate one cannot be denied. But it is important for all who know the extreme gravity of the South African problem to know also that the land has its ferment. Thoughts are flowing and new forces are at work beneath the surface. Much that is happening represents a mood of some concession and flexibility in face of the pressure for change from the outside world. Outspoken liberals even welcome the severest censure of South African policies abroad as a method of bringing their country to terms with the main currents of world political development.

At the same time, certain liberals of unquestioned integrity are thoughtfully attentive to some of the acts of Dr. Verwoerd and his Government. They even show respectful interest in the concept of independent or quasi-independent Bantustans. For anyone coming from the outside this is distinctly surprising. The idea that Bantustans could ever be a homeland or a series of homelands for the Africans is still absurd. Even with a measure of self-rule and economic development they do not offer a major solution to black and white relationships in South Africa. The most liberal provision of land and political privilege for those in separate areas still leaves totally unaffected the lot of those living in towns and on farms. Even though the border industries fostered by the Government would give employment and income to the residents of the so-called Bantustan areas, this does not alter the fact that the African labor force is the essential basis of the whole national economy. Nor are those who favor giving up the whole of the Transkei, Natal and Zululand and in addition Basutoland, Bechuanaland, Swaziland and a part of the northern Transvaal doing more than buying time by temporary concessions and expedients, shuffling open spaces on a map without regard to the

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people in them or to how the people in them can adequately share in the opportunities of the modern world.

Thus in a few sentences one can dispose of the dream that white and black areas can produce an acceptable apartheid of viable white and black states. The proposed Bantustan solution is a measure of the despair of those who admit that the great majority of the whites refuse to share political power with the non-whites. Nevertheless, for certain liberals who reject the principle of Bantustan, or the even more radical division of South Africa into white and black areas, the Bantustan experiment has some appeal because it promises an enlarged political experience and establishes an enlarged area of experiment. The end is abhorrent; but the means offer relief from the political rightlessness in the white areas. These are considerations that should not be too summarily rejected.

IV

Even in the areas reserved by laws and police measures for white domination the black population is not stagnant or hopeless. Political rightlessness and social segregation do not result in economic stagnation as well. Thus there is evidence of the emergence of an African lower middle class, meaning people who are urbanized, wage-earning, some way up the ladder of industrial skills, westernized in many of their tastes and cultural attributes. Despite the lines of legal separation, there continues an upward rise of the African population and an interweaving with the European's economic institutions. In the history of the Negro in America there came a moment when he became an American and was no longer an African. There is reason to believe that in a special but most important sense Africans are becoming South Africans. To students of South Africa there is nothing startlingly new in the growing interdependence of black and white. It is not only economic but increasingly cultural and, according to the leading South African anthropologist, emotional as well. South African refugees do not feel themselves at home in Dar es Salaam or Accra. They come from an environment where even for themselves there is a higher standard of living, one which is more sophisticated and culturally more complex. The South African refugee frequently finds it hard not to feel superior to the Tanganyikans whom he meets. Paradoxically, he often feels more alien where he is free than where he is unfree.

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In other words, not all the legislation of apartheid can separate classes, races and colors from one another, nor can it prevent Africans from gaining in knowledge and experience. The law is a heavy crust, but beneath it there is a ferment of change and adjustment that ultimately might reduce the inequities and discrimination against which so much of the world protests.

In making this point, some South Africans feel that they present a telling argument in favor of letting the customary pace of their history carry on its work of improvement and adjustment. Unfortunately the argument is not complete. By imprisoning and gagging the African leaders the government has made it difficult for South Africans to recognize adequately another advance in the sophistication of the non-white population, namely the advance in political self-awareness. This advance can be described as a grim and continuing movement of estrangement between white and black and the piling up of ever greater masses of explosive material. The effort to draw or dampen the fuses of African leadership cannot diminish the latent explosive power that already exists. No censorship or detention, no Bantu Education Act or frontier patrol, can prevent the African population from reading and understanding the story of its condition.

Every student of South Africa has participated in the guessing game on when and how the explosion will arrive. Some may exaggerate the nearness of the crisis, others its remoteness; few will predict no crisis at all. The crisis could come by summer 1965 in international form as a consequence of the pronouncement of the World Court on the status of South-West Africa. A peremptory mandate from the United Nations or an inflexible response from Dr. Verwoerd's Government could set in motion severe economic or other coercive pressures on the Republic. It is necessary also to pay the closest attention to the rising temperature over Southern Rhodesia and, above all, Portuguese Angola and Mozambique. The forward diplomatic and political push of independent Africa has not been checked; new challenges and predicaments for the South African Government are on the way. Some sort of cataclysm may be an historical inevitability. Yet any mind guided by compassion and by the certain knowledge that black and white alike will founder in the same cataclysm must persist in raising the question whether there is still an alternative. The question becomes even more pressing when it is recognized that a crisis or

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tragedy in South Africa would throw great shock waves into the rest of Africa, and, farther still, into the cold war.

One must concede that with each year Dr. Verwoerd's Government further depletes the stock of understanding and concession available in the outside world. Yet in the spirit of the statesmanship which continues to negotiate in the very teeth of imminent war, there is wisdom as well as generosity in struggling to maintain whatever contact is possible with the forces of liberalism in South Africa, and also with the other worried men there who have begun to wonder whether there is much time left in which to compose their differences with the outside world. It was an African liberal, Chief Luthuli, who explained that in a new South Africa an even deeper coöperation between black and white would be indispensable.

The late President Kennedy left us with two lessons that could be relevant to the South African problem. The decision of his Administration to support the civil rights movement by word and deed was necessary to break the deadlock caused by Southern resistance and inertia. But then he proceeded to the argument that the full citizenship of the Negro would be advanced most surely if there were compliance and consent in the minds and the hearts of all Americans. In order to apply these lessons to South Africa one must assume that in a country brought into step with the rest of the world there will still be a real place for the labor, the talents and the dedication of the white population. On this critical point some leaders in Africa as well as in the free world have already spoken with tolerance and discernment. In perhaps paradoxical language, this requires an involuntary reaction both to the sting of criticism from without and to the irritation, thoughtfulness and self-examination within. If there is still room for a plea that the United Nations show patience and moderation in the difficult times that lie ahead, it is not because patience and moderation will certainly produce a cure, but because nothing but patience and moderation, without sacrifice of principle, has a chance of mitigating the severity of a crisis if it comes and strengthening the elements of coöperation which remain vital to any solution worked out within South Africa.

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RUSSIA AND EUROPE

By Zbigniew Brzezinski

THE Soviet attitude toward the development of European unity has been ambivalent in both politics and economics. The Kremlin, unable to interpret the European movement accurately, has oscillated from one reaction to another. Meanwhile the processes of change within the Communist world, intensified by the Sino-Soviet schism, were creating the preconditions for a new historical relationship between the Western and the Eastern parts of the old Continent.

II

The Treaty of Rome, establishing Euratom and the Common Market, was signed March 25, 1957. It was not a sudden move. Coming after many years of discussion and prolonged negotiations, it climaxed the efforts initiated by the Marshall Plan in the late 1940s. Yet despite this lengthy prelude, the Communist leaders at first seemed unable to perceive the Common Market's full implications, and as a result their responses to it have been characterized by a high degree of confusion and inconsistency.

In the seven years that have since elapsed, the Soviet analysis of European developments, of the Common Market, of the role of the United States, of the reëmergence of France, and of the new Franco-German relationship has undergone several radical revisions. In part, these revisions were necessitated by the rapid flow of events. It would be wrong to imply that flexibility of analysis is in itself proof of the inadequacy of the original analysis. But Soviet statements also reveal that Soviet policy-makers were struggling hard to perceive the implications of a new reality which somehow did not fit their ideologically influenced categories.

An examination of the major Soviet pronouncements and, even more important, of the discussions in the serious academic Soviet journals on foreign affairs, suggests that the evolution and revision of Soviet thinking may be seen in terms of four successive major themes, one of course overlapping with the next. The latter qualification is important, because it would be misleading to suggest that at any given point the Soviet mood was fixed and absolutely rigid; within a certain wide spectrum there was a continuous debate.

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Thus, broadly speaking, immediately prior to the Treaty of Rome and for a while afterwards, Soviet spokesmen stressed the proposition that politically the Common Market was an American plot to subordinate Europe and that economically it was unimportant. In the late fifties, the emphasis shifted to the political threat represented by Germany (or, as a variant, to the danger of a joint American-German hegemony), while economically the Common Market was seen in an ambivalent light—no longer simply dismissed as an insignificant irrelevance but not yet taken quite seriously. In the early sixties, uncertainty pervaded the political analysis, especially in defining the Soviet stand toward British participation in the Common Market; but economically the ambivalence gave way to at best a thinly veiled fear of the Common Market's impact on the Communist world. Finally, from mid-1962, the political analyses began to lay primary emphasis on the Franco-German threat, while the economic analyses welcomed any open manifestations of "imperialist contradictions."

In June 1957, the authoritative Moscow Institute of World Economy and International Relations published its basic theses "On the Creation of the Common Market and Euratom," in which it dismissed categorically, as an illusory hope, the proposition advanced by some supporters of the Common Market that eventually it would make Europe independent of America. Moreover, Soviet observers, writing in the authoritative *International Affairs,* saw it as expressing an inherent capitalist tendency toward domination "by one leading imperialist power over others" and leading toward "American tutelage over France and the whole of Western Europe." As a result, the West European countries would be "robbed" of any possibility of pursuing an independent economic policy. The treaty was defined as "one of the most important links in the chain of Europe's economic and political subordination to the aggressive plans of U. S. monopoly capitalism." However, the writers (introducing a theme which subsequently was to become dominant) warned that the long-range beneficiary of the treaty would be West Germany.

Remarkably little attention was paid to the economic aspects. For example, a joint meeting of the editorial board of *International Affairs* and of the Department of Political Economy of the Academy of Social Sciences of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. in April 1958, which was devoted to the subject of "The

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Present Economic Situation in the Capitalist World," barely deigned to mention the Common Market, and then only in passing, but instead concentrated on the more ideologically satisfactory matter of "the sharpening of contradictions" in Western Europe. The view tended to be that these contradictions were fundamentally insoluble and that the Common Market would founder on them.

Partly for tactical reasons, and perhaps in part because of genuine fears, the Soviet Union by 1958 had also stepped up the theme of German domination in West Europe. Not surprisingly, the warnings were most frequently addressed to France, in keeping with the broad thrust of Soviet propaganda since the West began in the early fifties to promote West German rearmament. The Common Market was increasingly represented as a joint American-German conspiracy, designed particularly to subordinate France. Numerous articles appeared in Soviet journals "proving" that West German monopolies were extending their sway over all of West Europe and underpinning the American effort to secure political supremacy. French interests were depicted as either sacrificed by disloyal French ruling classes or incapable of resisting this overwhelming onslaught. The constant leitmotiv was that French and German national interests were irreconcilable. Even after General de Gaulle had come to power this view continued to dominate. Some Soviet commentators did gradually concede that the German and French "bourgeoisies" had certain common interests, that outside the French Communist Party "there is no political group of any importance in France which demands an end to the policy of alliance with German militarism," and that there might even be some temporary benefits accruing to French big business from such a rapprochement. But the argument usually turned on the basic proposition that France was becoming West Germany's junior partner and that this was inevitable, given the constellation of economic power.

Earlier contemptuous dismissals of the economic importance of the Common Market gradually gave way to a greater, if rather ambivalent, interest in it. Internal economic difficulties were gleefully discussed, and much attention was devoted to the clash of interests between the E.E.C. and EFTA. This was held to validate the original proposition that from an economic standpoint the enterprise was doomed to fail. Somewhat inconsistently, however, and certainly in conflict with the analysis made in 1957

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by the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, there began to appear by late 1959 the theme of European-American economic competition. Although France and Germany were still said to be in basic economic conflict, they were seen as already jointly challenging American hegemony, and Secretary Dillon's mission to Europe was described by *Pravda* (December 12, 1959) as an effort to overcome West Europe's attempts "to weaken somewhat the course of American economic 'guidance'." Thus West European economic unity, said to be an impossibility, was paradoxically portrayed as challenging the American economic domination which was held to have been enhanced by American efforts to enforce that same European unity.

Within a year, the original thesis of American domination was officially buried. In September 1960, a contributor to *International Affairs* declared that "in contemporary conditions the former U. S. approach to West European economic problems, as only a means of reinforcing the NATO military bloc, is clearly outdated. The United States has lost control over the process of West Europe's economic integration." This was made authoritative a year later with Khrushchev's statement to the Twenty-second C.P.S.U. Congress, which noted that the United States had lost its "absolute superiority" in the capitalist world economy and that this decline, shared also by England and France, was paralleled by the growing power of West Germany and Japan. However, the political implications seem to have been quite hazy to the Soviet leaders. Khrushchev, abandoning hope of inter-imperialist wars, still stressed intensifying contradictions while speaking of the decline of the United States, Britain and France.

The crux of the political uncertainty was the problem of British participation in the Common Market. Since the whole venture was described as an imperialist plot—first purely American and then increasingly taken over by the Franco-German bourgeoisie—the Soviet leaders found difficulty in favoring the adherence of other nations to it. Furthermore, the Kremlin instinctively welcomed the conflict between the E.E.C. and EFTA, and feared that the United Kingdom's entry into the Common Market would automatically spell the end of that particular "imperialist contradiction." At the same time, however, the Soviet leaders were probably sincerely concerned lest the decline in relative American power be balanced by a consequent increase in German influence, or possibly a Franco-

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German constellation, thereby giving the Common Market a more anti-Soviet complexion. They doubtless felt that German aspirations were likely to conflict more directly with their own than the more defensive American and British desire to forge an Atlantic community, with the Elbe its eastern limit.

Thus the Soviet leaders were torn by conflicting considerations. From an economic point of view, Britain's membership in the Common Market would be a further denial of the underlying premises of their ideological perspective; it would round out an even more powerful economic "capitalist" world; and it would be certain to have a further negative impact on the trade of the Soviets and of Communist East Europe. More broadly still, it would intensify the historical appeal of European unity; and this was a consideration which Moscow could not entirely neglect in view of the revisionist mood among the youth of East Europe and even Russia. By the middle of 1962 the Soviet leaders seem to have awakened to the realization that the Common Market was a reality, and, perhaps overcompensating for their past belief in its "insoluble internal contradictions," they now began to speak of it as a powerful and dangerous instrument of imperialist aggression. In this light, any further expansion of it was unwelcome. At the same time, something would be gained if Britain joined. Germany would be balanced; a restraining voice, perhaps eventually even a pacifist one, would be introduced (so the Soviets reasoned) into the political councils of the Common Market; and what seemed advantageous, the entire political structure would become more complex. As Moscow belatedly began to perceive that a Franco-German axis was being formed, Britain looked like a good counterweight.[1]

This ambivalence about Britain's political role in the Common Market was matched by a growing concern over the organization's economic implications, and the two together made for a very uncertain general line. In May 1962 Khrushchev delivered a major attack on the Common Market and urged that an international conference be convened to produce in its stead a worldwide trade organization of which the Communist bloc would be

[1] Some Soviet observers went so far as to negate their previous warnings about "German hegemony" and talked about "French hegemony in Western Europe." For example, see I. Lemin, "European Integration: Some Results and Perspectives," *Mirovaia Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnie Otnosheniia,* Part II, May 1962, p. 42–55; and V. Cherpakov, "The Common Market—An Instrument for the Intensification of Monopolistic Oppression and Aggression," *Kommunist,* May 1962, p. 22–35.

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a part. This left little doubt that the Common Market was now being taken seriously and was being interpreted not only as a direct threat to the Communist world but also as an effective mechanism for establishing closer bonds between the Western world and the developing nations. New theses of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, published shortly afterwards, while still speaking about the "knot of imperialist contradictions" as well as now also noting the French and German claims to leadership in Europe, grudgingly acknowledged that the Common Market could "provide an impetus to increasing the volume of production and of domestic and foreign trade." This was coupled with a strong plea for the most-favored-nation principle.[2] These proposals were clearly not being made from a position of economic strength.

Soviet optimism was given a new lease on life by General de Gaulle's press conference of January 14, 1963. It was triumphantly proclaimed that "this confirms what Marxists have said all along: Underneath the thin crust of 'Atlantic Unity' there boils the hot lava of imperialist contradictions." For the time being, fears of Franco-German imperialism were laid aside and the event was seen as renewed proof of the West's inevitable decline. The whole Western Alliance was represented as being at stake, and, while Soviet reporting on the whole took a sympathetic tone toward Britain's plight, the dominant note was clearly one of jubilation. But more somber voices were also heard, and it did not take long for Moscow to perceive that fundamentally not much had really been changed, that the economic threat still persisted, and that in some ways the political picture had become more ominous. V. Nekrasov, writing in *Izvestia*, warned that Britain's exclusion facilitated the transformation of the Common Market into a political-military bloc (the theme of contradictions being quietly ignored), and by the middle of the year Moscow was addressing urgent pleas to Paris (Soviet note of May 17, 1963) not to further the nuclear rearmament of West Germany, and unashamedly appealing to the pride of the French (only a short

[2] *Pravda*, August 26, 1962. For a more ideological and also oversimplified restatement of these themes, see V. Gantman, "Imperialist Integration and International Relations," *Kommunist*, November 1962, p. 96–107. See also the proceedings of the Moscow Conference on Contemporary Capitalism, summer 1962, published in *Mirovaia Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnie Otnosheniia*, November and December 1962, p. 54–71 and 59–79 respectively, which cast an interesting light on the role of non-Russian Marxists in enlightening their Russian colleagues about affairs in Europe.

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time before portrayed as German vassals): "It will be no exaggeration to say that if the Soviet Union and France, the two greatest powers of the European continent, were to act in concert on the basic issues on which the future of Europe depends, then no forces could rise up and attempt to redraw the map of Europe." The change from contempt to flattery was caused both by the impact of the Common Market on the East and by the reappearance of a French foreign policy.

The foregoing discussion suggests that the Soviets were impeded in gaining any clear perception of the Common Market by: 1, ideological rigidity, with strong emphasis on "inherent" economic contradictions in capitalism; 2, an assumption that old national animosities in Europe would endure, particularly those between France and Germany; 3, a fixation on the American position in Europe and the resulting tendency to judge everything in terms of it; 4, an overestimation of the importance of the failure of the E.D.C. and hence the belief that the E.E.C. would also fail; and 5, a general ignorance of developments in the West, caused by lack of personal contacts and lack of understanding of dominant trends of Western thought, the outcome of many years of self-imposed isolation.

III

If a sense of Soviet weakness and concern was discernible in the realm of politics and ideology, it was even more clear and also more warranted in the economic field. The simple fact was that trade with Western Europe was more important to the Communist states than to Western Europe, and the development of the Common Market, with its internal tariff arrangements and new internal trade patterns, was thus a formidable threat. The device chosen to counteract it was a strengthening of the Council of Economic Mutual Assistance, a long-dormant Stalinist organization of the East European nations and the Soviet Union, which had been revived in the mid-fifties to compensate for the decline in direct Soviet political control over the satellites. The situation faced by CEMA was that its trade with the E.E.C. represented a percentage of its total trade 2.3 times higher than the corresponding percentage of the E.E.C.'s trade with CEMA, relative to the E.E.C.'s total trade. Further, while the trade of some of the Communist states with the Common Market did not represent a very significant portion of their total trade, it

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did represent a major part of their total trade with the "capitalist" world and was a prime source of hard currency.

Because of these considerations, Communist leaders feared the consequences of lowered customs among the Common Market countries, combined with the introduction of uniform customs duties in respect to non-member countries. They also feared that the endeavor to establish a common agricultural policy, aiming at self-sufficiency, might affect adversely the exports of some of the East European countries. Finally, they were uneasy lest the effort to establish a general commercial policy regarding non-members might give the business community in Common Market countries a new lever in dealings with the East. This was stated frankly by a Polish journal in August 1963: "A common commercial policy of the Common Market countries creates the possibility of a simultaneous stopping of imports or exports by all six member countries. Let us simply recall the embargo in the recent period of the cold war to realize the full danger contained in this intention of the Common Market countries."[3]

In public, the Soviet reaction to the economic impact of the Common Market was to thunder against it as a political and economic plot. The substantive reaction, beginning in 1960, was to accelerate efforts to develop the Council of Economic Mutual Assistance. Under its auspices economic specialization has been introduced into several branches of the heavy industry of member nations; preliminary steps have been taken to establish broad guidelines for national economic planning over a twenty-year period; and, after a long delay, multilateral economic institutions have begun to make their appearance. The operations of CEMA, hitherto largely an ad hoc body, were also regularized and institutionalized, and a formal charter was promulgated, outlining in some detail its scope and modus operandi. In October 1963 a CEMA agreement was signed, providing for a common bank for clearing purposes, based on a gold ruble (a scheme obviously copied from West European experience). Energetic efforts were also made to create the necessary statistical basis for effective common planning (a matter of particular importance,

[3] Presumably because of this fear, some Communist spokesmen have shown interest in a trial balloon launched in the late summer of 1963 by Austrian Foreign Minister Kreisky, proposing an EFTA-CEMA trade agreement (*cf. Rynki Zagraniczne,* September 14, 1963).

In September 1963, the E.E.C. made its first joint tariff move with respect to the U.S.S.R., demanding Soviet acceptance of the E.E.C. tariff while offering the benefits of the lower internal E.E.C. tariff on four Soviet export items (*Le Monde,* weekly ed., October 17–23, 1963).

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given the absence of the market mechanism), and several multilateral economic projects were undertaken involving common pipelines, rail stock, communication cables, etc.

The quest for economically "rational" specialization, however, soon proved incompatible with specific national interests in the Soviet bloc, given the wide disparities in levels of industrial development and proficiency. Applied strictly, it was bound to favor the more industrially developed nations, *i.e.* the Soviet Union, East Germany and Czechoslovakia. As a result, the move was opposed by the less developed states, and especially by Rumania, which saw favorable opportunities for its own industrial development. As a Rumanian spokesman said: "Just as on the domestic scene an absolutist criterion of efficiency cannot be countenanced, so in the field of specialization and coöperation between the socialist countries, economic efficiency and profitability cannot be accepted as the one and only criterion with which to evaluate new economic steps." And he asserted: "Building Communism on a world-wide scale is incompatible with the notion of dividing countries into industrial states and agrarian states, into developed countries and underdeveloped countries."[4]

Two factors made it difficult to refute the point made by the Rumanians. One was the development of the Common Market, which, on the one hand, involved the rapid industrial development of a relatively backward country such as Italy (thereby creating an embarrassing example) and, on the other, could present the Rumanians with tempting trade arrangements (*e.g.* the French have already shown an interest in developing the Rumanian oil industry). The other was the development of internal complications within the Communist world. The Chinese, in their attacks on Moscow, have pointedly raised the matter of discriminatory economic development, and this item the Rumanians have demonstratively republished in their own press. Here again, the relative ability of the Common Market to solve similar problems was bound to intrude into the Communist discussions. Indeed, one may suspect that the resentment of the Chinese leaders at the Soviet failure to help their economic development adequately was fed by the sight of the extensive and effective American aid to Europe. The resulting spectacular European recovery

[4] I. Rachmuth, "The Importance of Establishing a Rate of Development Which Will Level Off the Economic Progress of All Socialist Countries," *Probleme Economice*, Bucharest, July 1963.

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contrasted sharply with continued Chinese failures and with the lack of interest shown by the Soviets, and in that way contributed to internal Communist dissension.

The economic and the ideological impact of the Common Market thus challenged the basic proposition of the Communists that they have the key to the future. There were political factors, too, which made them pay more attention to the new strength of Western Europe, among them their failure to resolve the Berlin issue in their favor and the gradual reëmergence of France as an independent European force.

IV

The political challenge was personified by de Gaulle and expressed through his assertively independent French policy for Europe. In its short-range aspect, this policy raised the immediate problem of the organization and distribution of power in the West; in its longer-range aspect, it called for the definition of a new relationship with the East. By 1963, the outlines of the former were clear, and the latter, although still tentative, were beginning to take shape.

De Gaulle's policy in the West rested on his confidence in the durability of West Europe's new economic structure and in the capacity of the United States to deter any Soviet military action against Western Europe. If the basic European motivation in the late forties can be said to have been fear of Soviet aggression, in the early sixties it was self-confidence. Taking this as his point of departure, de Gaulle pressed steadily to diminish American political influence on the Continent and to replace it by Franco-German concord. Given the limits imposed on German rearmanent and, more important, the moral and political factors involved, he could reasonably assume that the political (and perhaps also military) leadership in that relationship would inevitably be exercised by France. To assure that end, and also to increase Europe's influence on American military policy (at least to the point of achieving the capacity to involve the United States even against its desire), de Gaulle undertook to transform France into a nuclear power. The long-range importance of this more than compensated, in his view, for the temporary isolation and even unpopularity of France. Only so could he defeat the Anglo-Saxon conception of an Atlantic community in which, as he saw it, the political and military power would be controlled

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almost entirely from Washington and London. A tightly integrated Western Europe subject to such "external" control would be, as he put it on September 28, 1963, a Europe "without soul, without backbone, and without roots," subject "to one or the other of the two foreign hegemonies."

Consequently, in his view, such a Europe would become the tool of the two superpowers, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., which in fact had no incompatible interests in Europe at the time. Moscow, it would seem, no longer expected to be able to swallow up (in the near future, at least) the rest of Europe, and was content to remain on the Elbe, busy consolidating its rear. America, despite what its leaders said, accepted that division. De Gaulle stated his belief in this quite openly on July 29, 1963: "The United States, which since Yalta and Potsdam has had nothing to demand from the Soviets, now sees prospects of understanding opening before it. The result is the separate negotiations between the Anglo-Saxons and the Soviets, which, starting from the restricted nuclear test agreement, appear about to be extended to other questions, notably European questions, and so far in the absence of any Europeans. This obviously runs counter to the views of France." Having held America responsible for the division of Europe, de Gaulle then asserted that in time "a complete change in the relations between East and West in Europe" would become possible and that "when this day comes, and I have said this before, France expects to make constructive proposals concerning the peace, equilibrium, and destiny of Europe."

De Gaulle has given several hints as to what these "constructive proposals" might be. In brief, they involve the absorption of East Europe and Russia in a larger European community, based on a common cultural and historical heritage and defined geographically in a speech by the French leader on March 25, 1959. In that speech he launched the slogan of "Europe to the Urals," linking it to an eloquent plea for a common sense of European enterprise:

> We, who live between the Atlantic and the Urals, we, who are Europe, possessing with Europe's daughter, America, the principal sources and resources of civilization . . . why do we not pool a percentage of our raw materials, our manufactured goods, our food products, some of our scientists, technologists, economists, some of our trucks, ships, and aircraft in order to vanquish misery, develop the resources, and the trust in work, of less developed peoples? Let us do this not that they should be the pawns of our policies, but to improve the chances of life and peace. How much more worthwhile that would be than the territorial demands, ideological claims, imperialist ambitions which are leading the world to its death!

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Since then de Gaulle has frequently alluded to this concept. Clearly, he sees its realization as culminating in a lengthy process of transformation within the Communist states, perhaps accelerated by the Sino-Soviet conflict and the growing attraction of Europe and the Common Market. Accordingly, de Gaulle has cultivated China, hoping that Russia's new encirclement might even make her anxious to become part of Europe.

In spite of de Gaulle's close ties with Germany, which he sees as the backbone for independent European action, he has hoped gradually to accelerate the process of amalgamating Russia into Europe by lessening the fear of the East Europeans of a renewed German "Drang nach Osten." In this connection he has gone further than Washington. He has seen that acceptance of the present Polish-German frontier on the Oder-Neisse Rivers as permanent is the sine qua non for drawing Poland back into the European orbit.[5] And obviously, given the geographic location of Poland and its present links with Russia, it would be the vital link in any eventual return of Russia to a European orientation.

De Gaulle's preoccupation with East Europe reveals the strong element of French *sacro egoismo* and deception in his policy. Since his concept of Europe is one led by France, it follows that the two best alternatives for France are (1) Europe divided on the Elbe, in which a divided Germany depends on France for eventual reunification, or (2) a united Europe including not only a 70-million-strong Germany but also East Europe (and even Russia), for the latter combined with France would more than balance Germany. He therefore could not welcome a reunification of Germany while East Europe remained in the hands of a hostile and perhaps fearful Russia. For this reason, he welcomes and yet abuses the present American policy, which implicitly accepts the division of Germany at the Elbe while explicitly preaching reunification but with the eastern frontiers of Germany undefined (thus leaving the Poles no alternative but to support Moscow and Pankow wholeheartedly). This policy further makes it possible for France to gain German support simply by adopting verbally a more militant stand than the United States or Britain

[5] De Gaulle said in his press conference, March 25, 1959: "The reunification of the two parts into a single Germany which would be entirely free seems to us the normal destiny of the German people, *provided they do not reopen the question of their present frontiers to the west, the east, the north, and the south,* and that they move toward integrating themselves one day in a contractual organization of all Europe for coöperation, liberty and peace." (Italics added.)

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on such issues as Berlin. For the time being, German *immobilisme* on the subject of frontiers, together with the Hallstein doctrine and American tolerance of the division of Europe, are all in keeping with de Gaulle's wishes: since it is too early to move in the East, Franco-German political unity in the West should be forged meanwhile at the expense of "passive" America. If the United States and Germany should move now to recognize the Oder-Neisse line and attempt a political-economic penetration of Eastern Europe, France would be found unprepared and unable to exercise leadership. But in time, de Gaulle figures, Germany will realize the futility of the present American approach to its problems; then the moment will be ripe for France to seek actively a "Europe to the Urals." (Could the Soviet realm beyond the Urals be an inducement for the Chinese?)

The Soviet reaction as de Gaulle's design unfolded has been guarded, but there have been signs of mounting concern. Initially, the Soviet leaders seemed to welcome French restiveness simply because it represented a new complication for the arch rival, the United States.[6] They repeatedly stressed their desire to see France play a greater and more independent (*i.e.* anti-American) role in international affairs, and de Gaulle's leadership evidently provided a further impetus in that direction. *Pravda* made a point of recalling that the Soviet Union, unlike the United States, had given strong backing to de Gaulle's wartime Committee of National Liberation; and Khrushchev, both prior to and after his March 1960 visit to Paris, stressed his respect for the General and his "friendly" relations with him. Parallel efforts were made to invigorate Franco-Soviet trade, which had grown steadily in the late fifties, and which in 1958 for the first time passed the 1913 level. The growth of France was clearly linked in the Soviet mind with the decline of American power in Europe.

Although the Soviets for a time were hopeful that the resurgence of France might weaken the West, they were quite sensitive to any signs of French interest in East Europe. Thus after Adenauer's visit to Paris in the early fall of 1958, Khrushchev in a special "interview" singled out for criticism a phrase in the de Gaulle-Adenauer communiqué about an eventual inclusion of "the maximum possible number of European states" in a Euro-

[6] This was in line with the thesis of inherent Franco-American economic contradictions. See V. Liubimova, "The Problems of France's Participation in the 'Common Market.'" *Mirovaia Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnie Otnosheniia,* No. 3, 1957.

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pean federation. In Khrushchev's words, this meant that de Gaulle and Adenauer "must have lost all sense of reality to count seriously on success in any venture in Eastern Europe." He reiterated the point two days later to a German journalist.[7]

These fears mounted as the Franco-German alliance took shape. By 1960 it was clear from the tone of denunciations used by the Soviet spokesmen that they had reappraised the French role and were beginning to see in it a long-range political danger. France was represented not only as seeking to dominate Western Europe but also as encouraging the proliferation of nuclear weapons and as led by an Olympian figure who had lost all sense of reality. By 1962 France was frequently represented as the chief obstacle to the relaxation of international tensions, and de Gaulle's trip to Germany was officially attacked as part of a plot to establish a "Europe to the Urals" (this phrase was quoted) which would involve the liquidation of the Communist régimes of East Europe; this was to be achieved by joint Franco-German coöperation, including the sharing of nuclear weapons. The denunciations reached their peak in 1963, after France's refusal to sign the test-ban agreement.

Since de Gaulle's plans appear vague even to his own followers, they probably also appear vague to the Soviets. Yet this very vagueness, combined with the strong overtones of assertiveness toward Russia and East Europe, might seem to the Soviets more dangerous than the known and basically static Anglo-American "interest" in the areas east of the Elbe. As a result, the Soviet attitude toward the American position in Europe became more ambivalent. From a political point of view, a possible Franco-German challenge based on continental Europe represented a greater threat than the American-sponsored Atlantic community. Yet from an economic viewpoint, and even more militarily, it was certainly the United States and NATO that posed by far the greater threat. How to reconcile these alternatives became increasingly a dominant dilemma for the Soviets, and by 1963 they seemed to be somewhat less anxious than, for instance, the Chinese to see the United States excluded politically from the Continent.[8] Instead,

[7] *Pravda* commented, September 24, 1958: "Chancellor Adenauer and Premier de Gaulle were concerned even at their first meeting not only with reaching agreement on their actions within their own countries but, it seems, also with how to draw the countries of Eastern Europe into the so-called European federation, which is nothing but a branch of the aggressive North Atlantic bloc."

[8] For a Chinese view, see "The Imperialist Bloc Is Fast Disintegrating," *Jen Min Jih Pao*, Peking, February 24, 1963.

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they were more inclined to try to manœuvre the United States into a position of joint sponsorship of the division of Europe, in the hope of stabilizing the present partition and, perhaps, eventually creating new political opportunities for Soviet diplomacy.

In this regard, the Soviet confrontation of the United States in Cuba in late 1962 can be viewed as a particularly important watershed. It convinced the Soviets that for the time being their means were inadequate to their ends, and that the Soviet policy of pressing both politically and militarily for a breakthrough in Europe by means of the squeeze on Berlin was doomed to fail, and in fact had already become counter-productive. The United States would not yield, and the effect of the Soviet pressure in Cuba was to strengthen the "aggressive" forces in France and Germany. However, by striving for a Soviet-American rapprochement, based on an acceptance by Washington of the division of Europe, the Franco-German challenge might be converted into a destructive feud inside the Western Alliance and possibly might even lead ultimately to a new Rapallo. Apparently resigning itself for the time being to French and German hostility, the Kremlin decided to try to make certain that the Franco-German alignment would not receive American political and military backing. Thus Moscow has vigorously opposed the American scheme for establishing a European Multilateral Nuclear Force, on the grounds that it would strengthen the German political and military posture.[9] Yet failure to set up the M.L.F. would make General de Gaulle's policies more attractive to Bonn, and might even result in the creation of an independent German nuclear force, or at least a joint Franco-German force—which would serve French and German political ambitions that are less compatible with the maintenance of Soviet control over Central Europe than American objectives are. The Soviet opposition to M.L.F. thus played into the hands of Paris and increased Soviet uncertainty about how to handle the increasingly complex problem of relations with Europe.

V

Russian and American coöperation could maintain the division of Europe, but there would be no guarantee that at some moment Russia might not choose to exploit European frustrations over

[9] This ambivalence is well reflected in V. Nebrasov, "The Vicious Circle of 'Atlantic Policy'," *Pravda*, December 27, 1963.

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current policies of the United States, Russia's real global competitor. For the United States to join Russia in supporting the division of Europe would therefore be dangerous. European collaboration with Russia against America could come about only as a consequence of European resentment of American leadership, due to what was felt to be some American betrayal of European interests. A condition precedent would therefore have to be an American-Soviet entente, based on joint acceptance of the status quo in Europe. This is the goal now being sought by the Soviet Union. Without that preliminary, European-Russian collaboration appears most unlikely, given the Soviet desire to perpetuate its hegemony over half of Europe and the increasing West European determination to challenge it. American collaboration with Europe to reunite Europe and to reintegrate Russia into the Western civilization, a process now being favored by the Sino-Soviet schism, appears to be the strongest and most enduring combination, one in harmony with both American and European long-range interests.

More than ever, Russia is now becoming susceptible to the attraction of Europe. In the past, the Russian attitude toward Europe had fluctuated. On the one hand, there was arrogant talk of Moscow being the third Rome, then of its being the source of a new and universal ideology. On the other hand, there was a deep-seated sense of inferiority to the West and a desire to imitate it. The Russian Communists combined the sense of superiority with a drive to erase the inferiority (through imitation, *i.e.* industrialization). By narrowing the technical, economic and cultural gap between Europe and Russia, the Soviet leaders have created for the first time the possibility of a relationship that is equal and honorable to both. Meanwhile, the Sino-Soviet schism marred the universalist aspect of the ideology, while Soviet control of Eastern Europe not only has diminished Russian fears of the West but also has created a transmission belt for Western values. Without knowing it, the Soviet leaders have performed the historical function of preparing the ground for a larger Europe, but—alas for them—not a Communist one.

The challenge posed by France is a sign that Europe is now looking ahead, is no longer fearful for its survival. This reawakening has necessarily involved a realignment of power in the West, with consequent tensions in the Western Alliance. But the real challenge points eastward. Ideologically, the concept of European

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unity, with the Common Market as the initial symbol, is proving itself more captivating as an image of the future than a Europe split into conflicting groups as the Marxist-Leninists hoped. Economically, Western Europe has shown a far more impressive development in trade, in the pooling of common resources and in the general improvement of the standard of living than have the Communist countries. In politics, the public debates and disagreements among Western powers have been far less intense and bitter than the parallel conflicts and reciprocal excommunications within the Communist world. All this provides the West with an advantageous platform from which to invite the East to abandon its futile and old-fashioned ideological positions and to join in an undertaking that is also in its interest.

This could be done jointly by the United States and Western Europe in a variety of ways, ranging initially from long-term bilateral trade arrangements (now being undertaken) to eventually a multilateral economic development plan, based on the principle of European unity. Step by step, the East European states should be encouraged to become associated, remotely and indirectly at first, and then more and more closely and directly, with the Common Market. West Europe could also take the initiative in opening its frontiers to the youth of the East—and leave it to the Communist régimes, if they wish, to prevent their young people from sharing in growing European unity. It is doubtful that pressures for close ties, which would be so clearly in the interest of the peoples concerned, could long be resisted by their Communist governments. Resist they surely will, and the present efforts to develop rapidly the institutions and operations of CEMA reflect the realization of the Communist leaders that without a strengthened economic framework the Soviet bloc will be unable to match the West and contain the forces of national self-assertion within each member state. These efforts should not be underrated. But for the time being the concept of a united Europe is still ideologically more appealing and economically more promising. Unless the Soviet Union succeeds in enlisting American support on behalf of the status quo, or unless America and Western Europe fail to exploit the present opportunity and look on passively as the Soviet bloc is reconsolidated, Europe is not likely long to remain "without soul, without backbone, and without roots."

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AGRARIAN REFORM IN ASIA

By Wolf Ladejinsky

IT is no longer news that land reform is a critical issue throughout Asia, the Near East and Latin America. We are not surprised to see the Shah of Iran going about the country sponsoring a drastic redistribution of private holdings. Only yesterday, the Kingdom of Nepal was a Shangri-La; yet today King Mahendra finds time to listen, question and respond to the proposition that his country, too, must begin to find its place in the second half of this century by dealing with the causes underlying both the poverty of its agriculturists and the low productivity of its agriculture. President Macapagal in the Philippines, President Betancourt in Venezuela and Prime Minister Nehru in India have similarly been using "agrarian reform" in their search for answers to some of their countries' instabilities.

Communism is not the precursor of the agrarian reformism we are talking about here. Communism has made immense political use of the borrowed slogan of "Land and Liberty," and has ridden to power in part on this promissory note. Admittedly, too, it has exerted great pressure on the non-Communist world to look more closely at its land problems—in Eastern Europe after the First World War and in Asia after the Second World War. Yet the wrenching readjustments involved when the landless contend for the landlord's land are as old as recorded history. Tiberius Gracchus (163-133 B.C.), that model of a Roman aristocrat, saw the deliverance of the pauperized farmers of Italy in a program of land ownership for the landless. And many are the examples between then and the solution offered by the French Revolution which show that there has been a continuous chain in the struggle between peasant and landlord. With due allowance for the passage of time and changes in conditions, the problems now as then are fundamentally the same: How relieve the plight of cultivators working mostly for a pittance? How revive stagnating agricultural economies? How root the peasant securely and beneficially on the land he cultivates? The one important departure from the conditions of a bygone age is that the stated problems have the closest bearing on the over-all economic development of Asia, as indeed elsewhere.

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II

The answer to these questions constitutes what is broadly known as "agrarian reform." The term can mean various things to various people within the free world, let alone as between the Communist and non-Communist worlds. As exemplified by Soviet Russia and Communist China, agrarian reform is simple enough: it is a means to political power, based on a promise to the peasant of the one thing he wants most—ownership of the landlord's land—in exchange for his political support. Once the Communists are in power, all the land is confiscated, peasants become farm hands on collectives, communes and state farms, and harsh production and delivery quotas complete the rude awakening from an exhilarating but all-too-brief experience of freeholding.

In non-Communist Asia, agrarian reform is not without political motivation. The emphasis, however, is not on consolidating the power of the state *over* the peasantry but on increasing the state's well-being. The need for drastic changes stems from such questions as who owns or doesn't own the land, how it is used, who gets what out of the land, the productivity of the land, the rate of economic development, and, of course, social status and political power. These are not unique in any one part of Asia; all cut across cultural and national boundaries and together they represent the Achilles' heel of the Asian socio-economic structure.

The mere enumeration of the issues points to the fact that no single panacea can deal with them effectively; even redistribution of the land will not do it unless it is accompanied by the necessary means to work and improve the land. The economic opportunity and psychological incentives which come with the possession of land or security of tenure must go hand in hand with a host of other developmental measures. For this reason, agrarian reform in the sense considered here encompasses all or most of the following elements: distribution of land among the landless and favorable financial arrangements for tenant land-purchases; security of tenure and fair rents; better methods of cultivation through technical assistance, adequate credit, cooperative marketing facilities, etc. Agrarian reform is a combination of a great many things, and not all of them are of equal importance. Important though the other ingredients are, unless those who work the land own it, or are at least secure on the land as tenants, all the rest is likely to be writ in water. And this is the

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most difficult step to achieve. It is relatively easy to use science to increase production, but only if the cultivator's relationship to the land and the state's treatment of him and of agriculture create incentives to invest, to improve the land and to raise productivity. Too many of Asia's cultivators are still waiting to find that incentive.

Balzac's memorable description in "The Peasants" of General Montcornet's struggle to preserve his broad acres from the grasping peasants begins: "Whosoever land has, contention has." Montcornet's troubles were over only after he had suffered endless humiliation, had disposed of his land and had flown the nobleman's nest. In recent years, the landlords of Asia have been beset with a good deal of "contention" of their own. Although not universally, many peasants overtly and more covertly are no longer satisfied with their condition and point to the landlord's privileges, whether inherited or paid for.

Recent sojourns in India, the Philippines and Nepal have left the writer with the strong conviction that even in the first-named country, after more than a decade of reform efforts, the cultivator lives and works on the ragged edge of penury. In the rich granary of the district of Tanjore, in the state of Madras, the life of the majority of the cultivators, not to speak of the vast army of agricultural laborers, is indeed "a long-drawn question between a crop and a crop," as Kipling pithily summed it up. And Tanjore is no exception. In the Pampanga Province, one of the most important rice-producing areas of the Philippines, the cultivators, mostly landless tenants, are little better off, if any, than their counterparts in Tanjore. To the question, "What do you sell and what do you buy?" the answer is: "We have little to sell and little to buy." They are hardly on the fringes of the monetary economy, maintain bare subsistence, have nothing with which to invest and innovate, add little to the national product, and cannot be expected to be part of the much-talked-about economic development process. In eastern Terai, in Nepal, an area of relatively sparse population, landownership is for the exceptional few. The economic consequences are such that even a landlord admitted that "the tenants are often getting no more than the rice straw."

Directly related to this problem is the fact that four-fifths of Asia's vast population are peasants; millions of them are on too little land, and hordes of others are crowding onto the same

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land. Inadequate tools, archaic methods of cultivation and institutional arrangements over which the peasant has no control underscore his plight and explain his resentment.

Newspaper headlines in Asia are snatched by the glittering economic development plans with their emphasis on industrialization as the cure-all. Yet agriculture, not industry, is the pivot of economic life there. The ambitious postwar schemes for industrialization throughout Asia no longer are mere blueprints, but so far they have made only a small dent in the continent's traditional character. The factory is bringing material advancement to some groups, but surely not to a degree, even in the foreseeable future, to obscure the fact that the heart of the problem of Asia still lies in the countryside. It is on the farm that solutions must be sought and found, if the empty rice bowls are to be filled, if something is to be added to the half-empty ones and if the economic development of the various countries is to proceed by their own efforts.

III

When looking at rural Asia today, nearly two decades after the start of the reform movement, we see that the old order in the countryside has been under attack—vigorously in some countries, much less so, and with results to match, in many more. The reforms have certain things in common, and not only with regard to the condition of the peasantry. Their purpose is the same whatever the wording of an official pronouncement. President Macapagal of the Philippines spoke for all of them when, in signing the recent Agrarian Land Reform Code, he observed: "Let this signing be recorded in our annals as an Act of Emancipation of the toiling farmer from his slavery to debt, poverty and misery and of his dignification as a human being and as a citizen. By this Act of Emancipation a new revolution is on." After a series of land reform failures in the Philippines over a quarter of a century, whether this is so remains to be seen, but it does mirror the ultimate hope often voiced by all Asian countries when this thorny subject is approached. To bring it about, the Philippine Code relies on two general features common to all attempted reforms in Asia: security of tenure and the creation of peasant proprietorships.

On issues of substance, however, the reforms speak in a variety of voices, which more often than not are a far cry from the exalted

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pronouncements made on the supposedly historic occasions. They reflect inevitably the political climate in the country concerned. This determines the will or lack of will to proceed with the task; the kind of specifics with which the general measures are or are not endowed; the care or lack of care with which the enabling legislation is formulated; the preparation or lack of preparation of the pertinent technical and administrative services; the presence or absence of technical agricultural services with their bearing upon success or failure; and, finally and most importantly, the drive or lack of drive behind the enforcement of the provisions of the law. For these reasons, the results of the reform movement in Asia are anything but uniform. They run the full gamut, from Japan and Taiwan where fulfillment in the widest sense has been achieved; to Korea where much land has actually been redistributed but with results far from satisfactory; to South Viet Nam where land reform has been carried out in its essentials, but engulfed by a civil war before it came to fruition. Then there are the Philippines, Nepal, Pakistan and Indonesia—all knowledgeable in writing reform laws, some of them at variance with their fervent preambles—where the record to date ranges between poor performance and non-performance. Finally, there is India, significant and encouraging for what it has attained in unprecedentedly difficult and bewildering conditions, and just as significant and discouraging for what it has failed to attain, and for the reasons why.

The picture, clearly, is mixed, and in order to assess it a number of questions must be raised. The primary one is: Why have some reforms succeeded, others fallen short of their goals, and still others failed to get off the ground?

Just as Soviet Russia was the progenitor of the Communist type of reform, Japan and Taiwan are the progenitors of non-Communist reforms in Asia. Japan, the leader, and Taiwan, the follower and innovator, provided between them all the pertinent elements of leadership, content and implementation which made for a successful reform.

In Taiwan as in Japan, reforms were not designed to satisfy the claims of both contending parties: the tenant was to gain at the expense of the landlord. Without going into details, we may cite a few main provisions to demonstrate the emphasis on the ideological underpinnings and the lack of vacillation about the real intent of the measures. Security of tenure is one of the

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cases in point. The sharp reduction of rents in Taiwan was an important move; but more important were the provisions that, for all practical purposes, the tenants could remain on the leased land undisturbed even after the expiration of a contract. This virtually insured the enforcement of rental provisions. Less carefully worded stipulations might have undermined this part of the reform program, as has been the case in India, not to mention others.

Provisions for security of tenure in overcrowded Asian villages, where tenants compete fiercely for the privilege of cultivating somebody else's land, are notoriously difficult to enforce; yet in Taiwan a land redistribution program for the benefit of tenants who cultivated 40 percent of the land became much more feasible as a result of such provisions. With rents effectively reduced, the price of land subject to reform declined sharply. The result was that the traditional approach to land as a prime investment became unattractive. This in turn created a favorable condition for the last phase of the reform—the land-to-the-tiller program—a condition which did not exist in any other countries of Asia concerned with reform.

The idea that the reforms were meant to benefit the tenants is also apparent in the principal provisions about land redistribution and the creation of peasant proprietorships among tenants. Absentee landlords had to sell all of their land at fixed government prices; resident landlords were compelled to sell their land in excess of the permissible ceiling. Neither Japan nor Taiwan aimed to do away with tenancy as an institution; but with determination to enlarge the area of individual, private ownership, the low ceiling made it possible to extract a great deal of surplus land for redistribution. The result is that whereas before the reform 54 percent of Japan's land was owner-operated, after the reform the figure had risen to 92 percent; the respective figures for Taiwan are 60 and 85 percent.

What matters is not only at what level the ceiling is set, but also that it not be evaded. The problem of West Pakistan, to cite but one case, is not merely that the ceiling of 500 irrigated acres and 1,000 unirrigated acres is altogether too high where two-thirds of the owners average five acres each; it is also the exceptions and subdivisions of large holdings among members of a family which were made on the eve of the reform and which have combined to divest the ceiling and, by the same token, the

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entire land distribution program of any meaning. It is not surprising, therefore, that even if West Pakistan had implemented this part of the reform, only an estimated 7.5 percent of the country's 2,000,000 tenants might have obtained land. And Pakistan is no exception. In Japan and Taiwan, on the other hand, the acreage that could be retained by a landlord was fixed retroactively, both on the basis of the household as a unit and on the basis of land owned by that household. With a low ceiling, no evasions and effective implementation, the majority of the tenants become peasant-proprietors.

A crucial feature of any reform not intended to result in out-and-out confiscation is price and method of payment. Whatever the differences displayed in Asia in formulating and implementing a program, there is a consensus on one point: the price fixed must be considerably below the market price. Land-purchase under a reform is not an ordinary real-estate transaction where seller, broker and buyer meet in a free market. If it were, and if tenants were able to pay the "going price," there would be no need for a reform. The price fixed by a government is an arbitrary one, the degree of its arbitrariness depending upon how a reformer answers this question: "For whose benefit is the reform designed?"

The question of how to pay for the land is of paramount importance for government, landlord and tenant. No matter what the price, experience in Asia has shown that a government cannot pay in cash, in one lump sum. Here Taiwan provides a lesson worth pondering. In content, Taiwan's reform is in many respects similar to that of Japan, but in method of paying it is not. In Japan, what appeared to be a reasonable price when first fixed was later on swallowed up by a galloping inflation, virtually confiscating the landlord's land. To avoid this possibility, Taiwan tied the price of land to payments in two principal products of the land and to shares of stock in government-owned industrial undertakings. In practice this meant that 70 percent of the value of the land was in the form of commodity bonds, payable in 20 semi-annual installments over a period of ten years, and 30 percent was paid outright in stocks.

This novel method has worked well for all parties involved. The commodity bonds preserved the value of the sales-price against fluctuations in the value of the currency for a ten-year period; the government was freed from the necessity of resorting

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to the printing press; and the tenants benefited from easy repayment terms. Moreover, an estimated 40 percent of the total compensation found its way into industrial and business investments, and those who held on to their original stock issues were amply rewarded through a sharp rise in their value in the years following. To date, it is the one known case in Asia of an agrarian reform which has consciously planned—and succeeded—in transferring private capital formerly tied up in land into the general developmental field.

Almost everything that an agrarian law could do to insure the fulfillment of its stated purposes was done. When the laws were implemented, the results surpassed expectations. There was a sharp rise in peasant-proprietorship, a reduction in tenancy and an increase in security of tenure, investment in land improvement, improvement in agricultural techniques, expansion of agricultural productivity, an increase in the standard of living, and a welcome reshuffling of the power structure in the village community. It also created a new and active concern on the part of the politicians about the state of agriculture *and* the welfare of agriculturists.

As indicated earlier, with the exception of important bright spots here and there in India, only very few of these gains can be found in other Asian countries which have gone to the trouble of writing reform laws, but largely limited and vague in content and with just as limited intent to translate them into action. The writing of reform laws—and some nations have done it more than once—may be good practice in preparation for the day when the execution of such laws becomes unavoidable. But as of the moment, it may be said in general that the high hopes reposed in agrarian reform during the immediate postwar years have not materialized in action. Before suggesting why this is so, we will find instructive a brief review of India's vast experience in the course of 15 years of reform activities.

IV

It is safe to say that all the disabilities which peasant and land can suffer are to be found in many of the 600,000 villages of India. An observer will find many striking and promising manifestations of a resurgent agriculture; but these are still only tiny islands in the vastness of the debilitating conditions noted elsewhere. The result is that the yields of basic food crops are too

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low in relation to the potential of the land and existing food needs, and particularly in view of the grim fact that between 1961 and 1976 the Indian agriculture will have to provide food for nearly 190,000,000 additional people. To remedy the situation, the Indian Government after independence set itself to ease the lot of the peasantry by a drastic overhaul of the land system, the complexity of which almost defies description. This would-be agrarian revolution was to have been attained through the familiar pattern already described, and through the elimination of the "zamindari" system, a peculiarly Indian problem.

The zamindari system was a by-product of the early British rule under which a zamindar or intermediary was given the right to collect land taxes and undertook to pay the British administration a fixed revenue. In return, he was not only permitted to keep a portion of the revenue but was also recognized as the proprietor of the revenue-bearing land. In time the system covered more than 40 percent of the cultivated land of India, and it created, too, some of the worst abuses that can be perpetrated upon a peasantry, including a long chain of non-cultivating sublessees all getting a share of the highly inflated rent from the same piece of land and the same cultivator. As one student of the problem put it, "His landlords form a Jacob's ladder in which each rung is occupied not by an angel but a tenure holder, and the topmost by the proprietor." This ladder the Indian Government set out to do away with as almost the first order of agrarian reform.

Despite opposition and administrative problems, the zamindari tenures have been virtually abolished. Tenures have been simplified; the cultivators have been made more secure by paying the land tax directly to the state; and some have acquired full ownership from the state for a moderate purchase price. Not all have benefited equally and not all the 20,000,000 cultivators affected have received permanent, heritable and transferable rights without any strings attached. Nevertheless, the effort was undeniably a first and major step—the clearing of the ground—toward a reconstruction of Indian agriculture. Why this measure succeeded is not difficult to answer. The zamindari system, with its absurdities and injustices, was the weakest enemy to attack, because it was imposed by a foreign power which handed out property rights to which neither the British nor most of the recipients had any claim. Thus abolition of the system became one of the symbols of freedom from the British rule, and it is not sur-

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prising that the abolitionists largely succeeded in eliminating it.

Getting rid of this system did not put an end to tenancy in India. Even in the ex-zamindari areas the "home-farms" of the former middleman continued to be operated by tenants, and not all the subtenants were eliminated. But above all there was the multitude of tenants—not to mention the millions of agricultural wage laborers—cultivating at least a fourth of the country's arable land in "ryotwari" areas (as distinguished from the former zamindari areas) where owner-proprietorship predominated. The Government of India decided to provide tenants with security of tenure and reduction of rents, and to confer landownership upon the tenants through the familiar ceiling device and officially fixed land prices. Under the guidance and continuous prodding of the Planning Commission, the States have enacted a voluminous body of legislation presumably designed to meet these goals.

Both from the point of view of the content of the legislation and the enforcement of it these reforms are in serious difficulties. Here and there tenants have secured better tenure conditions or have acquired land. In Bombay State, the security of the tenant is strictly enforced and, as a consequence, the rentals are so low that a tenant has little to gain from purchasing land. But as against such cases there are the widespread evictions of tenants that can be traced to the legislation itself, the prevalent failure of the new rental regulations, and the wholesale evasion of the ceiling provisions upon which an increase in peasant-proprietorship was to rest.

Administrative problems are a formidable obstacle to implementation of the reforms. On the other hand, judging by the experience of the largest and most populated state of India, Uttar Pradesh, this is not an insurmountable difficulty—if there is the will to overcome it. More to the point is the faulty content in many legislative enactments. In India, the most glaring manifestation of this is the seemingly reasonable but ill-defined right of the landlord to resume tenanted land for what is euphemistically called "personal cultivation." As the writer saw in widely separated parts of the country, this has led to mass evictions of tenants; to "voluntary surrenders" of land by tenants in order to salvage some relationship to the land, even if it be as a hired hand; to augmentation of the ranks of agricultural workers; and, inevitably, to the failure of the new rent regulations.

The ceiling provisions did not fare well at all. While the tenancy

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reforms can claim achievements in a few states, the same cannot be said about ceilings as a means of acquiring ownership. With becoming candor, the Planning Commission in the Third Five Year Plan notes the following: "On the whole, it would be correct to say that in recent years transfers of land have tended to defeat the aims of the legislation for ceilings and to reduce its impact on the rural economy." For the moment, the question of how much land might have been available for redistribution is academic; of India's 80,000,000 acres or more of tenanted land very little is available for redistribution. In anticipation of ceiling provisions, the landlords divided up the land among members of their families so as to make certain that holdings were *under* the ceiling; for the legislative provisions, unlike those in Japan and Taiwan, did not contain the teeth to preclude such transfers. More recent amendments designed to annul such transfers have had, so far, little effect on the evasions committed.

Needless to say, such developments do not produce the incentives which lead to better living conditions, investments in land, improvement of land and a rise in agricultural productivity. Yet these were the goals of the tenancy reforms—the goals that Mr. Nehru so aptly summed up in the phrase, "placing the peasant in the center of the piece."

V

From the experience of Japan and Taiwan and from that of India one may learn why so few reforms in Asia have succeeded and so many have not. Neither success nor failure can be attributed primarily to the presence or absence of experts or to a special reform mystique. The usefulness of facts, figures and preparatory work no one can deny; but reforms cannot be "researched" or "studied" into existence. Of far greater importance is the acceptance of the reform idea, to begin with, in such a manner that technical problems are not an excuse for inaction but something to be resolved. There is no country in Asia, however underdeveloped, which does not know how to write a reform law, or what its implications might be. They have written them, and many have not been carried out—precisely because the political decision-makers understood their implications and their inevitable repercussions.

The politicians make or unmake agrarian reforms. It is they who provide the impetus or lack of impetus, who decide between

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reform and "reform." They alone can create a condition "when the economic sails are filled with political wind."[1] There is no gainsaying the fact that the economic environment, population pressure on the land, and customary relationships sanctioned by a long history of social and religious traditions exert great influence on what happens to legislation designed to break old institutional molds. But this does not invalidate the main premise —that the content and implementation of agrarian reform are a reflection of a particular political balance of forces in a country. This premise assumes even greater significance in Asia because the peasants themselves, while discontented, have not developed a movement, whether in the form of tenant-unions like those of Japan before the reforms, or peasant political parties like those of East Europe after the First World War. For a time, the Communists in Hyderabad, Tanjore and Kerala exploited the peasant grievances for their own ends; the Communist Huks in Central Luzon played a similar role. For the most part, however, the peasants behaved as if any change in their condition depended upon somebody else. By their apathy they have disproved the reasonable assumption that in an agricultural country a government must have peasant support. The fact is that national and state legislatures in Asia do not represent the interests of the peasantry; if they did, reform might have taken on a different character altogether. The reality is that even where voting is free, the peasantry in Asia is not yet voting its own interests. Except in Japan, the peasants do not yet know that they can be bearers *and* recipients of political gifts; the idea that "we support those who support us" has yet to take root. More important, then, is the role of the articulate and politically powerful pro-reform groups.

VI

In Japan and in Taiwan both the forces which were indigenous and those which were created as a result of the war favored a drastic agrarian reform and a redistribution of income and social and political power. In the case of Japan, the defeat by the United States and the American influence as an occupying power were crucial in the timing of the reform but were of only limited importance in giving it a radical character. Other factors were also the memories of peasant rebellions; the numerous, if

[1] Doreen Warriner, "Land Reform and Development in the Middle East." London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1957, p. 9.

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unsuccessful, prewar reform measures; the strong tenant-unions; the windfall of the Communist opposition to the "MacArthur reform"; the emergence of large groups of Japanese who were disillusioned with the old oligarchy; and an eager and active pro-reform leadership in the Ministry of Agriculture which drafted the enabling legislation. This "political wind" found expression in the firm proposition that "those who cultivate the soil of Japan shall enjoy the fruits of their labor." This meant clearly defined provisions, a minimum of half-measures and a minimum of loopholes. Similarly on the enforcement side, the reformers recognized not only that the cultivators had to be made aware of the essence of the main provisions, but that they—and only they—had to be the true implementors of the reform if it were to succeed. This attitude led to the creation of a practical enforcement agency, the local land commissions—so far shunned by all other countries engaged in reform save Taiwan.

The situation in Taiwan on the eve of the reforms was not the same as in Japan, but here, too, special circumstances—primarily non-economic or sociological—created the setting for action. The final decision rested with the politicians or, more specifically, with a political and military leader. The Communist victory on the mainland and the subsequent prevalent belief among the Nationalist politicians that the Communists won because of the promise of land to the tillers played a crucial role in creating the favorable climate. Certain elements in the Nationalist ideology worked to the same end, especially when the beleaguered government realized it needed greater social stability as a means to military security. But none of these factors might have sufficed were it not for the fact that General Chen-Cheng, then Governor of Taiwan and an influential member of the Nationalist Party, had resolved that rural Taiwan was to undergo a thorough change. The tone having been set, the technicians played their important role, fully conscious for whose benefit the reforms were meant. It was the good fortune of Taiwan that the Joint (Chinese-American) Commission on Rural Reconstruction was on the scene to help provide invaluable social, economic and technological advice. The result was a program of lasting agricultural development, as well as of a redistribution of income. The combination of the two prevented the redistribution of income from degenerating into a mere passing phase of peasant welfare.

To return to India: while the need for reform there is surely

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as great as in any country in Asia, the difficulties in the way are incomparably greater. Among them are the sheer size of the subcontinent; the administrative decentralization, with each state a law unto itself; the paucity of good land records; the fact that a third of the tenanted land belongs to owners with five acres or less; the fierce competition for any tillable plot of land on almost any terms; the lack of peasant initiative and his inability to comprehend the complex laws; the poor prospects for alternative occupations despite the country's progress of industrialization; and the millions more people added annually to the already overcrowded land.

All these are sufficient to give one pause before rendering any hasty judgment about the tortuous and far from successful path of Indian reforms (other, that is, than the elimination of the zamindari). And yet the handicaps, especially the technical handicaps, do not quite explain why so much of the intent of the reforms is still unrealized. There are States in India which have demonstrated that, given strong leadership, many of the problems can be overcome. What is significant is that most of the handicaps, including the principal one—poor enforcement or nonenforcement—are not always causes but in a large measure consequences of attitudes displayed by state politicians and legislatures. This anti-reform sentiment has proved to be a crucial element in thwarting India's expectations.

By extension, and with variations, the same is true of most Asian countries. In the Asian political milieu, vague and complicated measures generously seeded with loopholes naturally become the rule, and so do evasions resulting from great delays in legislative enactments. It also is natural that little effort is made to explain to the peasants the ABCs of the enactments or to propagate the idea that they are the beneficiaries of the reforms. The assertion is sometimes heard that the tenancy problem need not be taken too seriously; this is not surprising either. It is understandable, too, that enforcement officers mostly behave as if reforms are not meant to be enforced, and with the same impunity as that enjoyed by those whom they are supposed to police. Nor is it surprising that they do not seek the assistance of the peasants in implementing measures that affect them so directly. And yet they are the authentic experts who know who is who in the village, who owns what, and who is entitled to what once the nature of the reform is clear to them.

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Clearly, the key to successful reform in Asia is the degree to which the controlling political forces of a country are willing to support reform and their readiness to use *all* instruments of government to attain their goals. Those against whom the reforms are directed will not divest themselves of their property and of political and economic power simply because a government wrote out a decree. Besides, despite the threat of Communism, the great fears generated by the French Revolution or by the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 are not immediately in evidence in Asia. The conclusion is inescapable: if the peasantry is to get what is promised, peaceful and democratically managed reforms are not going to fill the bill. Government coercion, whether practiced or clearly threatened, is virtually unavoidable.

It is generally supposed that the Japanese and Taiwanese reforms and the abolition of the zamindari system in India were peaceful affairs. A closer look will reveal that they were peaceful because the landlords in the first two countries knew that overt opposition would have met with drastic punishment. In India, the zamindars knew that public opinion was overwhelmingly against them; and as the British went, they went. The Taiwanese reform took place under the aegis of a military-authoritarian government. It is unlikely that General Chen-Cheng, the activist of the reform, had ever read Theodore Mommsen's comment on how, having killed Tiberius Gracchus for his land-reform efforts, his murderers later on went about enforcing his project. "Loud and often well-founded as were the complaints," Mommsen wrote, "the Senate let the [land] commission have its way; for it was clear that if the land question was to be settled at all, some such unceremonious vigor was necessary." [2] General Chen-Cheng left no doubt in the mind of the opposition that he was ready to proceed with a good deal of "unceremonious vigor."

The story of why few agrarian reforms in Asia have succeeded and why many more are in the doldrums is not a cheerful one, but the end is not yet. For a number of reasons the reform movement will continue to demand attention. Most of the countries in Asia are greatly in need of increasing agricultural production, and they all recognize the role agriculture could and should play as a source of developmental funds. There is a rising awareness of how much the success of this depends on incentives which the existing land-tenure system does not provide. This is now

[2] Theodore Mommsen, "The History of Rome." New York: Meridian Books, 1958, p. 54.

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particularly recognized in India. But there are other considerations which augur well for the eventual liberation of the Asian peasantry.

Regardless of the meagre results so far, any preoccupation with agrarian reform represents an advance. It serves notice that the issue will not just go away. The mere writing and passing of reform laws is a good thing, even if they are deficient and their execution is obstructed. Their very existence is a promise to the tenants and a threat to the landlord, even though it often is not immediately perceptible. For even though the cards are still stacked in their favor, many landlords are in a troubled state of mind, not about the plight of their tenants but about their own future. They know that this is not the last round in their tug of war with the tenants. Some of the provisions most damaging to them are still on the statute books, and some day someone may venture to apply them. They recognize that the old order in the countryside is not what it used to be and wonder whether their best days may not be over. This uneasiness is not widespread but on the other hand it is not rare.

These are significant straws in the wind, but if they are to be capitalized upon, if agrarian reform is to be attained sooner rather than later, pressure will have to be applied by a dominating political group willing to face the issue squarely, willing to bring into play all the institutional resources of a country, and willing, if need be, to act with "unceremonious vigor." This is the only road of progress until the day when the peasantry becomes a source of authority and a mainspring of change. But in whatever way it comes, in most instances the realization of agrarian reform is a precondition of the economic, social, political and technological changes without which democracy in Asia has no bright future.

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KUWAIT: A SUPER-AFFLUENT SOCIETY

By Fakhri Shehab

STRETCHING over some 6,000 square miles of the hard, gravelly and waterless northeast corner of the Persian Gulf, Kuwait has been thrust from oblivion into sudden prominence by her hidden wealth and the creative genius of Western enterprise and technology. In less than two decades, since the first shipment of oil left her shores, material riches have changed the face of her barren territory, and Kuwait is now experiencing a host of complex social, political and economic problems which are shaking her essentially tribal and primitive structure. The purpose of this essay is to discuss the nature of the challenge presented by this transitional phase and to examine Kuwait's response to it. But in order to appreciate the magnitude of the task that confronts this city-state, the reader must first know something of the static society that used to exist and of the main events that have so radically transformed it into what it is now.

Present-day Kuwait was reportedly founded in the early eighteenth century by tribesmen driven from their home in inner Arabia by warring kinsmen. The tiny fishing village they founded offered few and meagre resources; but its very austerity was perhaps its main asset. For the rigorous physical environment rendered the individual tough, imaginative, enterprising and excellent in team-work. These qualities have, for over two centuries, distinguished the Kuwaitis as the Gulf's most successful businessmen, sailors and sea-farers.

Broadly speaking, Kuwait was comprised of three main groups: a ruling family, an oligarchy of merchants and a working class—mostly fishermen, pearl-divers and shipbuilders. Of these groups, the second has been by far the most powerful and dynamic social force. It was the merchants' enterprising spirit that provided the ruling family with their meagre income in the shape of customs duties and provided employment for the rest of the community. A triple social structure still exists in Kuwait, although, as we shall see, new circumstances are altering it.

This small community needed peace first and foremost to enable it to eke out a living, and, in the two and a half centuries since they settled on the Gulf, the Kuwaitis have had no more than two internal crises involving serious violence, and only a

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few skirmishes with neighboring tribes. Crimes of violence are almost unknown and even litigation is a rare indulgence. As with individuals, so with the state: the desire for peace eminently characterizes Kuwait's relations with her neighbors—a monumental diplomatic feat considering the struggle for power that divides the Arab states.

Of governmental organization Kuwait possessed little more than the traditional tribal type in which power was vested in an autocratic ruler, who, in conformity with tradition, was chosen from among members of the Subah family for his superior personal qualities. The choice of a new ruler was usually regarded as a family affair; and while clearly it was no democracy, this primitive political system allowed the Kuwaiti wide freedoms of action and expression. Regard for tradition made public opinion an important political force. Hence, it was the general practice for the ruler to consult the elders of the community on matters involving serious decisions. Law and order were maintained in a simple and unceremonious way in accordance with Islamic law as modified by tribal usage and local custom. Internal security was preserved by a small bodyguard, and in times of emergency external security was the responsibility of all able-bodied men (and sometimes women). Education was confined to a few primitive and privately run semi-religious institutions and not until 1912 did the town notables organize the first elementary school. As for health services, Kuwait's first hospital was not opened until well after her oil had begun to flow, in 1949.

This tribal structure held sway until 1937 when popular endeavors to modernize it finally led to the election of the short-lived Legislative Assembly whose only legacy was the creation of certain government departments with broadly defined functions. These departments formed Kuwait's basic administrative framework until 1962, when constitutional government was introduced.

Import duties, varying between 4 and 6 percent, constituted the main source of public revenue. The scope of the government operations may be seen from the fact that in 1938–39 public revenue totaled some £60,000 (approximately $290,000), of which nearly two-thirds came from import duties and the rest from miscellaneous dues and fees, plus a small royalty paid by the Kuwait Oil Company following the discovery, though not the actual extraction, of oil. This primitive financial system drew no distinc-

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tion between public domain or revenue, on the one hand, and the ruler's personal estate and income on the other. At this stage, the city-state had hardly emerged as an independent and recognizable entity and the ruler, still resembling a tribal chieftain, combined with his basic responsibilities of maintaining law and order the traditional and costly functions of tribal hospitality.

As for the private sector, pearling and seafaring together absorbed the majority of Kuwait's labor force (estimated at some 8,000 to 10,000 men). It is said that average earnings in pearling hardly exceeded 100 rupees (just over $35 at the prewar rate) for a season of three to four months. This was often supplemented by seafaring, which brought in an additional 150 or 200 rupees for an expedition of some six months. Exceptionally, an enterprising man could add to these two sources of income by trading, and might make a profit of some 100 or 200 rupees. Thus, at best, average family earnings from various sources barely touched 500 rupees (rather less than $180) a year. Assuming an average family of five, these calculations would suggest an average personal annual income of some 100 rupees (roughly about $35). As for an unskilled laborer, he barely managed to reach subsistence level. His daily wage was not more than a half rupee, and employment was rarely available throughout the year. These conditions were far worse than those then obtaining in the agrarian communities of Iran or Iraq.

II

Today such conditions exist only in memory, for Kuwait now is a land of superlatives. It is the largest oil producer in the Middle East and the fourth largest in the world; it boasts the world's largest oil port where the world's largest tankers are loaded in record time; at 62 billion barrels, its proved oil reserves are the largest in the world; and the magnitude of its oil receipts in relation to the size of the native population is such that even if all other sources of income in both the private and public sectors are disregarded, the annual revenue per citizen amounts to K.D. 1,200 (Kuwait Dinar = U.S. $2.8).

In sharp and dramatic contrast with the austerity of former times, Kuwait's current foreign trade statistics list an extraordinarily wide range of luxury goods transported by sea, land and air from some 60-odd countries, at an annual expenditure averaging in recent years nearly $300,000,000, or about $825

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per inhabitant. More impressive still is the present-day expenditure on fresh water distillation and power supply which costs the state not less than $140 per inhabitant, while every tree and shrub that decorates her thoroughfares and public squares costs an average of some $250 a year. As for social services, a welfare state of unsurpassed munificence has suddenly emerged. Expenditure on health and education and other benefits (mostly in pecuniary forms) has placed this tiny state on a higher level than some of the most sophisticated societies in the world; for in the fiscal year 1961–62 it reached some $240 per inhabitant as compared with $210 in the U.K. and slightly less in Sweden.[1]

What has been the impact of the sudden explosion of wealth upon this primitive society? In less than two decades the whole face of Kuwait has changed beyond recognition. But behind the spectacular physical change lie fundamental problems which have rarely, if ever, been faced by an affluent community before.

One basic question has always been asked: how long is it going to last? The Kuwaitis are quite alive to the precariousness of their riches. Anxiety over the future dominates their thoughts and many of their actions. It is evident in the attempt to build up their social capital, to set up an organized public service and to foster rapid industrial development; it is evident in the determined effort to accumulate foreign reserves; and, above all, it is evident in the desire to achieve all this in a desperately short time. Haste is, indeed, the order of the day.

But growth is a function of time and the hurried transformation of Kuwait from the poor, obscure and stagnant society it used to be into one of uncommon complexity and sophistication has proved challenging and, at times, even dangerous.

Oil receipts began to accrue in 1946. In the early stages no more than rudimentary physical planning of the town was needed. The sharp increase in revenue in 1951 made clear that planning required expert advice, and foreign consultants were engaged for this purpose. Subsequently, a group of five engineering firms was engaged to carry out the work on a cost-plus basis. It was soon discovered, however, that this procedure pushed up costs unduly and left much room for abuse, and it was abandoned. It was realized that the task of building could not be simply farmed out to foreign contractors. Responsibility for planning

[1] Both the British and the Swedish figures include payments by the private sector in the form of employers' and employees' contributions.

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and executing a development program was then entrusted to the Public Works Department. This was a tribute to the courage of the government, considering Kuwait's small population and the acute shortage of trained personnel.

Paucity of population is not necessarily associated with economic backwardness; the shortage of trained people is. The presence of both in a setting of extreme wealth makes the story of Kuwait unique. The earliest population figures available for those years are from the first census of 1957. They give Kuwait's total indigenous labor force as being 23,977, all between 15 and 60 years of age. By far the largest group (over 19,000) was composed of those with either no training at all or with only minimal professional qualifications. Another group, designated "professionals and technologists" and totaling some 4,000, includes only one chemist, one geologist, two physicians, two author-journalists, eight accountants and 156 clergymen.

The government's difficulties thus can hardly be exaggerated. To ensure control of its own affairs, it gave preference to its own citizens; and if suitable Kuwaitis were not available preference went to other Arab citizens and only in the last resort to non-Arabs. With abundant financial resources and in the absence of a strong civil service tradition, there soon evolved an administrative machine which was vast, complicated, cumbersome and not always guided by the highest ethical standards.

This created more problems for the state than it solved. Since all top administrative and executive jobs were reserved for citizens, the responsibility for final decisions invariably lay with them; the presence of the foreign technician or adviser did not help much. The Kuwaiti policy-maker was still called upon daily to evaluate highly technical, and not infrequently conflicting, proposals which ranged from the choice of some complex electronic equipment for an ultra-modern telephone system to the assessment of the chemical components of local soils as factors affecting the choice of road-construction techniques. As the great majority of Kuwaiti executives came to their new responsibilities unprepared, vital decisions were often deferred, and when they were made, showed the pressure of vested interests.

There was also the problem of the mere volume of the new business. At the start, far too many projects were undertaken and as time went on the number increased. The demands on the limited time of the Kuwaiti executives and policy-makers grew

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correspondingly, resulting in insufficient guidance from the top. This shortage of leadership in Kuwait was alarming, since it involved the one thing that could not be imported from abroad.

Meanwhile, business was offering unlimited scope for success and, to the qualified few, its attraction was too powerful to be resisted. Some sort of a compromise had therefore to be devised to eliminate this competition, and it was found by permitting civil servants to run their own businesses side-by-side with their public offices. This concession caused immense harm. It overtaxed the limited time and energy of those in key positions, strained their allegiance to the state, exposed them to grave temptations and meant that the public service ceased to be considered a career. Senior appointments were generally accepted for prestige reasons, mostly by those who lacked distinction; and employment in the lower echelons was regarded more or less as a sinecure, or as a means of channeling a certain amount of the wealth to the average citizen.

These factors have led to such overcrowding in the public service that salaries and wages now create a very serious drain on the treasury. The city-state at present has on its payroll no less than 53,000 men and women, both indigenous and aliens, excluding those in the armed forces, at an annual cost of nearly $168,000,000. This means that every three citizens are being served by one public servant at an average cost of about $1,120 per citizen.

This, then, was one of the results of the second phase of the experiment. It raised public expenditures for administration to an incredible level. It placed in positions of great responsibility either men of an older generation, whose views and standards were hopelessly outdated, or very young persons, who lacked the required experience; and it put a heavy strain on their loyalties. Further, it eliminated competitive selection for the public service and thus encouraged complacency in the new generation and a tendency to judge performance by local standards alone.

III

It was only natural that the new wealth should create a demand for services hitherto unknown in the country. The resulting problem was made especially acute by the ambitious projects planned by the government, and its determination to carry them out all at once. Inevitably, a uniquely attractive market for labor

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was created and a flood of skilled and unskilled workers flocked from the four corners of the globe, but mostly from neighboring countries. This influx created new problems. The ethnic and political composition of this immigrant labor was heterogeneous, though the largest proportion (about 70 percent) were Arabs. Their social habits, cultures, creeds and, above all, political leanings were numerous and widely divergent.

Moreover, by far the largest group of these aliens (73 percent) were males mostly between 15 and 50 years of age, which meant that they were transient immigrants.[2] It is this transient population that provides the bulk of Kuwait's skilled labor and 78 percent of her unskilled workers. It is they who supply the city-state with her teachers, doctors, architects, engineers and administrative and managerial personnel. They are the makers of her laws, the builders of her industry and the founders of her financial institutions. So pervasive has been their influence that there is hardly an aspect of national life which does not bear their mark. It affects the Kuwaitis choice of fashion, architecture and interior decoration; their cultural and artistic interest; their entertainments and dietetic habits; and even their colloquial Arabic, which has considerably changed under the influence of the newcomers.

Yet this all-powerful community of aliens has no permanent ties with the host country. Their services will apparently continue to be in demand indefinitely; yet the individuals themselves are constantly changing and are regarded by their hosts as changeable. This situation has inevitably led to a lack of continuity in planning and performance as well as to a sense of instability among the resident aliens, discernible in their behavior and their attitudes to the state.

The ephemeral status of the members of this community is especially marked among manual and menial workers. Grim unemployment in neighboring countries has driven tens of thousands of these men to search for a living in this rich oasis. But in turn the unlimited supply of labor has inevitably depressed wages to the point where the now derelict and nearly forgotten "iron law" may be seen in full swing. At present an unskilled laborer in Kuwait makes between nine and twelve shillings a day (about $1.25 to $1.65). This is generally higher

[2] This fact is reflected in the number of air travelers, which in recent years has reached some 230,000 annually, or more than 70 percent of the total population.

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than average earnings in the region; but the advantage is lost in a country where most goods are imported, where major imports are controlled by oligopolies and where rents and utilities are inordinately high. The result is that families are often left at home, and the wage-earner's remittances to his dependents reduce him to hardly more than subsistence. Thus the fate of thousands of aliens is to live in squalid hovels, indefinitely separated from their homes and families, desperate for employment; they have exchanged the best of their working years for wages that can just keep them and their dependents alive. Against the background of superabundance and prodigality existing in Kuwait, the wide gulf between the two segments of the population is not only indefensible but is bound to engender social resentment and instability.

Nor is this all. The remittances of the resident aliens are a permanent drain on the national income. The extent of it cannot be ascertained, but is conservatively estimated at some $120,000,000 a year. If this labor force could be persuaded to strike roots in Kuwait, this drain on national wealth would be minimized and the base of the economy would be broadened. This viewpoint is gaining recognition, but not fast enough.

Finally, the growing size of this foreign labor force has suddenly awakened the Kuwaitis to the fact that they are about to become a minority in their own country. According to the 1961 population census, they barely exceed half the total. This would be serious enough in any country, let alone in one so small, underpopulated and rich, and where the indigenous community lacks all the vital technical skills.

IV

The discovery that it was being swamped by aliens alarmed Kuwait and prompted defensive measures. Foremost among these was the naturalization decree of 1959 and its amendment in 1960. This legislation, a landmark in Kuwait's history, confined Kuwaiti citizenship to residents in Kuwait prior to 1920, to their descendants in the male line and to foreign women upon marriage to Kuwaitis. For Arabs, naturalization is now possible only after 10 years of residence, and for non-Arabs after 15 years, commencing, in both cases, from the date of the amending decree. Moreover, only 50 persons are to be granted citizenship in any one year. Exceptions to this general rule are that Arabs in

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residence before 1945, and foreigners before 1930, as well as other Arab nationals who have performed outstanding services to the state, may be granted citizenship without waiting.

The legislation also confined certain basic rights and privileges to the citizen class. All imports and retail trades and all contractual business are either limited to Kuwaiti nationals or have to be transacted through Kuwaiti agents. In the civil service, pension rights, permanent tenure and certain key executive positions are the exclusive privileges of citizens. The entry of aliens into some professions such as medicine and law, where not many citizens could compete for a long time to come, is restricted to a stringent licensing system.

A unique feature of this transformation is the ingenious device evolved to diffuse the new wealth among the citizen class through public expenditure. As we have seen earlier, the distinction between public income and property and the ruler's income or property was unknown in Kuwait. Gradually, as budgetary practices and controls were introduced, all public receipts were paid into the Exchequer.[3] Since the process was confined at first to annual disbursements and receipts of money, control of the public land was overlooked; and so long as realty was not of great economic significance the oversight was not serious. But then real estate prices rocketed. Meanwhile, large tracts of worthless desert had been seized and fenced in by those who had either the foresight or foreknowledge to anticipate the coming public projects; and they subsequently were compensated handsomely by the state. With a rapid turnover of land and in the absence of legislation covering the acquisition of land for public uses, the cost to the Treasury was fantastic.

The process within the city itself differed somewhat from that outside the old city wall. Land was purchased in excess of what was actually required for public projects, and the surplus was later sold back to the public, often at a fraction (estimated at 4 percent) of its cost to the Treasury. Enormous private fortunes were amassed by both selling to, and buying from, the state. It has been estimated that between 1957 and 1962 close to $840,000,000 of public money was spent on land.

This huge expenditure would have been justified on the grounds that it engendered economic activity and diffused a

[3] However, this new practice does not include Kuwait's substantial reserves which still remain with the Bank of England in the name of His Highness the Emir.

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large portion of the new wealth, were it not that in fact only a limited amount was piped into the local economy. By far the larger part was remitted abroad either directly, or indirectly through the banking system. Further, the wealth was not spread evenly, the greater part going to those at the top of the social pyramid, even though, because of the small size of the indigenous community, a fair amount did go also to the masses. It now is argued that unless the process is continued, large-scale bankruptcies will wreck the economy, since substantial bank advances have been made to merchants who are said to have invested them in land. It is difficult to ascertain whether this is true; but banking statistics show that advances to Kuwaiti residents (about $110,600,000 toward the end of 1963) represent just over 40 percent of total visible imports—a fact that hardly bears out the argument. Yet the practice continues unabated despite serious warning by government advisers and the recommendation of the World Bank.

The process of diffusing the new wealth was not confined, however, to land purchases. Social security benefits and state aid in most generous and varied forms, free medical treatment and scholarships for training abroad, the granting of free building sites and loans at very low interest—all were made available to the citizen as his birthright.

V

The effects of these measures on Kuwait must be evaluated from two standpoints: the response they evoked from the aliens and the impact they had on the citizen class.

That they have been effective in achieving their aim is obvious enough. They have introduced a sharp distinction between the two classes of society; and they have reserved to the citizens all the fruits of the windfall of riches (with the lion's share going to a relatively small group within this class). Little else can be said in favor of these measures. They have permanently estranged and embittered the most efficient and indispensable element in the community—the resident alien. Uprooted, often separated from his family, insecure and unsettled, he has now become envious and resentful. With little or no hope of being permanently integrated into the community, he is left without any sense of allegiance to Kuwait.

Let us look now at the impact of these protective and restric-

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tive measures on the citizens for whom they were devised. An immediate consequence was the reversal of the old order that made the state and members of the ruling family dependent on the merchants, for now it was the latter who sought favors from the state. They wanted not only compensation for land but also the preservation of their commercial interests. While the state has been strengthened by its financial independence and has become less susceptible to pressures from this group, the change was not an unmixed blessing, considering that the government is not dependent upon popular consent for its annual income.

Further, the ease with which wealth has been acquired has impaired the enterprise of the mercantile class and made them dependent on the state. Hardly any worthwhile financial or industrial venture which deviates from the established pattern is ever attempted by Kuwaiti entrepreneurs (of whom there are, in any case, very few) unless it is assured of state financing, protection or guarantee. Conversely, private capital can be forthcoming to excess when an expatriate entrepreneur, acting with state coöperation, comes forward with new ideas for investment.

Developments are disturbing, too, at the other end of the social scale. Here the state's compensatory payments were naturally less extensive, since the property involved was mainly private dwelling houses. The money received was promptly spent, usually on prestige items or travel abroad. When this spurt was over, the common citizen was assured a modest income from a minor government sinecure, and various state benefits, plus a small private income from, say, a taxi or a tiny retail store—the whole accepted in much the same spirit as that of a pensioner receiving his dole.

Originally intended to preserve the identity of the old community, reserve the bulk of the new wealth for its citizens and protect them against the intruding aliens, these measures have inadvertently forced competition out of national life and made Kuwait an insular society. The elimination of competition now probably presents the most serious social danger facing Kuwait. Young people have lost their perspective, their urge to acquire knowledge, their acceptance of discipline. As a result, the drive, diligence and risk-taking that characterized the old Kuwaiti are no more. At both ends of the social scale the new citizen is content to enjoy a life of leisure and inertia, and is unwilling that this happy state of affairs should be disturbed. Protected,

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pampered, lavishly provided for and accountable to no one, he lives in a world of make-believe.

Another serious threat is posed to Kuwaiti society by the social vacuum which these measures have created. By relegating the traditionally dynamic classes to a position of only titular authority at the apex of the social pyramid or else to one of passive contentment, they have placed a premium on inertia and prevented the rise of an indigenous and dynamic middle class. The vacuum thus created is naturally filled by watchful and enterprising aliens.

The people attracted to Kuwait by its new wealth were of varied backgrounds, experiences and standards of conduct. The avarice and intrigues of many of them have brought bitter disillusionment to the Kuwaiti. Consequently, traditional Kuwaiti behavior is changing and men for whom the spoken word used to have the sanctity of a written contract have become instinctively suspicious of strangers and new ideas.

Further, the magnitude of the new wealth has given money and material possessions an importance and their owners a sense of power hitherto unknown. Naturally this has resulted in false perspectives. Ostentatious consumption, prodigal expenditure, idleness and pleasure-seeking are common; frugality, moderation and enterprise have become the antiquated virtues of a bygone age.

Finally, and most important of all, the new wealth has asssumed such proportions that it is beginning to threaten the very concept of the state. This is because the lavish welfare benefits and privileges have entailed no effort or sacrifice on the part of the public, which sees no need to contribute to a state whose chief problem is what to do with its income. A fundamental principle in the relationship between state and citizen has therefore been jeopardized—namely, that in exchange for protection and benefits, the citizen has a duty to serve it and to make necessary sacrifices for it. The idea of the state as a communal institution demanding service, sacrifice and devotion, and as an embodiment of political and social ideas, exists today in the minds and hearts of very few and exceptional Kuwaitis.

VI

This tiny city-state: prodigal, complacent, short of technical skills, unperturbed by the acquisitiveness of its upper classes, the

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torpor of its common citizens and the savage rivalry among its resident aliens—what chance has it of survival in a poor, covetous and unstable region?

First it must be noted that most major events in the Middle East are influenced by external and regional forces; the survival of political régimes does not solely depend on their own economic or social merits. However, the record of Kuwait's achievements is such that (barring the unexpected) one may suppose that disruptive forces from outside will encounter there an exceptional degree of viability and resilience.

Kuwait entered the modern era of welfare and technology with very few handicaps from her past. Unfettered by rigid traditions or conventions, she was free to experiment and adopt institutions and practices best suited to her own circumstances. Naturally anyone willing to follow the rough path of trial and error must be prepared to pay the price; Kuwait was willing and has done so. This willingness to experiment with new ideas gives the state both dynamism and flexibility not often found in old societies. Kuwait is not stagnant, nor has her social fabric as yet assumed final form. Her social and economic legislation is constantly revised and improved; her public services are being reorganized and streamlined; her city planning is being reviewed.

There is, further, a feeling on the part of the indigenous community that its present privileged position can be preserved only by total and unqualified domestic solidarity. Solidarity among the Kuwaitis is a time-honored tradition, and the recent waves of immigration have so strengthened the need for it that any deviation is now simply inconceivable. This was plainly demonstrated in 1961 when the entire community rallied around the Emir in the face of Kassem's threats; all past rancor was forgotten as autocratic rule was wisely replaced by constitutional government.

Despite the shortcomings and dangers attending the rapid transformation of a primitive society into one of great sophistication, certain fundamental traits in the character of the individual Kuwaiti remain unimpaired. He still remains tolerant, placid, and, above all, devoted to and proud of his freedom. These qualities explain why differences of opinion continue to be settled by debate and not violence; why the fundamental freedoms of speech and the press are respected; why censorship and the secret police—two monumental features in every Arab state—do

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not figure in Kuwait's political life, and have no impact on the thoughts or actions of her people. It is fortunate that the drafting of the constitution should have been completed during this period of Kuwait's history when these qualities are still a salient feature of the Kuwaiti personality.

There remains one more item on this balance sheet which calls for special mention, namely Kuwait's attitude toward the massive, woeful and demoralizing poverty outside her boundaries.

Here again, Kuwait's perspicacity and high-mindedness have been extraordinary. Transcending all the animosities and feuds of contemporary Arab politics, she has single-handedly set up the most enduring and constructive institution ever attempted by a small state. This is the Kuwait Fund for the Economic Development of the Arab Countries, with capital resources totaling altogether K.D. 300,000,000 ($840,000,000). This institution has been established to make loans to other Arab states to enable them to carry out projects directly useful in developing their economies. It is a permanent, well-administered organization with clearly defined objectives and intelligent criteria for evaluating projects. It stands out as a monument to Kuwait's foresight and generosity. It also marks a turning point in her development as a state, for it demonstrates that she recognizes her responsibilities and is willing and able to live up to them. Within less than two years of its inception, the Fund has already lent $19,600,000 to the Sudan for the modernization of its railways; $21,000,000 to Jordan for agricultural and industrial projects; and $18,200,000 to Tunisia; besides substantial sums pledged to Algeria, the Yemen and the U.A.R.

Naturally, Kuwait is very proud of her achievements; but in determining her fate her own assessment of her performance is far less important than the opinion of her neighbors. Whether or not her extravagance will be excused because of her generosity, only time will tell. What is certain is that she can justify her survival as a political entity in this age of regional internationalism only by serving effectively and impartially as a distributor of substantial economic aid to her neighbors. Herein lies Kuwait's present *raison d'être*. In order to maintain her independent identity she will have to pursue her plans for economic aid with a zeal induced by the knowledge that it is an essential part of her struggle for survival.

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SHIFTS IN SOVIET STRATEGIC THOUGHT

By Thomas W. Wolfe

THE great predicament of the modern world was summed up by the late President Kennedy in one of his last public remarks: "The family of man can survive differences of race and religion . . . it can accept differences in ideology, politics, economics. But it cannot survive, in the form in which we know it, a nuclear war." Widespread appreciation of this fact accounts in part for the growing significance of the strategic dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union, particularly in so far as it represents a means by which the two great nuclear powers may seek to clarify the complexities and mitigate the dangers of their strategic relationship in the nuclear-missile age.

The two sides are not, of course, speaking just to one another or wholly in the interest of better understanding. Each is seeking to advance its policy interests, to enhance its posture of deterrence, to obtain political advantage from its military power or prevent the other from doing so, to impress the authority of its position upon allies and onlookers, and so on. There is at the same time a perceptible desire on both sides to promote better, or at least more precise, communications with respect to military policy, strategy and corollary problems. This in itself may be a small start toward a more fruitful and intelligent strategic discourse between East and West, with the participants talking past each other less and to each other more.

The most notable new expression of Soviet strategic thinking is a revised and slightly expanded edition of the book "Military Strategy," written by a collective team of Soviet military experts headed by Marshal V. D. Sokolovskii. The original edition, published in mid-1962, was described in the Soviet Union as the first comprehensive work on military strategy to appear there in more than three decades. It attracted a good deal of attention abroad, so much so, indeed, that it was brought out in English translation by two different American publishers, not to mention versions in several other languages.[1]

[1] The two U.S. versions of the first Sokolovskii edition were: "Military Strategy: Soviet Doctrine and Concepts," published by Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1963, with an Introduction by Raymond L. Garthoff; and "Soviet Military Strategy," published by Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1963, with an Analytical Introduction and Annotations by Herbert S. Dinerstein, Leon Gouré and Thomas W. Wolfe of the RAND Corporation.

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The revised Sokolovskii edition appeared in the Soviet Union in November 1963. The interval of 15 months between editions was unusually short for such a work. This, plus obvious Soviet awareness of Western interest in the original volume, suggests that the Soviets regard the book as an important vehicle of external as well as internal communication on strategic problems of the nuclear age. Another noteworthy Soviet contribution to the discussion of strategy was a direct riposte to U.S. commentary on the first Sokolovskii edition, published recently in the Soviet newspaper *Red Star* (November 2, 1963) over the signatures of four of the Sokolovskii authors. Like a number of other recent expressions of Soviet strategic thinking, this article gave evidence of Russian sensitivity to Western interpretations of Soviet military policy and posture, and contained "corrective messages" on such questions as escalation of local conflicts, Soviet second-strike capability and the preëmptive strike.

II

The last year and a half has been a critical and trying period for the leaders of the Soviet Union. They have been confronted by serious internal difficulties in agriculture and the economy; the dispute with Communist China has worsened, calling into question Soviet leadership of the world Communist movement; and the after-effects of the Cuban missile confrontation with the United States have underscored the failure of this effort to redress the strategic imbalance between the United States and the Soviet Union. These difficulties have sharpened the problems facing the Soviet leadership in the strategic field, including the central problem of the allocation of resources between competing economic and defense requirements. The developments of this period also have left their imprint on Soviet strategic thought, which shows an awareness of the need to adjust policy to changes in the character of the strategic environment.

There is first an insistent effort to enhance the credibility of the Soviet deterrent posture in Western eyes, coupled with an attempt to disabuse the United States of any idea that it can count on a successful first strike or draw political advantage from its strategic position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. The methods employed to put this dual point across range from doctrinaire play upon the theme that Soviet military strength and readiness to employ it should be taken seriously by the West to fairly close-

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knit technical arguments to demonstrate the certainty of the Soviet ability to deliver a retaliatory nuclear strike.

One finds an example of the first type of warning in the preface to the revised Sokolovskii book, where the authors state that the Communist countries do not wish to ". . . leave the enemy with any illusions that they are unprepared to rebuff him." Citing a pamphlet by Marshal Malinovskii, the Soviet Minister of Defense, to the effect that in Soviet eyes the best means of defense is not an attack, but rather "a warning to the enemy about our strength and readiness to destroy him at the first attempt to carry out an act of aggression," the Sokolovskii authors then observe: "That is why, rather than hiding our views on the nature and means of waging a future war, we have revealed them in the book, 'Military Strategy'."[2]

A more precise argument seeking to establish that the Soviet Union is now militarily in a sound position to carry out a retaliatory second strike can be found in an article by I. Glagolev and V. Larionov in the November 1963 issue of *International Affairs*. The authors assert that "foreign military analysts" have erroneously concluded that ". . . Soviet nuclear rocket weapons are highly vulnerable and are designed for a first and not a counterstrike."[3] The authors then make a series of points designed to refute this impression.

First, they argue that Soviet measures to disperse, harden, conceal and otherwise reduce the vulnerability of their strategic forces mean that an enemy "cannot hope to knock out all these counterstrike means simultaneously." Next, they contend that modern warning techniques make it possible for the defender to avoid being taken by surprise, and that even missiles "can be detected in the first section of their flight path"—which, by the

[2] Marshal V. D. Sokolovskii, *et al.*, "Voennaia Strategiia" (Military Strategy), second edition, Voenizdat Ministerstva Oborony S.S.S.R., Moscow, 1963, p. 3 and 4. Hereafter referred to as "Military Strategy," 2nd ed. The pamphlet referred to here was by Marshal R. Y. Malinovskii, *Bditel'no stoyat na strazhe mira* (Vigilantly Stand Guard Over the Peace), Voenizdat Ministerstva Oborony S.S.S.R., Moscow, 1962, p. 25. Malinovskii had alluded on previous occasions to the value of "warning the enemy." See, for example, his article in *Kommunist*, No. 7, May 1962, p. 15.

[3] The authorship of this article represents an interesting combination. Glagolev is a Soviet specialist on international relations and disarmament affairs who has been active in promoting the informal discussion of disarmament questions with various American scientists and government officials. Colonel Larionov, a Soviet military expert and a prolific writer on strategic affairs, is one of the authors of the Sokolovskii work. The collaboration of these two men marks a departure from customary Soviet practice, suggesting that the particular competence of a military specialist like Larionov was deemed desirable to reinforce the policy arguments of the *International Affairs* article.

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way, represents a rather novel claim for very early detection of missile launchings. A third point advanced to buttress their argument is that the attacker would be limited to a relatively small initial strike with missiles if he wishes to achieve "a measure of even relative surprise." The article discounts U.S. bomber forces as a factor in an initial attack on the grounds that they ". . . would hardly produce any element of surprise, in the modern sense." This tendency to reëvaluate the factor of surprise is to be noted also in the revised Sokolovskii volume, which, while charging that the United States is still actively studying ways to achieve "maximum surprise," suggests at the same time that changing conditions may now be reducing U.S. confidence in the feasibility of conducting a surprise attack.[4]

Rather interestingly, the Glagolev-Larionov article does not specifically spell out the problem of target location as one of the factors that would have a significant bearing on the success of a U.S. attack. By contrast, in a new discussion of U.S. counterforce strategy in the second edition of the Sokolovskii book, the problem of locating targets receives great emphasis. In fact, this problem emerges from the Sokolovskii authors' analysis as one of the principal reasons for increasing doubt as to the political and military effectiveness of a counterforce strategy: ". . . the political value of a counterforce strategy may be depreciating even more rapidly than its military value, because it becomes increasingly difficult for the representatives of the military command to convince the political leadership of the absolute reliability of their plans and calculations, based on fragmentary intelligence data on enemy targets."[5]

The new treatment of U.S. "counterforce" or "city-sparing" strategy in the revised Sokolovskii work furnishes another example, incidentally, of the tendency to present a more detailed and objectively argued analysis than has been customary in Soviet military discourse. The authors review the evolution of this strategy and examine various basic requirements which they say must be met in order for it to be "realistic and practical."[6] The resulting analysis indicates that the authors have at least

[4] "Military Strategy," 2nd ed., p. 90.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 87.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 85–86. These requirements, as discussed by the Sokolovskii authors, include: (1) reliable reconnaissance; (2) large numbers of missiles of great accuracy, reliability and readiness, "since there are considerably more military targets than cities;" (3) reliable systems of command and control, warning and communications; (4) careful coördination of missile strikes and other military operations; (5) surprise.

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done their homework on the subject, even though their argument is cast in terms designed to support Soviet charges of aggressive U.S. plans and to fortify claims of an invulnerable Soviet retaliatory posture.

III

In connection with efforts to reinforce the credibility of the Soviet deterrent posture, a notable feature of current Soviet military discourse is the increasing emphasis placed on the strategic missile forces as the main element of Soviet military power. This reflects not only a serious endeavor to adapt the doctrine and structure of the Soviet military establishment to a new technological environment, but also a desire to exploit them for political and psychological purposes.

Today, the strategic missile forces bear a special cachet in Soviet discussion. They are frequently described as "the mighty shield standing in the way of the imperialist aggressors,"[7] and the "special care" which the Presidium of the Central Committee and Khrushchev personally have bestowed on their development is often mentioned. Besides being pictured as the guarantor of Soviet security, these forces also are credited with being a major tool of Soviet foreign policy. Thus, for example, the Glagolev-Larionov article ascribes a string of diplomatic victories to the Soviet missile forces, observing that the Soviet Union has "used its nuclear rocket might to shield Socialist Cuba, to avert aggression against the Chinese People's Republic, and to safeguard the independence and freedom of Egypt, Syria and Iraq."

Some treatment of the missile forces in the Soviet press in the fall of 1963 dwelt on the superior virtues of missile personnel in a fashion which may have been meant to pave the way psychologically for further reductions in the traditional branches of the Soviet armed forces—a move which Khrushchev later (in December) indicated he intended. An article in *Red Star* (November 6), for example, seemed to be aimed at spinning a mystique around Soviet rocket personnel. Remarking that a strategic rocketeer may not be distinguishable outwardly from an officer in any other branch of the Soviet armed forces, the author went on to say: "But if you knew that here before you stands a lieutenant or a colonel of strategic rockets—then, word of honor, you would doff your cap in his presence."

[7] *Red Star*, November 19, 1963.

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A further feature of Soviet discourse today is a consistently negative attitude toward concepts of the controlled use of strategic weapons and restraints designed to limit damage if a major war should occur. The treatment of U.S. counterforce strategy in the new Sokolovskii edition exemplifies Soviet resistance to what the authors describe as "some sort of suggestion to the Soviet Union on 'rules' for the conduct of nuclear war."[8] Arguing that this strategy is founded on "illusory" American hopes of saving the capitalist system by conducting a "so-called 'controlled' nuclear war," the authors point to what they regard as obstacles to such a strategy. First, how "convince" others of the need to adhere to "new rules" of sparing cities when "most military targets are located in or near cities?" Second, if these rules are to be followed, the United States and its European allies should start to remove all their military installations from cities. However, this is not only unrealistic, but as noted in the Western press, if such a move were carried out, ". . . the U.S.S.R. would draw the conclusion that the United States was preparing to attack."

Throughout Soviet military writing there is insistence that only measures to avert war are a permissible subject of discussion, which of course ignores the question of trying to place limits on the level of violence in case a war unwanted by either side should begin through accident or miscalculation. Nevertheless, the Glagolev-Larionov article displays a notably defensive attitude on this question when taking note of Western comment that "the Soviet strategic concept is rigid and does not set any limits to the use of nuclear weapons in the event of war." The article then goes on to argue, however, that the Soviet refusal to entertain agreements which would have the effect of "legalizing" nuclear war is actually more humanitarian than the position of Western advocates of measures to limit destruction.

On the question of the likelihood of war, current Soviet views remain ambiguous. The general line, consonant with efforts to cultivate an atmosphere of détente in East-West relations, is that the danger of war has abated somewhat, thanks largely to respect in the "imperialist camp" for Soviet military might. The new Sokolovskii volume reflects a divided mind on this matter. On the same page, for example, it offers a slightly more optimistic judgment on the likelihood of war in the current period, but continues to stress the danger of Western attack on the Soviet

[8] "Military Strategy," 2nd ed., p. 85.

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Union, "despite the growing influence of factors ensuring the preservation of peace."[9] In general, Soviet military spokesmen seem more inclined than the political leaders to emphasize that the danger of war is ever-present. Although "official" views are generally foreboding, the impromptu remarks of political leaders are sometimes more relaxed, as when Khrushchev suggested in the spring of 1962 that threats of war from both sides had the effect of cancelling each other out and stabilizing things, which, as he put it, ". . . is why we consider the situation to be good."[10]

IV

The subject of limited war customarily has received much less attention in Soviet military literature than has general nuclear war. By insisting that general war will be violent and global in character, and by rejecting the idea of limitations on its scope and destructiveness once it has begun, the Soviets may have hoped to strengthen deterrence by emphasizing an unqualified Soviet nuclear response. Similarly, on the danger of small wars, the Soviets' unvarying stress on the great danger of escalation has reflected a rather high degree of doctrinal rigidity.

Today, however, there are some signs that the Soviet position on local and limited wars is undergoing change. A good deal of inconsistency characterizes Soviet treatment of the subject, and no unified doctrine of limited war applying to Soviet forces has emerged. Nevertheless, more attention is being given to the possibility of local wars, and there seems to be some effort, particularly in military journals, to treat the subject of escalation in a less arbitrary way. These tendencies, which were evident to a small degree in the first Sokolovskii volume, are still more apparent in the new edition and in other current Soviet commentary.

The most interesting evidence of an effort to redefine the Soviet doctrinal position on limited war and escalation is to be found in the November 1963 *Red Star* article by four of the Sokolovskii authors, who went to rather unusual lengths to make the point that Soviet doctrine does not preach the "inevitable" escalation of limited wars into general war. Taking issue with the U.S. editors of their book, they said they had merely warned that local wars "can grow into a world war," and they charged that the

[9] *Op. cit.*, p. 232.

[10] Remarks by Khrushchev in Maritsa, Bulgaria, on May 15, 1962, broadcast on that date by the Sofia domestic radio, but not circulated in the Soviet Union.

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U.S. editors had deliberately ignored an important proviso linking escalation with the participation of the nuclear powers in local conflicts. In point of fact, this charge amounted to setting up a straw man, for the U.S. editors in question had quoted in full from the pertinent passage in the Sokolovskii volume, which stated: "One must emphasize that the present international system and the present state of military technology will cause any armed conflict to develop, inevitably, into a general war if the nuclear powers are drawn into it."[11]

The Sokolovskii authors then resorted in their *Red Star* article to the curious step of misquoting themselves in order to reinforce the point they were interested in making. In citing the above passage from their book, they quietly omitted the key word, "inevitably." This particular omission, along with general denial of the inevitability of escalation, represents a notable shift in the usual Soviet argument. The Russians may hope thereby to reduce their vulnerability to Chinese charges that a hard line on escalation immobilizes support of national liberation movements, and at the same time to deter the West from feeling that it has greater freedom to act because of hypersensitive Soviet concern about escalation. It is of some interest, incidentally, that it has been the Soviet military who have recently placed the greatest emphasis on vigorous Soviet support of national liberation struggles.

Related to the apparent Soviet desire to convey an image of greater flexibility in supporting local conflicts is a new suggestion that in the case of certain third-power conflicts the Soviet Union might try to avoid expanding the conflict by withholding attacks against the United States in return for U.S. abstention. This "message" emerges somewhat tentatively from the November *Red Star* article by the Sokolovskii authors. Commenting on a statement by the U.S. editors of their book to the effect that Soviet doctrine seems to imply a retaliatory strike against the United States in the event of Western action against a Soviet bloc member, the Sokolovskii authors denied that this was a valid interpretation of the Soviet position. In their book, the Soviet authors said, they were dealing simply with the case of "an attack by imperialist forces" on a socialist country, and "the United States was not mentioned." Only if the United States were "to carry out such an attack itself" would the Soviet Union be impelled to deliver a retaliatory blow, "in which case the United States would have been the aggressor."

[11] "Soviet Military Strategy," p. 44.

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This circumlocution appears to be more than an effort to avoid the implication that there are circumstances under which the Soviet Union might strike first. Rather, the Soviet authors seem to be trying to convey the thought that there are some situations where the Soviet Union may be anxious to dampen the possibilities of automatic escalation, by distinguishing between the United States and third powers in the event of local conflict. That the Soviets are thinking specifically of Central Europe is suggested by Khrushchev's recent references to the high escalation potential of a local clash between countries in the heart of Europe,[12] and by statements elsewhere that West Germany might start a local war against East Germany on its own initiative.[13]

Despite what seems to be a general Soviet desire to be reassuring to the United States, the Soviet position on preëmption remains, perhaps intentionally, ambivalent. Thus, for example, while the Sokolovskii authors went to some pains in their *Red Star* article to disclaim that statements of Soviet readiness to frustrate and break up an enemy attack are meant to imply preemption, the revised edition of their book still adheres to a formula that calls for ". . . breaking up the opponent's aggressive plans by dealing him in good time a crushing blow."[14] The Glagolev-Larionov excursus also contains a statement suggesting that the Soviet Union may contemplate a strategy approximating that of preëmption, in fact if not in name. Speaking in a context where the Soviet Union represents the defensive side, the article states: "The first rockets and bombers of the side on the defensive would take off *even before the aggressor's first rockets, to say nothing of his bombers, reached their targets.* (Italics in the original.) If this description is to be taken at face value, a fine line indeed exists between the Soviet conception of a preëmptive and a retaliatory strike.[15] At the very least the passage seems meant to convey the notion that Soviet response to warning of a strategic attack would be instant and automatic, without waiting

[12] *Pravda*, January 4, 1964.
[13] "Military Strategy," 2nd ed., p. 362.
[14] *Ibid.*, p. 260.
[15] There are large practical differences between a preëmptive strike—which by definition would be intended to break up or blunt an enemy attack that had already been set in motion—and a retaliatory or second-strike which would be mounted only after having absorbed the full force of the enemy's initial blow. Soviet rhetoric customarily claims the practical results to be expected from a preëmptive strike, while disclaiming at the same time that the Soviet Union would ever contemplate any course but a retaliatory strike. Ambiguity as to where the Soviets really stand on this question is the result.

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for incontrovertible evidence that an attack actually had been launched at Soviet targets.

V

Much of the East-West strategic dialogue to date has centered on the question whether the balance of military power in the world favors one side or the other. Today, the Soviet voice seems to reflect growing uncertainty whether the Soviet Union's best interest lies in asserting military superiority over the West, at the risk of stimulating more vigorous Western defense efforts, or in settling for the notion of a second-best position. The predominant note in Soviet discourse up to now clearly has favored a doctrine calling for military superiority over the West. Khrushchev himself has more than once made plain that the policy of peaceful coexistence rests in essence on the premise that the Soviet bloc countries, as he puts it, "have a rapidly growing economy and surpass the imperialist camp in armaments and armed forces."[16] A typical expression of Soviet commitment to a policy of military superiority was the statement made in the spring of 1963 by Marshal Andrei Grechko, Soviet First Deputy Minister of Defense, and commander of the Warsaw Pact forces: "The Communist Party and the Soviet government base their military policy on the fact that as long as disarmament has not been implemented, the armed forces of the socialist commonwealth must always be superior to those of the imperialists."[17]

On the other hand, it is recognized that there are liabilities in professing a policy of military superiority, for if the Soviet military posture is made to look excessively formidable, the result may well be simply to spur the West to greater efforts, leaving the Soviet Union relatively worse off than before. For a country whose resources already seem strained by the high cost of arms competition, this is a serious consideration, and a principal reason for cultivating an atmosphere of détente. A revealing sign of Soviet wavering on the question of military superiority appeared recently in an article by the same Marshal Grechko who some six months before had spoken categorically for a policy of military superiority. Grechko took note of Western military preparations, singling out remarks by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara at the NATO Council meeting in December on "the number of

[16] *Pravda,* February, 28, 1963.
[17] *Izvestia,* May 9, 1963.

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American long-range missiles and the number of bombers on air alert." Western preparations, Grechko said, were meant "to attain military superiority over the Soviet Union." Instead of responding with the customary assertion that Soviet forces are superior to those of the West, Grechko adopted a notably restrained tone. The Soviet Union, he said, "has sufficient means to restrain any aggressor, no matter what kind of nuclear power he may possess." Further, said Grechko, the Soviet Union is not "in the least interested in an armaments race," but merely intends to maintain its defense "at the level necessary to assure peace."[18]

At bottom, Soviet policy on the question of military superiority is complicated by many factors. Not only is the Soviet Union at a relative disadvantage in resources, but, as experience shows, it has managed to live for a considerable period in a position of strategic inferiority to its major adversary without being subjected to the "imperialist attack" so often predicted. The underlying issue hinges intimately on what the limits of military power in the nuclear age are understood to be. Can the use of military power, or the threat of its use, enable one side to alter the political situation to its advantage, or is the feasible limit merely to prevent the other side from attempting to do so? Putting it another way, has war or the threat of war lost its meaning as an instrument of policy? Interestingly enough, an internal discussion has developed in the Soviet Union during the past year, and has carried over into the polemics with the Chinese, over the continuing validity of the Leninist thesis on war as a continuation of politics by violent means.[19] This is more than a matter of splitting doctrinal hairs.

If on the one hand there is still a prospect that war can be won —or lost—in a meaningful sense, then it might seem worth the effort to strive for a war-winning strategy and military forces commensurate to this task. But if on the other hand there should no longer seem to be anything to choose between victor and vanquished in a nuclear war, then the course to take might look quite different. So far as Soviet military policy is concerned, a second-best solution might be readily rationalized as the best solution.

[18] *Red Star,* December 22, 1963.

[19] Soviet discussion of this question may be found in the following articles: Boris Dimitryev, "Brass Hats, Peking and Clausewitz," *Izvestia,* September 24, 1963; Colonel P. Trifonenkov, "War and Politics," *Red Star,* October 30, 1963; Marshal S. Biryuzov, "Policy and Nuclear Arms," *Izvestia,* December 11, 1963. See also "Military Strategy," 2nd ed., p. 25, 216.

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That is to say, the Soviet leadership might settle indefinitely for a strategy of deterrence and Soviet forces at a level sufficient to maintain credibility but still clearly inferior to those of the adversary. Perhaps it is safe to say that neither the Soviet political nor military leaders have yet made up their minds on this issue, if indeed they have posed it in this way at all. However, life itself, as Khrushchev sometimes puts it, may now be making a place for the matter on the agenda.

It would be premature in the extreme to suggest that the Soviet image of the West, as projected in the strategic dialogue, now mirrors reality with reasonable fidelity. Soviet perception of the West is still filtered through ideological and parochial suspicions that produce a woefully distorted picture, particularly of Western motives and intentions. At the same time, the picture of the West that emerges from recent Soviet strategic discourse is beginning in some respects to take on more objective dimensions, notably in treating the United States as a strong but withal responsible adversary. This in itself can be regarded as a small advance.

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THE SOVIET MILITARY BUDGET

By Timothy Sosnovy

> The Soviet Union does not conceal its expenditures for defense, because all mankind knows of the peaceable character of the Soviet Government.
>
> —"Finansy S.S.S.R." ("Finance of the U.S.S.R.," a textbook for schools of higher education), Moscow, 1958, p. 285.

THE great development of modern weapons of mass destruction has caused enormous changes in military science including military doctrine and military strategy. However, these changes have not affected the concept of the military budget. Today, as in the past, the military budget, approved by appropriate organs of the state, indicates to a certain extent the defense effort of the nation. On the basis of the analysis below, it appears that, as a percentage of Gross National Product (for the U.S.S.R.—national income), the Soviet military budget is about double that of the United States.

The national defense power and the military budget are indivisible. Therefore it is important to establish the size of the Soviet military budget as a first step in the discussion of the problems of disarmament and the possible reduction of the defense budget. However, the solution of this problem is difficult because the Soviet Union is a closed society and has drawn one of the tightest security screens in history around its military affairs and related technology and industry upon which its military power is based.

The two paramount purposes of the obfuscation are, first, to sustain the Soviet propaganda front, such as the totally false claims of lowered military expenditures in recent years; and, second, to conceal the exact nature of their military build-up and the real size of the over-all military budget.

The curtailment of the published indicators concerning the Soviet military budget has taken place gradually. In the mid-1920s, Soviet military expenditures were divided into nine major groups, such as salaries, organizational and administrative expenses, clothing-subsistence costs, technical supply, cultural and educational expenses, finance of defense industry, etc., which were in turn subdivided into 79 individual entries. In the early 1930s, military expenditures were broken down into two groups. From the early 1940s to the present time, military expenditures are designated as expenditures of the Department of Defense.

The composition of the Soviet state budget and the relative position of military expenditures in it during the last 25 years is shown in the table on the following page.

According to Soviet statements, the Soviet armed forces comprised 5,763,000 men at the beginning of 1955. During the 1955–1958 period, the alleged cut in Soviet and armed forces was 2,140,000 men.[1] In spite of the considerable cut in the armed forces, military expenditures remain almost unchanged, except for 1956, following the 1955 cut. More specifically, in 1956 one billion rubles less were spent for military purposes than in 1955. The expenditures during the 1956–1960 period remained on almost the same level—between 9.3 and 9.7 billion rubles per year.

[1] *Pravda*, Jan. 16, 1960, p. 3.

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This steady level of military expenditures did not result in a reduction in Soviet military capabilities, but rather a shift in the balance between manpower and more advanced weapons including atomic and thermonuclear devices, rockets of all types and other modern weapons.

Later, in connection with the Berlin crisis, the planned cut in Soviet armed forces of 1,200,000 during 1960 and 1961 was not carried out and the armed forces were possibly even expanded. In this connection, expenditures for "Defense" were increased to 11.6 billion rubles in 1961, and 12.7 billion in 1962. In 1963 and 1964, "Defense" appropriations of 13.9 and 13.3 billion

STATE BUDGET OF THE U.S.S.R. IN 1940, 1950, 1955–1964 IN BILLIONS OF NEW RUBLES, IN CURRENT PRICES

Year	*Total Expenditures*		*National Economy*			*Social-Cultural Projects*		*Defense*		*State Gov't Expenditures*		*Other Expenditures Not Shown*	
	Am't	%	Am't	%	Industry only	Am't	%	Am't	%	Am't	%	Am't	%
1940	17.4	100.0	5.8	33.5	2.3	4.1	23.5	5.7	32.6	0.7	4.0	1.1	6.4
1950	41.3	100.0	15.8	38.2	7.8	11.7	28.2	8.3	20.0	1.3	3.4	4.2	10.2
1955	54.0	100.0	23.4	43.2	11.0	14.7	27.3	10.7	19.9	1.2	2.2	4.0	7.4
1956	56.3	100.0	24.5	43.5	12.8	16.4	29.2	9.7	17.3	1.2	2.1	4.5	7.9
1957	60.7	100.0	26.7	44.0	13.1	20.0	33.0	9.1	15.0	1.2	2.0	3.7	6.0
1958	64.3	100.0	29.0	45.2	13.7	21.4	33.3	9.4	14.6	1.2	1.8	3.3	5.1
1959	70.4	100.0	32.4	46.0	14.9	23.1	32.8	9.4	13.3	1.1	1.6	4.4	6.3
1960	73.1	100.0	34.1	46.7	15.6	24.9	34.1	9.3	12.7	1.1	1.5	3.7	5.0
1961	76.3	100.0	32.6	42.7	16.1[1]	27.2	35.7	11.6	15.2	1.1	1.4	3.8	5.0
1962	82.2	100.0	36.2	44.1	14.8[1]	28.9	35.2	12.7	15.4	1.1	1.3	3.3	4.0
1963[1]	86.2	100.0	34.5	40.0	15.5	31.0	36.0	13.9	16.1	1.1	1.3	5.7	6.6
1964[1]	91.4	100.0	38.7	42.3	15.5[2]	32.8	35.9	13.3	14.6	1.1	1.2	5.5	6.0

Sources: For 1940, 1950, 1955–1960: *Gosudarstvennyy byudzhet S.S.S.R. i soyuznykh respublik, Statisticheskiy Sbornik* (State Budget of the U.S.S.R. and Union Republics, Statistical Annual), Moscow, 1962, p. 18–20. For 1961 and 1962: *Narodnoye Khozyaistvo S.S.S.R. v 1962 godu*, Statisticheskiy Ezhegodnik (National Economy of the U.S.S.R. in 1962, Statistical Annual), Moscow, 1963, p. 635. For 1963, *Pravda*, Dec. 14, 1962, p. 1. For 1964, *Pravda*, Dec. 20, 1963, p. 1.

[1] Planned. [2] Assumed.

rubles were approved and represented 16.1 percent and 14 percent respectively of the total budget for these years.

The alleged decline in the ratio of defense expenditures to total expenditures is widely publicized and used by the Soviet Government. For example, "The Soviet Union systematically, from year to year, cut appropriations for military purposes in the State budget. The percentage of this appropriation for 1960 constitutes only 12.7 percent of all expenditures in the State Budget as compared to 19.9 percent in 1955."[2] "In the imperialist countries like the U. S., the military budget for 1961/62 was 61.4 billion dollars or 77 percent of all expenditures of the budget."[3]

The purported low percentage of Soviet appropriations going to the military can be explained by the fact that the State Budget includes appropriations which finance not only all branches of the economy but also include

[2] From "Appeal of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet to Parliaments and the Governments of all Nations," in connection with the law which reduced the Soviet Armed Forces by 1,200,000 men at the beginning of 1960. *Pravda*, Jan. 16, 1960, p. 1.

[3] *Finansy S.S.S.R.* (Finance of the U.S.S.R.), edited by D. A. Allakhkerdjan, Moscow, 1962, p. 311.

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cultural undertakings and a vast group of other appropriations not covered by the budgets of Western democracies. Furthermore, it also includes the budgets of the Union-republics and local budgets. In short, the Soviet State budget absorbs more than one-half of the national income.[4]

Moreover, it should be stressed that the official expenditures for defense, published every year, represent only a part of Soviet military outlays. In other words, they represent the direct military part of the State budget which is set aside for Rocket Troops, Air Force, Ground Forces, Navy, Air Defense and rear services of all types and kinds of the armed forces, and spent in the following ways:

(a) payments established for Army, Air Force and Fleet (Navy) armaments, ammunition and engineering, fuel and lubricants, rations, clothing and other valuable materials necessary for combat readiness of troops; (b) financing of capital construction and industrial enterprises of the Ministry of Defense; (c) military requirements, political training and housing and recreation facilities for units of the armed forces; (d) allocation of pay and allowances for military personnel of the armed forces.

Other military expenditures—defense industry, strategic defense materials and food reserves, atomic research, war veterans among others—are concealed in another section of the State budget, and are supplementary to the official military budget. Real military expenditures are therefore much higher than is shown in the annually published Soviet Defense budget.

It must be emphasized that we do not know the exact magnitude of the sums concealed within the State budget of the U.S.S.R. We do know, however, the type of measures for which these sums have been earmarked and in what part of the State budget they are reflected. Many other factors which enter into the picture, such as Soviet budgetary history, financial legislation and, particularly, Soviet budgetary practices, also help us to estimate the size of the hidden sums in question.

Under the heading "National Economy," besides expenditures for basic branches of the economy such as agriculture, transportation, communal economy, etc., there is also one figure for the financing of industry, which in fact includes 21 branches of industry, four being for military purposes.

Ever since the beginning of forced industrialization, the defense industry has been one of the most privileged branches of the Soviet economy. There has been a constant rise in the percentage allocated in the budget for the development of the defense industries as compared with allocations for the development of industry as a whole: in 1923/24—1926/27 it was 11.2 percent; in 1937, in conformity with two sources, between 13.8 and 18.5 percent; and in three years of the Third Five Year Plan (1938–1940) 29.0 percent.

After the Second World War, all traces of the extent of defense-industry financing vanished. Moreover, for the first time in many years the published Soviet budget for 1964 does not indicate funds for the financing of industry and construction as a whole, although for 1964 and 1965 funds for the chemical industry and certain other industries are given. One gets the strong impression from the 1964 State budget that the Soviet authorities try to render figures concerning the Soviet economy as confusing as possible.

The resources allocated to the defense industry are probably growing in

[4] *Finansy S.S.S.R.* (Finance of the U.S.S.R.), No. 1, 1963, p. 26.

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absolute terms, because of the increasing development of new weapons.[5] However, according to the author's estimate, the ratio of defense industry to total allocations for the development of industry and construction as a whole has not changed in comparison with the years 1938–1940, but remains 29.0 percent.

During 1955–1962, the ratio of funds for industry and construction to the total allocation for the national economy was 43.2 percent. For 1963 the planned figure was 40 percent. For 1964 we assume for the industry the same percent. In other words, in 1964, out of 38.7 billion rubles allocated to finance the national economy, 40 percent or 15.5 billion rubles are earmarked for industry as a whole, of which 4.5 billion rubles, or 29.0 percent, was for the defense industry.

The Soviet Government attaches exceptional importance to strategic defense material and food reserves and takes all possible measures to increase them, because "the concentration of large quantities of materials and food reserves in the hands of the government is necessary in the interest of strengthening the country's defense potential."[6] On the eve of World War II, defense reserves included strategic raw materials such as oil and nonferrous metals as well as fuel and food supplies. Today the number of items encompassed is considerably greater. They include "substantial reserves of power potential, strategic raw materials, food reserves and reconstruction materials, to prevent any delays in supplying the defense industry and the armed forces."[7]

State defense reserves constitute a special fund and their custody is centralized nationally. In 1946 two all-Union ministries for materials and food reserves were created to replace the Main Administration of State Reserves of the Council of Ministries of the U.S.S.R. In 1948 these ministries were merged into one—the Ministry of State Food and Material Reserves. As of 1953, the State Planning Committee of the Council of Ministers was charged with these functions. Toward the end of the 1930s, the allocations for strategic materials and food reserves were treated separately in the published data concerning the State budget. At present they are concealed under the State budget heading "National Economy" and "Other Expenditures Not Shown." For the last nine years (1955–1963) the latter category has averaged 3.9 billion rubles a year.

Funds of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. and Union Republics are basically used to finance the national economy. It is possible that a part of these funds are used for war industry or research purposes, although the exact figure is unknown. In this connection it should be remembered that in 1959 and 1960 the increase of circulating capital and reserves was 12.8 and 12.9 billion rubles respectively. In 1961 and 1962, for the same purposes, 17.6 and 16.5 billion rubles respectively were allocated. It may be asked what part of these funds is going for strategic defense and food reserves.

[5] In order to increase control over military production, four ministries of defense industry were transformed in December 1957 into the following four committees of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministries: Aviation Engineering, Defense Technology, Radio Electronics and Shipbuilding. These include the branches of industry forming the defense industry base, as well as the aerospace industry.

[6] A. D. Kursky, *Ekonomicheskiye osnovy narodno-khozyaist-vennogo planiovaniya v S.S.S.R.* (Economic Principles of National Planning in the U.S.S.R.), Moscow, 1959, p. 30.

[7] BSE, vol. 36, 2nd ed., 1955, p. 265.

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Allotments for defense reserves have steadily increased. The Fourth Five Year Plan (1946–1950), for example, called for state defense reserves to total "about 6 percent of the Gross National Product."

The 1964 appropriation for strategic defense materials and food reserves is estimated at 5.4 billion rubles which constitutes 3 percent of expected national income of the U.S.S.R. for 1964 (see section VI). However, this sum also includes funds for the formation of financial reserves.

The sum of 32.8 billion rubles allocated in 1964 for social and cultural projects also includes expenditures for atomic energy research and pensions to war veterans.

In the Soviet Union science receives exceptional attention; the best scientific talent is concentrated in the area of new weapons systems. Science, of course, is thoroughly regimented and totally subordinated to Party and State objectives. At any given moment, the entire scientific establishment, with unlimited financial resources, may be committed to the solution of scientific and technical problems deemed to be most important, and most closely connected with the country's war potential.

"It is a well-known fact," Mr. Khrushchev has said, "that the Soviet Government never hesitates to spend money for the development of science."[8] Probably for the first time in history there has been a total acceptance of the fact that, in a very genuine and realistic sense, knowledge is power. With this in mind, the Soviets have trained and will continue to train an army of scientists and technologists in the fields of basic and applied research, as an aid to economic growth and military power.

In 1961 the Soviet Government created a new super agency charged with the coördination and control of all scientific research in the country. The chairman, Engineer K. Rudnev, who was working in the field of armaments, was named to head the new agency with the rank of Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers. It is significant, too, that the new president of the Academy of Sciences, Academician M. Keldysh, was formerly director of research at the then top secret "Research Institute No. 1" of the Ministry of Aircraft Industry, which was engaged in Soviet rocket development during World War II. He was charged with the solution of major scientific and engineering development problems in the area of missile and space technology.

Scientific research is also centralized to the utmost. In 1926–27 the Union budget financed 24.4 percent of expenditures for science. In 1960 the Union budget financed 80 percent of all expenditures for science, and the figure is probably even higher today. Appropriations for basic scientific research are rapidly increasing. In 1940, just prior to World War II, 0.1 billion rubles were spent on scientific research, which represented 0.6 percent of all expenditures of the national budget. After World War II the budget expenditures for basic science rose from 1.2 percent in 1950 (0.5 billion rubles) to 3.9 percent in 1964 (3.6 billion rubles)—a sevenfold increase.

What part of the expenditures for science has a military character? In the Soviet Union, the problem of the delimitation of military and nonmilitary expenditures is facilitated by the fact that any peaceful undertaking, notably in the field of scientific research, is considered with regard to its influence on national defense. Almost 40 years ago the Defense Commissar, M. Frunze, wrote: "In any new undertaking—economic, cultural

[8] *Pravda*, December 16, 1958, p. 7.

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or other—one must always ask the question: What relation does this undertaking have to the task of protecting the nation? Is there any possibility of letting it serve specific military purposes also without impairing peaceful goals?"[9]

Frunze's pronouncement is often cited in the Soviet press by authors writing on military subjects as a pattern for organizing work in any branch or area of the Soviet economy, culture, etc. Thus, all expenditures for scientific research are, to a greater or lesser extent, of a military character. However, we may attempt to divide these expenditures into two categories, although no direct information for such a division is available.

In the State budget for 1950–1957, the percentage of non-itemized expenditures increased from 42.6 percent in 1950 to 60.4 percent in 1957. If we assume that the percentage of concealed allocations for science in the years 1958–1964 is the same as in 1957, this means that in 1950–1964 expenditures for military research increased from 0.3 billion rubles in 1950 to 2.2 billion rubles in 1964, representing a sevenfold increase. This increase lay primarily in the field of atomic energy.

The Soviet Union continues to bear a financial burden from past wars, paying veterans' pensions as do the Western nations. While this sum is not a direct military expenditure, it needs to be included for comparative purposes. At the beginning of 1963, the number of war veterans and their dependents stood at 5,550,000. We estimate that expenditures under this heading in 1964 will be 2.0 billion rubles.

A number of other activities are also financed by expenditures concealed in the national budget, and although they are not of a direct military nature, they support far-reaching military and political objectives. These activities include espionage, intelligence, financing of subversive activity in all its forms, extending "aid"—military, economic, technical and scientific—which includes the training and sending of "experts" and "technicians" abroad, and extending loans to underdeveloped countries.

For example, the "State Government Expenditures" entry, which totaled 1.1 billion rubles in 1964, is an historical source of espionage and intelligence money in the Soviet budget. This entry includes the sums for upkeep of central government organs which include the Committee for State Security of the Council of Ministers, the agency responsible for espionage and intelligence. According to official Soviet sources, the expenditures for espionage and intelligence services were classified as "expenditures not to be made public" in 1923–24, "Secret expenditures" in 1924–25, and "special expenditures of the Unified State Political Administration" (OGPU) in 1925–26. We do not know how much is allocated for this purpose now.

Some expenditures for defense are not reflected in the national budget—for instance, the surplus of revenue over expenditures, which is typical of the Soviet budget and for the last 10 years (1955–1964) averaged 2.2 billion rubles a year.[10] As a rule, these surpluses are not carried over into the following year's budget. It can be assumed that half that surplus is used

[9] A. N. Lagovskiy, *Strategia i ekonomika: kratkiy ocherk ikh vzaimnoy suyazi ivzaimnoyo vliyaniya* (Strategy and Economics, Brief Essay on Their Interrelation and Interdependence), Moscow, 1957, p. 194.

[10] The Soviet State budget has been without deficit since 1924–1925, with the exception of the first three war years (1941–1944).

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for espionage, the financing of Communist parties in other countries, and other subversive activities in all vulnerable parts of the world. In 1964, therefore, this sum amounted to 1.0 billion rubles.

In addition to the State budget of the U.S.S.R., another means of financing measures of a military character is provided by the resources of industrial defense enterprises. Under the Soviet "cost-accounting" system, each enterprise may retain a portion of its resources, including "profits." In 1964, it is estimated that that these hidden resources allocated for defense industry amounted to 3.5 billion rubles, or 29.0 percent of the 11.9 billion rubles from the resources of industrial enterprises.[11]

Summing up all expenditures for military purposes, the possible size of the military budget of the Soviet Union is determined as shown below.

SUMMARY TABLE OF SOVIET MILITARY EXPENDITURES IN 1964
IN BILLIONS OF RUBLES

	Amount	*Percent*
1. Direct Military Expenditures		
(a) Military Budget	13.3	41.7
2. Indirect Military Expenditures		
(a) Defense Industry	4.5	
(b) State Defense Reserves	5.4	
(c) Scientific Research in the Military Field	2.2	
(d) Pensions for War Veterans	2.0	
Total	14.1	44.2
3. Expenditures not included in the State Budget		
(a) Excess of Revenue over Expenditures	1.0	
(b) Defense Industry	3.5	
Total	4.5	14.1
Sum Total	31.9	100.0

This table shows that concealed expenditures of a military nature in the State budget are more than twice as high as the open expenditures. It is the author's estimate that 14.1 billion rubles are concealed in the 1964 budget (defense industry, state defense reserves, scientific research and war veterans) making the total military support funds 27.4 billion rubles or 64.3 percent of the Union budget, which is 42.6 billion rubles for 1964.

Recognizing that the validity of Soviet national income data is subject to question, it will nevertheless be useful to show the defense budget as a percentage of national income, which in 1962 was 162.9 billion rubles. If we assume an annual increase of 5 percent, the national income in 1964 may be estimated at 179.5 billion rubles. Expenditures for defense in 1964 are estimated at 31.9 billion rubles, which is 17.8 percent of the national income. In the author's view, this estimate is a conservative one. For purposes of comparison, it is estimated that the G.N.P. of the United States for 1964 will be $623 billion and that the expenditures for national defense for 1964 (F.Y.) will be $56 billion, or 9.0 percent of the G.N.P.

It should be noted that many factors other than the size of the military budget contribute to the war potential of the Soviet Union without requiring special expenditures. Among these are:

[11] In 1964, financing of the national economy from resources of the enterprises themselves constitutes 29.800 million rubles. *Pravda,* December 17, 1963, p. 5.

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1. Adjustment of the Soviet economy in peacetime to military purposes. A long time ago, the Third All-Union Congress of the Soviets (1927) passed a law regarding "building of all other [read: non-military] industries vis-à-vis requirements in time of war."[12] This is in conformity with Soviet practice in which "the development of industry, agriculture, and transportation simultaneously serves to strengthen the war potential of the country."[13]

2. Since World War II, great attention has been paid to the problems of the regimentation of the civil population and civil defense operations. At present, the All-Union Society for Coöperation with the Army, Air Force, and Navy has embraced tens of millions of people, who are being trained in many fields of direct military use.

3. Price formation and price policy have encouraged the low level of prices for articles that are destined for the armed forces, especially armaments and equipment.

In connection with the Soviet military budget, there arise many other no less important questions that need special consideration, namely: What kind of relationship exists between military potential and the defense budget? Where are the areas of strain in the Soviet military budget? Is it true that the Soviets may find it increasingly difficult both to keep up with the West in the international power struggle and to modernize their economy and raise living standards?

It is not the purpose of this article to answer these questions; however, we should avoid the danger of underestimating Soviet willingness to give the highest priority to military programs. The Soviet budget always is strained to the utmost, but at the 1960 session of the Supreme Soviet Khrushchev said that "if necessary, we can raise the military budget by tens of billions of rubles."[14] This was not an empty boast. Later in a speech of July 8, 1961, addressed to graduates of the military academies, Khrushchev calmly announced that the current year's defense budget would be stepped up by a third, that is by 3.1 billion rubles.[15] The same thing happened in 1962. Finance Minister V. Garbuzov simply informed 1,378 delegates at a joint session of the Supreme Soviet in the Grand Kremlin Palace that defense expenditures jumped from the 9.3 billion rubles originally planned for 1961 to 13.4 billion rubles for 1962.[16] This represents a 44 percent increase of direct military expenditures. In 1963, they rose again by 0.5 billion rubles. No question was asked; no doubt was expressed. None of the delegates mentioned the military budget. This has been a firmly established way of life in Soviet society for decades. Long before Goebbels, the people of the Soviet Union truly knew the meaning "guns instead of butter." For example, in 1934, direct military expenditures rose from 1,655 million rubles to 5,000 million rubles, or more than trebled. The increases of 1961, 1962 and 1963 showed that the Soviet Government is as able under Khrushchev as under Stalin to increase military expenditures to any level desired.

[12] *Kommunisticheskaya partiya sovetskogo soyuza i stroitel' stvo vooruzhennykh sil* (Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. and the Building of Armed Forces), Moscow, 1959, p. 231.

[13] Lagovskiy, *op. cit.*, p. 200.

[14] *Zasedaniye verkhovnogo soveta S.S.S.R. pyatogo sozyva, chetvertaya sessiya* (Conference of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet, Fifth Convocation, Fourth Session (January 14–15, 1960), Stenographic Report, Moscow, 1960, p. 47.

[15] *Pravda*, July 9, 1961, p. 3.

[16] *Pravda*, December 9, 1961, p. 1.

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THE COLORADO WATERS DISPUTE

By Norris Hundley, Jr.

ONCE again the diplomatic relations of the United States and Mexico are troubled by controversy over the waters of the Colorado River. The latest dispute, though building up slowly, is potentially more serious than earlier ones because of the vast agricultural development of the Southwest and the urgency of hemispheric solidarity. Water with heavy salt content draining back into the Colorado from irrigated land in the United States is endangering Mexican crops further downstream. At a time when the Johnson Administration particularly wants the friendship of Mexico and the rest of Latin America, the controversy provides Mexican leftists with a popular rallying point for their attacks on their own government as well as that of the United States. Unfortunately, the treaty of 1944 which divided Colorado River water and guaranteed orderly development of the region was drawn in haste and without clear provision for handling certain obvious problems. These omissions are the source of the present quarrel and may become the basis for action by the World Court.

Since the turn of the century, Mexico and the United States have been concerned about Colorado River water, and the attitude of each is understandable. This valuable stream drains some of the most beautiful and driest land in the world—about 242,000 square miles in the United States (parts of Wyoming, Colorado, Utah, Nevada, New Mexico, Arizona and California) and 2,000 square miles in Mexico. From its source high in the snow-capped Rocky Mountains, it flows nearly 1,400 miles in a southwesterly direction through a majestic countryside—painted deserts, Grand Canyon, fertile valleys—where water is as precious as gold. Crossing the international border near Yuma, Arizona, the Colorado winds its last 100 miles through Mexico before emptying into the Gulf of California.

Despite its vast watershed and artery of tributaries, the Colorado is not a heavy flowing stream. In the entire basin the average precipitation is only 15 inches and evaporation quickly reduces runoff by 90 percent. On the basis of records kept since 1922, the remaining 10 percent amounts to less than 15,500,000 acre-feet, only a thirty-third of the volume of the Mississippi and a twelfth that of the Columbia.

But it is obvious to all familiar with the area that, even if the Colorado were fully exploited, thousands of square miles would still remain desert. There is simply not enough water to irrigate all the available land or to provide for more than a handful of cities and industries. This situation has led to bitter disputes between individuals, states and, perhaps most serious of all, between Mexico and the United States. The two nations sparred with one another from the turn of the century until 1944, when they agreed to a treaty which should have settled their differences.

When the treaty was signed, not everyone received the news with joy. Californians, anxious about reclamation projects for which water might not be available, assailed the provision giving Mexico 1,500,000 acre-feet. By January 1945, when the Senate began deliberations on the treaty, proponents of the agreement sought to counter California's charge with a variety of

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arguments, most of which do not concern us here. But one argument, which proved important at the time, also sheds light on the present controversy between Mexico and the United States. Treaty advocates insisted that the grant to Mexico would be made up largely of "return flow" drainage from reclamation projects in the United States. They estimated the return flow at about one million acre-feet. Consequently, of the 1,500,000 acre-feet allocated to Mexico, two-thirds of it would be satisfied with return flow—water already used at least once by the United States.

Californians immediately recognized the power of this argument for, if true, it meant that the treaty was giving Mexico little more than she would receive in the natural course of events. They wasted no time in moving to the attack. Spearheading the Senate opposition was California's Senator Sheridan Downey who considered the return-flow estimate too high and tried by relentless cross-examination to get the treaty advocates to modify their figure. He drew finally from Royce Tipton, an engineer and adviser to the American treaty negotiators, the concession that the United States would probably be able to reclaim all but 730,000 acre-feet of the return flow. Tipton admitted further that the only thing that would prevent the United States from reclaiming even more would be the poor quality of the remainder. This water, because of heavy prior use for irrigation, would be too saline for most crops. Rather than use such water, Tipton felt that it should be allowed to flow downstream, thus helping the United States fulfill its treaty obligation to Mexico.

It was shortly before this that one of the most important debates on the treaty occurred. Downey seriously doubted that the United States could get away with giving Mexico unusable water and he questioned Tipton closely on this point.

"Is there any statement in the treaty as to the quality of water that must be delivered by the United States to Mexico?"

"We are protected on the quality, sir," quickly responded Tipton. Downey saw an opening and his next question came right to the point.

"You would mean by that statement that we could perform the terms of our treaty with Mexico by delivering to her water that would not be usable?"

"Yes, sir," answered Tipton without a moment's hesitation.

"And you think," asked Downey as he pressed his examination, "that some court in the future would uphold that kind of interpretation, that we could satisfy in whole or in part our obligation to Mexico under this treaty of delivering 1,500,000 acre-feet of water, even though some or all of it were not usable for irrigation purposes?"

Tipton remained adamant. "That is my interpretation of the treaty, sir," he replied. "During the negotiations, that question was argued strenuously. Memoranda passed back and forth during negotiations indicate what the intent was. Language was placed in the treaty to cover that situation and to cover only that situation."[1]

The language to which Tipton referred appeared in several provisions stipulating that Mexico's allotment would come "from any and all sources," would

[1] Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "Hearings on Water Treaty with Mexico," 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 1945, p. 322. See articles 10 and 11 of the treaty in "United States Statutes at Large," LIX, p. 1219 f.

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be "for any purpose whatsoever" and would be "made up of the waters of the said river, whatever their origin." However, there is no evidence, other than Tipton's testimony, that the provisions were inserted "to cover only" the question of water quality. The memoranda to which he referred are now missing. Moreover, after additional questioning, he admitted that the Mexican negotiators had signed no such memoranda. Even so Downey tried to have them entered into evidence, but Tom Connally, powerful chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, refused to approve the request. Since Connally's home state of Texas benefited from other provisions in the treaty, he favored the agreement and shied away from anything that might have jeopardized its ratification.

The available evidence seems to suggest that the words "from any and all sources" and "waters . . . whatever their origin" were inserted primarily to give the United States maximum credit for the return flow and only indirectly —if, indeed, at all—to cover the question of quality. Some return flow would enter the river above the boundary; some would enter below the California border along the twenty-mile stretch where the river forms the common boundary between Arizona and Mexico; and some, the drainage water from the Yuma project, would never enter the river, but would flow instead across the land boundary into Sonora. To gain credit for this return flow (or at least that part of it constituting "good quality" water, according to Mexico) would seem to have been the real reason for the provisions cited by Tipton. It should be noted that neither government attempted to define "usable" or "good quality" water and scientists have not devised any hard-and-fast rule themselves.

Treaty advocates insisted that there was another provision which would compel Mexico to accept polluted water. Article 10 provided that the amount allocated to Mexico was "for any purpose whatsoever." The implication here was that Mexico would have to find another use for her water if it were too saline for irrigation. Though this provision might be construed to favor the United States, it seems unlikely that an international tribunal would interpret it in such a fashion. Besides, if the allotment were unusable, then there would be no "purpose" to which Mexico could put the water unless it were treated in a desalinization plant. But the cost of such an operation was then—and still is—prohibitive.

Another event seems to corroborate the above conclusion. In January 1944, less than a month after the negotiations, Charles Timm, another adviser to the American negotiators, was questioned about the treaty. When he was asked if it contained anything about the quality of Mexico's allotment, Timm replied, "Not in the treaty. . . . There was frankly strenuous objection on the part of Mexico. They objected to the omission of the quality but we succeeded in evading it."[2] If the question of quality were evaded, it would certainly be stretching things for Tipton to say that both sides agreed to a provision which both understood settled the question. Moreover, it would seem highly foolish for the Mexicans to agree to accept unusable water.

The incredibility of Tipton's contention caused Downey to insist that the words "regardless of quality" be written into the treaty. That way the mean-

[2] Colorado River Basin Committees of Fourteen and Sixteen, Proceedings, Jan. 27–28, 1944, p. 21.

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ing of the treaty would be expressly clear and the United States need not fear the adverse decision of a future arbitration tribunal. The treaty advocates rejected this suggestion, insisting that the language was clear enough. Though it obviously was not, Downey failed to convince the Senate and on April 18, 1945, the treaty received a favorable vote of 76 to 10.

Though Downey had failed to convince the Senate that the treaty needed clarification, subsequent developments in Mexico should have done so. In the summer of 1945, the two Foreign Relations Committees of the Mexican Senate conducted a series of "round table" discussions, in which interested engineers and lawyers participated. Many expressed concern over the quality of water Mexico might receive under the treaty, but officials urged them not to worry. They insisted that the treaty provided sufficient safeguards against Mexico receiving water too saline to be usable. One of the leading Mexican proponents, Adolfo Orive Alba, cited article 27 to indicate that the Mexican water was intended for irrigation. "Therefore," he concluded, "in this treaty, as in any other of its kind, it is understood that the water must be of good quality."[3] This meant, he asserted, that Mexico should receive water similar to that used in the lower basin of the United States so long as it was "of good quality for irrigation."

A reservation could have been attached to the treaty making the Mexican position clear, but the Mexican officials realized the inadvisability of such a move. They knew what the American negotiators had said about quality and, consequently, anticipated that a reservation might cause the United States to reject the treaty the second time around. Moreover, most of them apparently believed that if a controversy did arise which resulted in arbitration no tribunal would permit the United States to give Mexico unusable water. Satisfied, the Mexican Senate voted unanimously for ratification on September 27.

California officials followed these debates with great interest. They noted the wide divergence of opinion on the question of quality and had their Senators contact Secretary of State James Byrnes about the discrepancy. But Byrnes was surprisingly undisturbed by the report and curiously replied that, since Mexico had attached no reservations to the treaty, there was "no basis for assuming that the two Governments entertain contrary views with respect to any of the provisions of the treaty."[4]

Why Byrnes could take such a position in view of the obvious disagreement over interpretation is not easy to explain. Perhaps the reason lay partly in ineptness and partly in his lack of good advice due to several important shake-ups that had occurred in the State Department. While the treaty was being negotiated and signed, Cordell Hull had been Secretary of State. In December 1944, Edward Stettinius, Jr., had replaced Hull. Then in July 1945, shortly after the Senate had approved the treaty, Byrnes replaced Stettinius. Changes had also taken place on lower but equally important levels of leader-

[3] *El Universal*, Mexico, D. F., Aug. 1, 1945. See also *Excelsior*, Mexico, D. F., Aug. 10, 1945, and *El Nacional*, Mexico, D. F., Aug. 11, 1945. A translation of the remarks made by Orive Alba on August 1 may be found in Senate Document 98, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 1945.

[4] James F. Byrnes to Sheridan Downey, Nov. 19, 1945, in "Treaty with Mexico Relating to the Utilization of the Waters of Certain Rivers" (Los Angeles: California Colorado River Board, n.d., 8 v.), v. 5.

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ship. For example, between 1943 and 1945 the policy-making position for Latin American affairs changed hands four times and each new appointee adopted a different program. "The ship of state zigzagged," writes Laurence Duggan, a top official in the Latin American Division at the time, and "no one could tell with certainty where it was headed."[5] Then, too, the end of World War II brought the State Department heavy responsibilities, including the negotiations to launch the United Nations. Moreover, many officials had come to associate the treaty, regardless of its imperfections, with the Good Neighbor Policy. They interpreted any attempt to modify the treaty as an attack on that policy and on hemispheric solidarity. Nevertheless, these problems should not have interfered with an attempt to reach a meeting of minds with Mexico. Perhaps the issue of the quality of the water represented an area on which no agreement could be reached. Though this might be true, the fact remains that Royce Tipton and others from the State Department vigorously denied any such deadlock. Obviously a conflict with Mexico was in the making, and no one who was in a position to do so was trying to prevent it.

For 15 years all remained quiet. As long as there was sufficient water in the river, the source of conflict lay dormant. The flow of water, however, was appreciably decreasing in the years after 1945. Less rain and snowfall, increased uses, and the operation of American storage reservoirs combined to reduce greatly the volume of water reaching Mexico. Much that did cross the international boundary was return flow, containing salts that were harmful to crops, but its mixture with fresher runoff was enough to eliminate the danger of loss. Unfortunately, in February 1961, a drainage channel from Arizona's Wellton-Mohawk project was completed, which carried off the return flow of a vast agricultural area. The addition of this new salty water to the Colorado changed the quality of river water dangerously. In the winter of 1961 the salt content reached 2,700 parts per million parts of water, or approximately 2,250 parts more salt than the water should contain for maximum usage. Under the schedule of deliveries set up by the treaty, Mexico's demands during the winter were small enough to be met by return flow. Rather than accept this highly saline water, Mexicans allowed it to flow on down into the Gulf of California. The resulting shortage of irrigation water caused crop losses which the Mexicans claimed amounted to more than 100,000 acres. Angered and bewildered by their losses, the farmers demanded good water and compensation. These demands were forwarded by the Mexican Government, which accused the United States of violating the 1944 treaty.

The United States was quick to insist that the treaty imposed no obligations "with respect to the quality of the water"—an interpretation given by the State Department 15 years before. Officials realized, nevertheless, that something needed to be done and offered to send fresh water to dilute the saline flow. Even so, the State Department insisted that this act of kindness should not be interpreted as a precedent; it was merely a friendly gesture on the part of the United States.

It is too early to predict what course of action will be adopted and how the treaty will be ultimately interpreted. A special committee, authorized by both governments, has been studying the problem and the Presidents of both coun-

[5] Laurence Duggan, "The Americas." New York: Holt, 1949, p. 102.

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tries have expressed a desire to settle the dispute as quickly as possible. Perhaps they will soon achieve a mutually satisfactory arrangement, but first they will have to contend with men like Arizona's Senator Carl Hayden, powerful chairman of the Committee on Appropriations. Hayden, though anxious to end the controversy, insists that the United States is under no obligation to send Mexico good-quality water.

In the meantime, developments are taking place which are clearly harmful to the interests of the United States. Angered at American attempts to foist polluted water on them, Mexicans are muttering about "Yankee imperialism" and threatening to take the controversy to the World Court. Particularly disturbing is the fact that all this is occurring at a time when Cuba is threatening the security of the Western Hemisphere and when the United States is trying desperately to make a success of the Alliance for Progress.

But the dispute involves far more than an international difference of opinion. For it has provided Mexican leftist and Communist groups with a rallying point for their attacks on both the Mexican and American Governments. Unrest has flared highest in Baja California, the region directly affected by the polluted water and also an area long beset by political instability. If current news dispatches are correct, insurgents there have made great headway. For example, shortly before the water controversy, Alfonso Garzon was a little known agitator with few followers. Today, after successfully capitalizing on, among other things, the discontent of farmers who suffered crop losses, he is a figure of national significance in Mexico. In fact, so many embittered farmers had joined his ranks by March 1963 that President Adolfo Lopez Mateos felt compelled to negotiate with him.

Aside from the legal and political difficulties, the problem has a very real human dimension. The people benefiting from Arizona's Wellton-Mohawk drainage operations are relatively few—about 300 or 400 farmers. On the other hand, there are about 10,400 Mexican farmers dependent on the Colorado. Moreover, the city of Mexicali, with a population in excess of 300,000, also relies on the river for part of its municipal supply. But Mexicans are not the only ones threatened by the polluted water, since the city of Yuma has also been affected.

Obviously, the mistake of 19 years ago has created an enormous headache. Had the State Department listened to the critics of the treaty in 1945, there might not be the present crisis over the Colorado River. Only time can tell how and when the dispute will finally be resolved. Certain things do seem rather clear, however. It is virtually certain that no arbitration tribunal will support the United States' contention that the treaty obligation would be satisfied by giving Mexico unusable water. Obviously, both countries have got to sit down and decide just what constitutes "good" or "usable" water. Perhaps their answer will be modified to include some of Secretary Stewart Udall's recent suggestions urging both countries to adopt better irrigation procedures and to step up water conservation projects. And, perhaps, it will incorporate some of the latest results of desalinization tests. Whatever happens, it is imperative that a solution be found quickly. Hemispheric interests compel it.

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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By Henry L. Roberts

with the assistance of William Diebold, Jr., Economics; Fritz Stern, Western Europe; Howard Linton, Asia; Richard H. Nolte, Middle East, North Africa; Joseph A. Ellis, Latin America; Pamela Day, Africa.

General: Political and Legal

DIPLOMAT AMONG WARRIORS. By Robert Murphy. Garden City: Doubleday, 1964, 470 p. $6.95.

For nearly 20 years, from 1940 to his retirement in 1959, Mr. Murphy's diplomatic and trouble-shooting assignments brought him close to an extraordinary number of the central issues of the wartime and postwar years. The value of these important and substantial memoirs is suggested by the following themes: Vichy, North Africa, Darlan, Casablanca, Tito, Berlin, the Congo, Japan, Suez, Lebanon and U-2.

MAO AGAINST KHRUSHCHEV: A SHORT HISTORY OF THE SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT. By David Floyd. New York: Praeger, 1964, 456 p. $7.95 (Paper, $2.95).

Mr. Floyd, a specialist on Communist affairs for the London *Daily Telegraph*, skillfully traces the developing conflict between the Russian and Chinese Communists from the death of Stalin to the open polemics of mid-1963. Of particular value are the chronology and selected documentation that comprise about half the book.

TSARS, MANDARINS, AND COMMISSARS. By Harry Schwartz. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1964, 252 p. $5.00.

Like the preceding book, this survey by Mr. Schwartz, a Soviet specialist for *The New York Times*, is centrally concerned with the background and causes for the present Sino-Soviet schism. The two books are in general agreement as to the nature of the rupture, though Mr. Schwartz is also concerned with the earlier history of Chinese-Russian relations and the role of territorial issues in the borderlands between the two nations.

THE STRATEGY OF DECEPTION: A STUDY IN WORLD-WIDE COMMUNIST TACTICS. Edited by Jeane J. Kirkpatrick. New York: Farrar, Straus, 1963, 444 p. $6.00.

This volume of essays on the Communist movement outside the U.S.S.R. deals with the general theory of revolutionary strategy and with the efforts and failures of the Communists in the various regions of the world and in the U.N.

BUILDING THE ATLANTIC WORLD. By Robert Strausz-Hupé and Others. New York: Harper and Row, 1963, 400 p. $6.00.

An inquiry into the history of the North Atlantic Alliance and into the problems of nuclear weapons which, the authors contend, brought the Alliance to its present

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crisis. Also a strong plea for "the Atlantic Community, the Closer Union," as a successor to NATO.

LA POLITIQUE MONDIALE CONTEMPORAINE. By Guy-Willy Schmeltz. Paris: La Colombe, 1963, 613 p. Fr. 30.

An attempt to interpret the major currents in the contemporary world: the trends toward unity, toward division and toward a "third world."

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE GERMAN QUESTION, SEPTEMBER 1958—JUNE 1961. Edited by George D. Embree. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1963, 330 p. Gldrs. 25.25.

A collection of Soviet documents and statements tracing the course of Soviet policy toward Germany and Berlin.

CANADA-UNITED STATES TREATY RELATIONS. Edited by David R. Deener. Durham: Duke University Press (for Duke University Commonwealth-Studies Center), 1963, 250 p. $7.50.

A symposium on a wide variety of historical and topical themes bearing on the treaty relations between the United States and Canada.

THE LAST DAY OF THE OLD WORLD. By Adrian Ball. Garden City: Doubleday, 1963, 278 p. $4.95.

A reconstruction of the events of September 3, 1939.

PROSPECTS FOR THE WEST. By J. William Fulbright. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963, 132 p. $3.25.

In these William L. Clayton Lectures the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations discusses Soviet-Western relations, the United States and its allies and the domestic tasks confronting us.

THE CIVIC CULTURE: POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND DEMOCRACY IN FIVE NATIONS. By Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963, 562 p. $8.50.

This is "a study of the political culture of democracy and of the social structures and processes that sustain it," based on several thousand interviews in Germany, Italy, Mexico, Great Britain and the United States.

PARLIAMENTS. New York: Praeger (for the Inter-Parliamentary Union), 1963, 321 p. $7.00.

In this comparative study of representative institutions in 41 countries there is much useful information on the structure and organization of parliaments, the legislative function, powers in financial matters and control of the executive.

A CROSS-POLITY SURVEY. By Arthur S. Banks and Robert B. Textor. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1963, 1,416 p. $20.00.

Although this book in its appearance resembles a quasi-arithmetical "Finnegans Wake"—it is a 7090 computer "printout"—it comprises a great deal of data on comparative politics. An interesting experiment, the practicability of which will have to be tested.

LAW AND PUBLIC ORDER IN SPACE. By Myres S. McDougal and Others. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963, 1,147 p. $15.00.

A massive and systematic attempt to produce a "framework of inquiry for study of the law and public order of space in their larger context." Includes a chapter on Potential Interaction with Advanced Forms of Non-Earth Life.

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MAN AND HIS GOVERNMENT. By Carl Joachim Friedrich. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963, 737 p. $13.50.

Based on a lifetime's study of politics and political theory, this is an ambitious effort to draw some general conclusions from "the political experience of mankind."

POLITICAL HANDBOOK AND ATLAS OF THE WORLD, 1964. By Walter H. Mallory. New York: Harper and Row (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1964, 334 p. $6.95 (Paper, $3.50).

Brought up to date as of January 1, 1964, this standard annual reference work gives the composition of governments; sums up party programs and lists their leaders; lists newspapers, indicating their political affiliations and editors; and includes facts on the United Nations and associated international agencies. Includes a 32-page supplement of political maps.

General: Military, Technical and Scientific

STRATEGY FOR SURVIVAL. By Thomas L. Martin, Jr. and Donald C. Latham. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1963, 389 p. $6.00.

A handbook on civil defense and thermonuclear war with a principal intention of demonstrating the need and feasibility of civil defense measures.

STRATEGIC MOBILITY. By Neville Brown. New York: Praeger (for the Institute for Strategic Studies), 1964, 254 p. $5.75.

A British student of military affairs discusses the possibilities and limits of mobile forces and operations.

GUERRILLA. By Charles W. Thayer. New York: Harper and Row, 1963, 195 p. $3.95.

Mr. Thayer, who has had military, diplomatic and O.S.S. experience—and commands a lively style—discusses the conditions under which guerrilla warfare may thrive, its potentialities and limitations and the prerequisites for counter-guerrilla measures. A good contribution to this burgeoning field of study.

PROBLEMS OF WORLD DISARMAMENT: A SERIES OF LECTURES DELIVERED AT THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY. Edited by Charles A. Barker. Boston: Houghton, 1963, 170 p. $3.50.

A series of lectures on types of contemporary warfare and aspects of arms control and disarmament.

KRIEGSTAGEBUCH. BAND II: VON DER GEPLANTEN LANDUNG IN ENGLAND BIS ZUM BEGINN DES OSTFELDZUGES (1.7.1940—21.6.1941). By Colonel-General Halder. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1963, 503 p. DM. 68.

This second volume of General Halder's important war diary (Volume I noted here in April 1963) covers the period following the fall of France up to the beginning of the war against Russia in June 1941; it was edited by Hans-Adolf Jacobsen.

THE ATOMIC AGE: SCIENTISTS IN NATIONAL AND WORLD AFFAIRS. Edited by Morton Grodzins and Eugene Rabinowitch. New York: Basic Books, 1963, 616 p. $10.00.

A collection of significant articles from the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* since 1945.

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General: Economic and Social

INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT. By Gerald M. Meier. New York: Harper and Row, 1963, 208 p. $4.25.

This is a valuable contribution to the current discussion about the relation between growth and foreign trade. Proceeding largely through an extension and modification of trade theory, Professor Meier reaches conclusions that challenge the emphasis frequently put on import restrictions, and suggest that the main problem may be how to communicate the benefits from expanded international trade to more than the export sectors of the underdeveloped countries.

INTERNATIONAL TRADE THEORY IN A DEVELOPING WORLD. Edited by Roy Harrod, assisted by Douglas Hague. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1963, 570 p. $14.00.

A valuable collection of papers by leading economists followed by a summary of their discussion at a conference by the International Economic Association in 1961.

TRADE BLOCS AND COMMON MARKETS. By Sidney Dell. New York: Knopf, 1963, 384 p. $5.95.

Skeptical of the economic benefits of the European Economic Community and largely opposed to what he judges to be its political consequences, the author believes the case for the formation of economic blocs among the underdeveloped countries is a strong one. Mr. Dell is an English economist on the Secretariat of the United Nations.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: PAST AND PRESENT. By Richard T. Gill. Englewood Cliffs (N.J.): Prentice-Hall, 1963, 120 p. $3.95 (Paper, $1.50).

THE PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. By Louis J. Walinsky. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963, 248 p. $7.50.

The literature and experience of economic development have reached the point where guides, synopses and condensations have become important tools. Mr. Gill, a lecturer at Harvard, gives a condensed statement of current economic thought not only on underdeveloped countries but also on growth in the advanced ones. Mr. Walinsky has written a simple and sensible guide to the practice of economic development based largely on his experience as a consultant overseas.

DAS WIRTSCHAFTLICHE WACHSTUM DER ENTWICKLUNGSLÄNDER. By Joachim von Spindler. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1963, 304 p. DM. 19.80.

OSTBLOCK, EWG UND ENTWICKLUNGSLÄNDER. Edited by Erik Boettcher. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1963, 173 p. DM. 8.80.

Two examples of the growing German interest in economic development. Spindler, a financial adviser to the government of Malaya, writes an economic treatise intended in part as an introduction to the subject. The volume edited by Boettcher includes papers on the underdeveloped world along with examinations of integration in Eastern Europe and Soviet attitudes toward Western European integration.

INTERNATIONAL FINANCING AND INVESTMENT. Edited by John F. McDaniels and Others. Dobbs Ferry (N.Y.): Oceana Publications (for the World Community Association), 1964, 738 p. $25.00.

There are a number of useful papers of varying approach, level and content, and a long bibliography in this record of a conference held at Yale in 1962.

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L'ÂGE DE L' INFLATION. By Jacques Rueff. Paris: Payot, 1963, 144 p. Fr. 9.

Six papers by an eminent French economist centering on the importance of finance in human affairs and the virtues of the gold standard.

TECHNOLOGY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. New York: Knopf, 1963, 205 p. $4.50.

This useful collection appeared originally as a special number of the *Scientific American*.

The United States

JAMES FORRESTAL: A STUDY OF PERSONALITY, POLITICS, AND POLICY. By Arnold A. Rogow. New York: Macmillan, 1963, 397 p. $6.95.

This is a painful and far from satisfying study expressed in psychological terms. Mr. Rogow, a political scientist at Stanford, attempts to probe the late Secretary Forrestal's personality to get at the background to his tragic suicide in 1949 and to find the relationship between his temper and character and his role in national policy. The author is much concerned both with the dangers to the national welfare of a man in failing physical or mental health being in a position of authority, and with the terrible pressures which the responsibilities of high office place on the individual.

THE INQUIRY: AMERICAN PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE, 1917–1919. By Lawrence E. Gelfand. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963, 387 p. $8.75.

This is the first solid study of the American group entrusted with the task of preparing a peace program following the United States' entry into the First World War. Of value in adding to our understanding of the peace settlement and its background, it also presents "the earliest precedent of use by the United States government of numerous scholars whose special talents were directed toward the shaping of American foreign policy."

THE FIRST NEW NATION. By Seymour Martin Lipset. New York: Basic Books, 1963, 366 p. $5.95.

In this historical and comparative analysis of the American nation, a prominent sociologist deals both with the question of America as an "exceptional" society and with the problem of achieving stability in the midst of change.

NATIONAL PURPOSE: IDEOLOGY AND AMBIVALENCE IN AMERICA. By Leonard G. Benson. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1963, 229 p. $4.50.

A discussion of the function of ideologies in the contemporary world and of American ambivalence about such articulated social purposes.

TOO GRAVE A RISK: THE CONNALLY AMENDMENT ISSUE. By Denison Kitchel. New York: Morrow, 1963, 128 p. $3.75.

An essay in defense of the Connally Amendment with respect to the jurisdiction of the World Court.

ATTITUDES AND SOCIAL RELATIONS OF FOREIGN STUDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES. By Claire Selltiz and Others. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1963, 434 p. $9.00.

This is the final volume of a series of monographs sponsored by the Committee on Cross-Cultural Education of the Social Science Research Council and deals broadly with the problems involved in the adjustment of foreign students to university life in the United States and to the American scene.

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LIBERALISM AND THE RETREAT FROM POLITICS. By William J. Newman. New York: Braziller, 1964, 190 p. $5.00.

An essay on some of the problems and quandaries of contemporary American liberalism, with particular attention to such figures as David Riesman, C. Wright Mills, Paul Goodman and Hannah Arendt.

THE ESSENTIAL LIPPMANN. Edited by Clinton Rossiter and James Lare. New York: Random House, 1963, 552 p. $7.50.

A substantial selection of Walter Lippmann's writings on various political themes over the last half-century.

REXFORD TUGWELL AND THE NEW DEAL. By Bernard Sternsher. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1964, 535 p. $9.00.

A comprehensive study of Tugwell's activities as a leading figure in the New Deal; an effort to "set the record straight."

THE CABINET DIARIES OF JOSEPHUS DANIELS, 1913–1921. Edited by E. David Cronon. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1963, 648 p. $8.50.

A source for the Wilson era by the Secretary of the Navy in both administrations.

The Western Hemisphere

THE WINDS OF REVOLUTION: LATIN AMERICA TODAY—AND TOMORROW. By Tad Szulc. New York: Praeger, 1963, 308 p. $5.95 (Paper, $2.25).

This is a thoughtful and useful examination of the current revolutionary temper in Latin America. Mr. Szulc, formerly Latin American correspondent for *The New York Times,* and now a member of its Washington bureau, contends that the United States, in its inability to understand Latin America's social revolution, has failed to provide a positive ideological alternative to Castro and Communism in the hemisphere. The increasing disillusionment with representative democracy as the political system with which to effect rapid social and economic change, along with the lack of a "mystique" necessary to provide popular support for the Alliance for Progress, has contributed to the deepening crisis.

LATIN AMERICA: TODAY'S ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVOLUTION. By John P. Powelson. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964, 303 p. $9.00.

A North American professor with long contact and experience in Latin American universities sympathetically and knowledgeably analyzes the problems of Latin American economic development. Dedicated to the Latin American student, the book attempts to reconcile divergencies in economic thought between Latin America and the United States and to clear up misconceptions which Latins hold concerning our economic structure and its implications for Latin America.

THE GREAT FEAR: THE RECONQUEST OF LATIN AMERICA BY LATIN AMERICANS. By John Gerassi. New York: Macmillan, 1963, 457 p. $6.95.

A provocative study of the contemporary political climate in Latin America which concludes that the region's social change can be effected only by the "extreme left" or by the "extreme nationalists" and not by Latin America's "democratic forces." Whichever group ultimately triumphs will depend upon a realistic assessment by the United States of its Latin American policy.

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WHITHER LATIN AMERICA? By Carlos Fuentes and Others. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1963, 144 p. $3.00 (Paper, $1.45).

In these studies from the left, United States policies in Latin America are condemned in the now stereotyped fashion. What makes the book of interest is the inclusion of essays by such figures as Carlos Fuentes, the young Mexican novelist; the leader of northeastern Brazil's Peasant Leagues, Francisco Juliao; the Peruvian writer, Sebastian Salazar Bondy; and the Vice Rector of Ecuador's Central University, Dr. Manuel Agustin Aguirre.

TAX POLICY ON UNITED STATES INVESTMENT IN LATIN AMERICA. By William Sprague Barnes and Others. Princeton: Tax Institute of America, 1963, 275 p. $7.00.

A symposium of papers by an able group of specialists.

COLLISION COURSE: THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS AND COEXISTENCE. By Henry M. Pachter. New York: Praeger, 1963, 261 p. $5.50 (Paper, $1.95).

A short study of the Cuban missile crisis and its implications for the nuclear age, strengthened by documents pertaining to "the momentous events that shook the world in the last two weeks of October, 1962."

THE MORNING AFTER: A FRENCH JOURNALIST'S IMPRESSIONS OF CUBA UNDER CASTRO. By Victor Franco. New York: Praeger, 1963, 248 p. $6.00.

A French correspondent writes of his personal experiences in Cuba during 1961 and bitterly relates how enthusiasm for the Castro régime became complete disillusionment.

CUBA: THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVOLUTION. Edited by Dudley Seers. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1964, 432 p. $7.50.

This useful economic and social assessment, based on trips made to Cuba during the summer of 1962 by Dudley Seers, Andrés Bianchi, Richard Jolly and Max Nolff, and amplified by numerous statistics and charts, deals with agricultural, educational and industrial developments since the revolution.

PUERTO RICO: FREEDOM AND POWER IN THE CARIBBEAN. By Gordon K. Lewis. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1963, 626 p. $10.00.

In this searching and scholarly study by a professor at the University of Puerto Rico, the author traces in detail the history and institutional structure of the island. Mr. Lewis, a member of the British Labor Party, writes from a socialist viewpoint and in his analysis of the political relationship between Puerto Rico and the United States he concludes that the island's peculiar political arrangement has had a retarding effect upon Puerto Rico's long-term economic progress and upon the cultural integrity of the Puerto Rican people.

AN INTRODUCTION TO BRAZIL. By Charles Wagley. New York: Columbia University Press, 1963, 322 p. $5.95.

A sympathetic and knowledgeable survey of the land and people of Brazil by a respected North American anthropologist who has had long contact with this nation.

Western Europe

PRÉHISTOIRE DES ÉTATS-UNIS DE L'EUROPE. By Achille Albonetti. Paris: Sirey, 1963, 311 p. Fr. 25.

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A leading Italian "Eurocrat" writes the political history of the movement for European unity from 1945 to 1963. An earlier and briefer version appeared in Italian in 1960.

THE NEW EUROPE: TODAY—AND TOMORROW. By George Lichtheim. New York: Praeger, 1963, 232 p. $5.50 (Paper, $2.25).

A quick review of the historical background, the political origins and the present milieu of the New Europe.

LES ORGANISATIONS EUROPÉENNES. By Roger Pinto. Paris: Payot, 1963, 443 p. Fr. 29.

A study chiefly of the legal aspects of the several European organizations by a professor of law at the Sorbonne. Particularly valuable is his detailed analysis of the Council of Europe and its role in the protection of human rights.

L'EUROPE DU MARCHÉ COMMUN. By Pierre Drouin. Paris: Julliard, 1963, 350 p. Fr. 16.20.

One of the best-informed French journalists here writes a comprehensive survey full of interesting points.

THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE SIX. By A. Lamfalussy. Homewood (Ill.): Irwin, 1963, 147 p. $4.50.

This is an important book into which a Belgian economist has distilled a great deal of his own and others' work on comparisons of growth rates in Britain and the Common Market. His conclusions point toward the importance of export expansion as a prime mover in growth.

DOCUMENTS AND SPEECHES ON COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS, 1952–1962. Edited by Nicholas Mansergh. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1963, 775 p. $13.45.

The third volume of a series devoted to the history of Commonwealth relations since 1931. A valuable and comprehensive collection which encompasses Commonwealth repercussions on Britain's application for entry into the Common Market.

BRITISH POLITICAL FACTS: 1900–1960. By David Butler and Jennie Freeman. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1963, 245 p. $9.50.

A most useful compilation of facts and figures on British political life.

RECRUITS TO LABOUR: THE BRITISH LABOUR PARTY, 1914–1931. By Catherine Ann Cline. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1963, 198 p. $5.00.

A brief study of the Liberals and few Conservatives who joined the British Labor Party after the First World War, and of their impact on Labor policies.

LÉON BLUM: THEORIE UND PRAXIS EINER SOZIALISTISCHEN POLITIK. BAND I: 1872 BIS 1934. By Gilbert Ziebura. Berlin: De Gruyter, 1963, 526 p. DM. 68.

In this first of a projected two-volume biography, a German political scientist rightly emphasizes the constant tension between Blum's socialist aspirations and the political realities of the Third Republic. A careful and reflective narrative with valuable insights into all aspects of recent French history.

A MODERN FRENCH REPUBLIC. By Pierre Mendès France. New York: Hill and Wang, 1963, 205 p. $3.95.

A reaffirmation of the author's beliefs in democratic ideals, with proposals for a real democracy in which citizens would play an effective role and coöperate fully with the government to plan for the good of all.

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LEOPOLD III AND THE BELGIAN ROYAL QUESTION. By E. Ramón Arango. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1963, 234 p. $6.00.

A broad, balanced and informative inquiry into one of the great controversies of recent times, the conduct of King Leopold of Belgium during and after the Second World War.

THE DUTCH UNDER GERMAN OCCUPATION, 1940–1945. By Werner Warmbrunn. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963, 338 p. $7.50.

A scholarly and judicious inquiry into all aspects of Dutch life, with particular emphasis on collaboration and resistance.

WIR BRAUCHEN EINE HEILE WELT: POLITIK IN UND FÜR DEUTSCHLAND. By Gerhard Schröder. Düsseldorf: Econ-Verlag, 1963, 283 p. DM. 19.80.

Excerpts from the postwar articles and speeches of the present West German Foreign Minister, with informative—and laudatory—comments by the editor, Dr. Alfred Rapp. Dr. Schröder emerges as a practical and pragmatic politician, with a clear bias for a strong government. His style is very different from that of Adenauer or Heuss.

LAND AND POWER: BRITISH AND ALLIED POLICY ON GERMANY'S FRONTIERS, 1916–19. By Harold I. Nelson. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963, 402 p. $8.25.

In focusing on a key issue Professor Nelson also illuminates many hitherto neglected aspects of British planning for a European order after World War I. An important and lucid book based on extensive research.

STILLBORN REVOLUTION: THE COMMUNIST BID FOR POWER IN GERMANY, 1921–1923. By Werner T. Angress. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963, 513 p. $10.00.

A thorough study of the German Communist Party in its revolutionary phase, when it prepared and tried to execute a revolution which Stalin prematurely hailed as "the most important world event in our time." As a consequence of the failure, the German Party became still more subservient to Moscow. An important, scholarly contribution to the political history of the Weimar Republic.

A HISTORY OF THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC. By Erich Eyck. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963, 535 p. $12.00.

An expert translation of volume two of an important German work.

STRESEMANN AND THE GREATER GERMANY, 1914–1918. By Marvin L. Edwards. New York: Bookman Associates, 1963, 245 p. $5.00.

A carefully documented study of Stresemann's annexationist activities during the First World War.

THE GERMAN PHOENIX. By William Henry Chamberlin. New York: Duell, 1963, 309 p. $5.95.

A quick, optimistic survey of the familiar features of the New Germany.

AUSTRIA, GERMANY, AND THE ANSCHLUSS, 1931–1938. By Jürgen Gehl. New York: Oxford University Press, 1963, 212 p. $4.80.

A brief but thoroughly documented and incisive study of efforts to bring about Austro-German union, culminating in the annexation of March 1938 which "was forced upon him [Hitler] by events." A further illustration of Hitler's inflexibility of aims and improvisation of means.

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THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF MODERN ITALY. By Shepard B. Clough. New York: Columbia University Press, 1964, 458 p. $10.00.

An important and comprehensive survey of Italy's economic development since unification. Professor Clough, an economic historian, is particularly concerned with the problems of Italy's economic growth.

THE TRAGEDY OF MANUEL AZAÑA AND THE FATE OF THE SPANISH REPUBLIC. By Frank Sedwick. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1964, 295 p. $6.25.

A sympathetic biography of Azaña, of whom Madariaga writes in the foreword: "The biggest mind and the noblest heart among the leaders of the Republic."

Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union

SOVIET RUSSIA IN WORLD POLITICS. By Robert D. Warth. New York: Twayne, 1963, 544 p. $7.50.

A useful introduction to the history of Soviet foreign relations, for which, however, a really thorough and definitive treatment is still lacking.

THE FUTURE OF RUSSIA. By Harry Braverman. New York: Macmillan, 1963, 175 p. $5.00.

An effort to predict the evolution of the Soviet society, economy and state in coming decades. It is the author's expectation that the Russians may "reconstitute for the world the image of socialism which their own development shattered."

DIE RUSSEN SIND ANDERS: MENSCH UND GESELLSCHAFT IM SOWJETSTAAT. By Günther Specovius. Düsseldorf: Econ-Verlag, 1963, 639 p. DM. 28.

An extensive and quite lively survey of the Soviet Union by a young German journalist.

THE PROPHET OUTCAST: TROTSKY: 1929–1940. By Isaac Deutscher. New York: Oxford University Press, 1963, 543 p. $9.50.

This third and final volume of a full-scale and impressive biography of Leon Trotsky takes his career from his banishment in 1929, through his years of exile in Turkey and Europe, to his assassination in Mexico in 1940.

THE FLYING TROIKA. By K. P. S. Menon. New York: Oxford University Press, 1963, 330 p. $7.00.

This book comprises extracts from the political memoirs kept by the Indian Ambassador to the Soviet Union in the years 1952–1961.

UKRAINE: A CONCISE ENCYCLOPAEDIA. VOLUME I. Edited by Volodymyr Kubijovyč. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963, 1,185 p. $37.50.

This first volume of a major reference includes information on Ukrainian geography, population, language, history, culture and literature.

THE BRITISH "INTERVENTION" IN TRANSCASPIA, 1918–1919. By C. H. Ellis. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963, 175 p. $4.50.

An interesting account, based in part on the author's own recollections, of the British operations in Transcaspia and the Caucasus in 1918 and 1919.

THE UNPUNISHED CRIME. By Alfreds Berzins. New York: Speller, 1963, 314 p. $5.75.

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A bitter account of the Soviet takeover and incorporation of Latvia, by a former Latvian Minister.

SUOMEN POLIITTINEN HISTORIA 1809–1955. By L. A. Puntila. Helsinki: Otava, 1963, 216 p. Fmk. 11.

An excellent survey of Finnish political developments, written by one of the country's leading political historians.

THE ECOLOGY OF MALNUTRITION IN FIVE COUNTRIES OF EASTERN AND CENTRAL EUROPE. By Jacques M. May. New York: Hafner, 1963, 292 p. $10.50.

A study of food resources and nutritional levels in East Germany, Poland, Jugoslavia, Albania and Greece.

POLAND BETWEEN EAST AND WEST: SOVIET AND GERMAN DIPLOMACY TOWARD POLAND, 1919–1933. By Josef Korbel. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963, 321 p. $6.50.

An interesting and scholarly study in diplomatic history dealing with the complex and shifting policies of Germany and the Soviet Union from the end of the First World War to the Polish-German Nonaggression Pact.

THE ECONOMIC INTEGRATION OF HUNGARY INTO THE SOVIET BLOC: FOREIGN TRADE EXPERIENCE. By Laszlo Zsoldos. Columbus: Ohio State University, Bureau of Business Research, 1963, 149 p. $5.00.

A monograph on Hungarian foreign trade between 1950 and 1960, with an eye to the question of the country's economic integration in the Soviet economic bloc.

THE MORPHOLOGY OF GREEK INDUSTRY: A STUDY IN INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT. By George Coutsoumaris. Athens: Center of Economic Research, 1963, 430 p.

A quite detailed empirical and statistical analysis of the structure and performance of Greek industry.

The Middle East

THE MIDDLE EAST: A SOCIAL GEOGRAPHY. By Stephen H. Longrigg. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1963, 291 p. $6.95.

A well-written, well-informed and sympathetic account of the modern Middle East based on 47 years' experience in the area by a British observer and author.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE MIDDLE EAST. Edited by Georgiana G. Stevens. Englewood Cliffs (N.J.): Prentice-Hall, 1964, 182 p. $3.95 (Paper, $1.95).

An up-to-date and authoritative discussion prepared under the editorship of Mrs. Stevens for the Twenty-fourth American Assembly (October 1963).

AMERICAN INTERESTS AND POLICIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST 1900–1939. By John A. DeNovo. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1963, 447 p. $7.50.

Professor of American History at Pennsylvania State University, Mr. DeNovo in this important volume presents the first full-dress description and assessment of American relations with the Middle East up to the Second World War.

AN ATLAS OF MIDDLE EASTERN AFFAIRS. By Norman J. G. Pounds. New York: Praeger, 1963, 117 p. $4.00 (Paper, $1.75).

Maps, graphs and brief commentaries depicting selected features of Middle

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Eastern history, geography, climate, population, resources and politics make this a useful quick reference for non-specialists.

RUSSIA'S SOUTH FLANK. By Günther Nollau and Hans Jürgen Wiehe. New York: Praeger, 1963, 171 p. $4.50.

A somewhat sketchy appraisal of the "Soviet threat to Iran, Turkey, and Afghanistan," based in part on the authors' travels to these areas.

THE KING-CRANE COMMISSION: AN AMERICAN INQUIRY IN THE MIDDLE EAST. By Harry N. Howard. Beirut: Khayats, 1963, 369 p. $7.50.

A carefully researched, fully documented study of President Wilson's attempt, in support of his self-determination principle during the World War I peace settlement, to ascertain the wishes of the populations in post-Ottoman Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia.

THE ARABS: THEIR HISTORY, CULTURE AND PLACE IN THE MODERN WORLD. By Arnold Hottinger. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963, 344 p. $7.50.

The result of a Swiss observer's long experience and scholarly devotion, this handsome volume is a multi-faceted, impressionistic portrait of the Arab and his society drawn equally from the cultural past and the political present.

LE PÉTROLE ET LES ÉCONOMIES ARABES. By Nicolas Sarkis. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit, 1963, 279 p. Fr. 32.40.

An analysis of the present relationship between producing countries and the oil companies, a discussion of new developments, and an estimate of the oil industry's impact on and implications for the economy of the Middle East as a whole.

THE NEW METROPOLIS IN THE ARAB WORLD. Edited by Morroe Berger. New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1963, 254 p. Rs. 12.50.

Essays on urban planning written by Arab authors for an international seminar held in Cairo in 1960.

WHERE THE JORDAN FLOWS. By Richard H. Sanger. Washington: Middle East Institute, 1963, 397 p. $5.75.

Revealing episodes from the palimpsest of Biblical legend and two thousand years of history make this volume at once a highly readable introduction to modern Jordan and a guidebook to the past.

L'IRAK D'AUJOURD'HUI. By Bernard Vernier. Paris: Colin, 1963, 494 p. Fr. 31.

A useful handbook on modern Iraq, principally devoted to the period 1958–62 under Kassem.

PALESTINE: LOSS OF A HERITAGE. By Sami Hadawi. San Antonio: Naylor, 1963, 148 p. $4.95.

The former Official Land Valuer and Inspector of Tax Assessments of the (British) Government of Palestine 1937–48 presents the facts of land ownership up to 1948 and argues the injustices committed against Arab property-owners by Israel since then.

LE SYSTÈME ÉLECTORAL ISRAÉLIEN. By Arye Arazi. Geneva: Droz, 1963, 209 p.

"In the electoral law more than in any branch of public and constitutional law is the spirit of a people most truly revealed." A description and analysis of the Israeli electoral system.

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ISRAEL: THE MAKING OF A NATION. By D. R. Elston. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Anglo-Israel Association), 1963, 159 p. $5.00.

An introductory survey, brief but balanced, of modern Israel.

TURKEY TODAY—AND TOMORROW: AN EXPERIMENT IN WESTERNIZATION. By Nuri Eren. New York: Praeger, 1963, 276 p. $6.50.

A widely known and popular Turkish diplomat examines the salient features of contemporary Turkey against a somewhat idealized image of Western democratic society, and finds much to criticize as well as approve.

ISRAEL: YEARS OF CHALLENGE. By David Ben-Gurion. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963, 240 p. $5.00.

This autobiographical account by "Mr. Israel," in part an apologia, reveals much but omits much and is imbued throughout both with the author's famous sense of mission and his implacable scorn for those with contrary views.

South and Southeast Asia

THE NEW STATES OF ASIA: A POLITICAL ANALYSIS. By Michael Brecher. New York: Oxford University Press, 1963, 226 p. $4.80.

Six essays by a McGill University political scientist on Southern Asian countries which have achieved independence since World War II. He analyzes the effects of the end of colonialism, the key role in world affairs of these countries, extending from Pakistan to Indonesia, and the problem of non-alignment. One chapter concerns Israel's role in Afro-Asian affairs.

SOUTHEAST ASIA: PROBLEMS OF UNITED STATES POLICY. Edited by William Henderson. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1964, 273 p. $6.75.

Eleven chapters, by 13 highly regarded specialists, stemming from an Asia House conference of May 1963 on postwar U.S. political, strategic, economic and sociocultural policies toward Southeast Asia. The editor concludes with a review of past policy and suggested factors for consideration by American policy-makers in the future.

INDIA AND SOUTH EAST ASIA, 1947–1960. By Ton That Thien. Geneva: Droz, 1963, 384 p. Swiss Fr. 40.

In this Study of India's Policy Toward the South East Asian Countries, the author concludes that "shorn of its . . . moralising admonitions . . . India's foreign politics, as all politics, was essentially power politics."

FOREIGN AID AND INDIA'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. By V. K. R. V. Rao and Dharm Narain. New York: Asia Publishing House, 1963, 111 p. (New York: Taplinger, distributor, $5.25.)

Two Indians collaborate, at the request of UNESCO, to show the "character, magnitude and organization of foreign aid, the conditions on which it has been received, the impact it has made on the economy, and the problems that it has given rise to."

NEHRU SEIZES GOA. By Leo Lawrence. New York: Pageant Press, 1963, 226 p. $4.00.

Born in Goa and educated in India, this Portuguese journalist, now with Portugal's Mission to the United Nations, writes an impassioned pro-Goan account of his country's annexation by India. He decries India's military aggressiveness and challenges the legal and moral bases on which action was taken.

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DYNAMICS OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT. By Jack D. Mezirow. New York: Scarecrow Press, 1963, 252 p. $6.00.

A description of the Pakistan government's $35 million attempt at rural development from 1952 to 1961, based on the author's observations during two years as I.C.A. adviser to the program. Its failure, he concludes, was caused by the country's authoritarian and bureaucratic departmentalism.

PLANNING IN PAKISTAN: ORGANIZATION AND IMPLEMENTATION. By Albert Waterston. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press (for the Economic Development Institute, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development), 1963, 150 p. $3.00 (Paper).

Recognizing that political, economic and social differences preclude a standard planning system for all "developing" nations, this Institute study traces, in model form, the effective formulation and implementation of development in Pakistan from 1948 to date. The author credits political leadership in that country for its success.

THAILAND: A POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS. By D. Insor. New York: Praeger, 1963, 188 p. $5.75.

Basically a political history, with background chapters on the land, its people and influences on their culture.

VIETNAM DIARY. By Richard Tregaskis. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963, 401 p. $5.95.

An American war correspondent's account of his coverage of all fronts of the war in Viet Nam from October 9, 1962 to January 11, 1963. Vividly written and illustrated with photographs.

INDONESIA: PERSPECTIVE AND PROPOSALS FOR UNITED STATES ECONOMIC AID. New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1963, 250 p. (Detroit: Cellar Book Shop, distributor, $4.50).

A well-organized analysis resulting from the U.S. team visit to Indonesia, arranged by the presidents of both countries, to scrutinize Indonesia's Eight Year Development Plan and to determine in what areas U.S. aid should be concentrated, with the over-all aim of formulating a general economic assistance program of mutual benefit. The team concluded that, although development in Indonesia is in its early stages only, prospects for progress are good.

The Far East and Pacific Ocean

THE PHILIPPINES AND THE UNITED STATES: PROBLEMS OF PARTNERSHIP. By George E. Taylor. New York: Praeger (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1964, 325 p. $6.95.

A study of the problems facing the Republic of the Philippines in the transformation which it is undergoing, and of its relations with the United States. To clarify the alternatives that are open to the United States in the long and special relationship between the two countries, the living past as well as present conditions and future hopes are realistically yet sympathetically assessed.

FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS. NUMBER THREE. Edited by G. F. Hudson. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1963, 144 p. $4.25.

A collection of scholarly articles, mostly on topics of current importance, by G. F. Hudson, Evan Luard, Haruhiko Nishi and other specialists.

COMMUNIST STRATEGIES IN ASIA: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

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OF GOVERNMENTS AND PARTIES. Edited by A. Doak Barnett. New York: Praeger, 1963, 293 p. $6.50 (Paper, $2.50).

Eight essays, all written by top Asian area specialists and edited by the chairman of the East Asian Institute's Communist China Studies Committee at Columbia University, examine six Communist régimes and parties, their challenge to Soviet dominance and the "polycentrism" that is resulting in the Asian Communist bloc.

20th CENTURY CHINA. By O. Edmund Clubb. New York: Columbia University Press, 1964, 470 p. $7.95.

Mr. Clubb, a retired Foreign Service Officer who served in Asia for 20 years and was the last U.S. Consul General to leave Peking, provides a clearly written political history covering the end of the dynastic era, the "abortive experiment in republicanism," and the emergence of Communism.

THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF MAO TSE-TUNG. By Stuart R. Schram. New York: Praeger, 1963, 319 p. $7.00 (Paper, $2.50).

Following a long introduction analyzing the origins of Mao's thought, the direction it is taking and its probable impact on the world, the author gives translations of many of Mao's works which best illustrate his analysis.

NORTH CHINA VILLAGES. By Sidney D. Gamble. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963, 352 p. $7.50.

The findings of 1933 field studies in more than 100 villages in four provinces of North China, directed by an American-trained Chinese sociologist. The Chinese reports of the same field studies were destroyed in the Japanese invasion of Peking in 1937.

CHENNAULT AND THE FLYING TIGERS. By Anna Chennault. New York: Paul S. Eriksson, 1963, 298 p. $5.00.

A biography of the "Flying Tiger of them all, Chennault of China," by his wife who used her own recollections checked, where necessary, against official papers, diaries and other private papers.

A MAN MUST CHOOSE. By Eric Chou. New York: Knopf, 1963, 301 p. $5.00.

An account by a journalist and intellectual, now living in England, of spying and counterspying in Red China.

HENRY L. STIMSON AND JAPAN, 1931–33. By Armin Rappaport. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963, 238 p. $6.00.

A history professor at Berkeley, using government documents and private papers, traces the development of Stimson's reactions—from calmness to outraged moral indignation—to the historic Mukden Incident and Japan's occupation of Manchuria.

LAW IN JAPAN: THE LEGAL ORDER IN A CHANGING SOCIETY. Edited by Arthur Taylor Von Mehren. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963, 706 p. $15.00.

Seventeen papers on Japan's legal system and law processes.

AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN: FROM PERRY TO MACARTHUR. By William L. Neumann. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1963, 353 p. $6.50.

A controversial study by a Goucher College historian of the effects of American attitudes toward Japan (many of them deep-rooted and misconceived) on the development of American foreign policy and its responsibility for events such as Pearl Harbor.

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COURT AND CONSTITUTION IN JAPAN: SELECTED SUPREME COURT DECISIONS, 1948–60. By John M. Maki. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964, 445 p. $9.50.

The decisions selected for translation (for the first time in English) purposely cover many aspects of Japanese life and conditions to show the impact which the new Constitution has had on that former authoritarian country.

PATERNALISM IN THE JAPANESE ECONOMY. By John W. Bennett and Iwao Ishino. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1963, 307 p. $6.50.

A highly scholarly work by two American professors of sociology and anthropology, based on research by SCAP during the military occupation of Japan, describing relationships among employers and employees in light of existing feudal and family systems.

CONSPIRACY AT MUKDEN: THE RISE OF THE JAPANESE MILITARY. By Takehiko Yoshihashi. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963, 274 p. $6.50.

The author, of American University's School of International Service, has used Tokyo War Crimes Trial materials and other sources, in Japanese and in English, to show how military leadership, with the aid of civilian ideologists and especially of Mori Kaku (the "true molder" of Japan's China policy) engineered the Mukden Incident, sometimes considered the beginning of World War II.

DE JAPANSE INTERNERINGSKAMPEN VOOR BURGERS GEDURENDE DE TWEEDE WERELDOORLOG. By D. Van Velden. Groningen: Wolters, 1963, 628 p. Gldrs. 27.50.

A careful and detailed study of the governing of internment camps in all Japanese-occupied areas in 1942–45, the treatment accorded the prisoners and their physical and mental conditions and the varying degrees of adherence by the Japanese to international conventions.

THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA: A POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STUDY. By W. D. Reeve. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1963, 197 p. $4.80.

From materials gathered while adviser to the South Korean Government from 1952 to 1957, the author provides factual information for assessing the results of exposure to Western democracy by an eastern country.

Africa

AFRICA: A FOREIGN AFFAIRS READER. Edited by Philip W. Quigg. New York: Praeger (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1964, 346 p. $6.95 (Paper, $2.50).

A collection of 24 articles which have appeared in this journal over a span of 40 years—from Lord Lugard and W. E. B. Du Bois to Nkrumah, Senghor, Balewa and Sékou Touré—with useful introductions to each article by the Managing Editor of *Foreign Affairs* and a foreword by Hamilton Fish Armstrong.

THE AFRICAN PRESENCE IN WORLD AFFAIRS: NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND ITS ROLE IN FOREIGN POLICY. By Arnold Rivkin. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963, 304 p. $5.95.

The desire for "growth and stability" is seen as the unifying factor in contemporary African states and is treated in both its internal and international setting.

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AFRICA AND WORLD ORDER. Edited by Norman J. Padelford and Rupert Emerson. New York: Praeger, 1963, 152 p. $4.50 (Paper, $1.75).

Originally written for a special issue of *International Organization*, these excellent articles treat various aspects of relations among African countries and between African countries and world organizations such as the Commonwealth and the United Nations.

THE UNITED STATES AND NORTH AFRICA: MOROCCO, ALGERIA, AND TUNISIA. By Charles F. Gallagher. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963, 275 p. $5.50.

Charles Gallagher, long-time Associate in North Africa of the American Universities Field Staff, calls his excellent book a survey. Historical essay, political analysis, social commentary—it is all these things, too, and absolutely first-rate.

LA MONARCHIE MAROCAINE. By Jacques Robert. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit, 1963, 350 p. Fr. 31.90.

A study of government and constitution in modern Morocco.

EDUCATION AND CHANGING WEST AFRICAN CULTURE. By John Wilson. New York: Teachers College, Bureau of Publications, 1963, 125 p. $3.50.

A senior lecturer in the University of London Institute of Education draws from over 25 years' experience in the Education Department of present-day Ghana to present a survey of education in English-speaking Africa and to document the need for an African, not a transplanted European, system of education.

EDUCATION AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE IN AFRICA, AND OTHER ESSAYS. By L. J. Lewis. New York: Nelson, 1963, 128 p. $2.75.

Essays by the Head of the Department of Education in Tropical Areas of the University of London which, somewhat didactic in nature, emphasize the need for coöperation in educational development.

LE DROIT DE LA NATIONALITÉ DES RÉPUBLIQUES FRANCOPHONES D'AFRIQUE ET DE MADAGASCAR. By Alexandre Zatzépine. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit, 1963, 149 p. Fr. 20.

A survey of the various laws pertaining to nationality in French-speaking Africa.

NIGERIAN POLITICAL PARTIES: POWER IN AN EMERGENT AFRICAN NATION. By Richard L. Sklar. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963, 578 p. $12.50.

A valuable, detailed analysis, employing case-study techniques, of party structures and functions in a new state. It is based on close examination of party records as well as more orthodox bibliographical and field research sources.

EDUCATION FOR A DEVELOPING REGION: A STUDY IN EAST AFRICA. By Guy Hunter. London: Allen and Unwin (for Political and Economic Planning and the Institute of Race Relations), 1963, 119 p. 20/.

An invaluable study of manpower needs in East Africa and a survey of the existing sources for manpower training and development.

FREEDOM AND AFTER. By Tom Mboya. Boston: Little, Brown, 1963, 288 p. $5.50.

An autobiography which expresses the attitudes, plans and vision of Africa by one of Kenya's best-known leaders. It merits a place with the earlier works of Nkrumah and other African leaders as a work by a man in a position of power describing the future as he hopes it may develop.

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'MAU MAU' DETAINEE. By Josiah Mwangi Kariuki. New York: Oxford University Press, 1963, 188 p. $4.75.

A record of the experiences of a young Kikuyu detained from 1953 to 1960 as an activist in the Mau Mau movement in Kenya.

SOMALI NATIONALISM: INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND THE DRIVE FOR UNITY IN THE HORN OF AFRICA. By Saadia Touval. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963, 214 p. $4.95.

A political history of the various constituent parts of contemporary Somalia and French Somaliland which gives full emphasis to the Pan-Somali fervor; overly optimistic in its hope for a peaceful resolution of border disputes.

CAMEROON: UNITED NATIONS CHALLENGE TO FRENCH POLICY. By David E. Gardinier. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Institute of Race Relations), 1963, 142 p. $2.50 (Paper).

Undertaken at the instigation of the Institute of Race Relations, this is a study of the development of Cameroon under French trusteeship and the effect of U.N. presence and activity. Descriptive rather than analytical.

OUT IN THE MID-DAY SUN. By Boris Gussman. New York: Oxford University Press, 1963, 179 p. $5.00.

The role and attitudes of the European settler in Central Africa are critically appraised and suggestions put forward for easing interracial tension.

FIN DE LA SOUVERAINETÉ BELGE AU CONGO. By W. J. Ganshof Van der Meersch. Brussels: Institut Royal des Relations Internationales, 1963, 684 p. Belgian Fr. 400.

The Belgian Minister of General Affairs in Africa from May 15 to July 20, 1960, gives a detailed account of the events of those days as well as his reflections on them. Invaluable documentation for this critical period.

I WILL STILL BE MOVED. Edited by Marion Friedmann. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1963, 126 p. $3.95.

Amnesty International has published this superb collection of statements by South Africans who endure apartheid.

THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA AND THE HIGH COMMISSION TERRITORIES. By Lord Hailey. New York: Oxford University Press, 1963, 136 p. $2.90.

A historical survey of relations among the High Commission Territories, the Republic and the British Government.

AN AFRICAN EXPLAINS APARTHEID. By Jordan K. Ngubane. New York: Praeger, 1963, 243 p. $5.50.

An African's view of the African's place under the encroachment of apartheid.

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SOURCE MATERIAL

By Donald Wasson

I. DOCUMENTS

Documents may be procured from the following: *United States:* Gov't Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington 25, D.C. *Great Britain:* British Information Services, Sales Section, 845 3rd Ave., New York 22. *United Nations, International Court of Justice:* United Nations, Sales Section, N.Y.; *United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Org., Food and Agric. Org.:* Columbia University Press, Int. Documents Service, 2960 Broadway, New York 27. *Int. Labor Office:* 1262 New Hampshire Ave., Washington 6, D.C. *European Coal and Steel Community, Economic Community, Euratom:* 808 Farragut Bldg., Washington 6, D.C. Washington imprints are Government Printing Office, and Congressional documents, unless otherwise noted, are for the 88th Congress, 1st Session. London imprints are Her Majesty's Stationery Office, and New York imprints are United Nations, unless otherwise noted.

Africa

Report of the Central Africa Conference, 1963. London, 1963. 16 p. (Cmnd. 2093.) is.3d.

A Review of the natural resources of the African continent. N.Y., Columbia Univ. Press (for UNESCO), 1963. 437 p. (Natural Resources Research, 1.)

The Development of higher education in Africa; report of the Conference on the Development of Higher Education in Africa, Tananarive, 3–12 Sept. 1962. Paris, UNESCO, 1963. 339 p. $7.00.

Official publications of Sierra Leone and Gambia, comp. by A. A. Walker. Washington, Library of Congress, 1963. 92 p. 55 p.

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

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
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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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